A discourse on Althusius: an investigation into Sui Generic constitutionalism by Matthew  R.J. McCullock (7186883)
University Library 
•• Loughborough 
• University 
AuthorlFiling Title ...... Mc.(~J...(.,.D.~"(.'/ .. }.!L ........... .. 
---r Class Mark .................................................................... . 
Please note that fines are charged on ALL 
overdue items. 
~M\~I~~ililiill III I IIIII \ \111 \11" IIIII 

A Discourse on Althusius: An Investigation into Sui Generic 
Constitutionalism 
by 
Matthew McCullock 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the award of 
Ph.D. of Loughborough University 
(20110/05) 
© by Matthew McCullock (2005) 
. ' 
U Ltulhb.roueh 
University 
Pilkington Liltrary 
Date A Ll!\ 2006 
Class 
-r 
~~ oLt-D~n&2g~ 
Abstract 
This thesis aims at furthering our understanding of the constitutional structures and 
processes of sui generic associations such as the European Union. The thesis argues 
that the problematical constitutionalisation of the European Union has highlighted the 
limitations of the political thought that has served as the basis of political 
associationalism since the Treaty ofWestphalia (1648) and the publication of Thomas 
Hobbes' Leviathan (1651). These limitations have resulted in the European Union 
being described, for want of a better expression, as sui generis. The thesis advances 
the argument that in order to be in a position to understand constitutional relations in a 
'non-statal' setting, what is needed is an alternative variant of political thought that is 
not based in or dependent on the societas canon that originates with Hobbes. One 
source of such political thought can be located in the work of Johannes Althusius 
(1557-1638) who, writing in the city of Emden in the Holy Roman Empire in the early 
17th Century, described a constitutional structure of a political association that differs 
in significant features to the centralised state theories of the societas canon. 
The thesis also argues that the traditional concepts of constitutionalism and political 
association applied to sui generic constitutionalism are hampered by the inherent 
weaknesses of modem political and legal vocabulary. Despite being used ad 
infinitum in the constitutional discussions on the European Union, there is not a 
precise definition of either the term 'constitution' or treaty' in political or legal theory. 
Althusius' work avoids this weakness, due to the fact that the centralised state does 
not enjoy the same position it does in the societas canon, and so the need to classify 
'intra' or 'inter' state relationships does not exist to the same degree. 
While taking the European Union as a workable model of a sui generic association, 
this thesis does not aim at solving the European Union's constitutional problems or 
offering a more suitable term to describe its nature. Rather, based on an analysis of 
Althusius' work, the thesis aims to offer an alternative understanding of the problems 
that result from the constitutionalisation of sui generic associations. 
Key Words: Johannes Althusius, Thomas Hobbes, Edvard Kardelj, sui generic 
associations, constitutions, social contract, sovereignty, federalism, European 
Union 
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"Men nearly always follow the tracks made by others and proceed in their affairs by 
imitation, even though they cannot entirely keep to the tracks of others or emulate the 
prowess of their models. So a prudent man should always follow in the footsteps of 
great men and imitate those who have been outstanding. If his own prowess fails to 
compare to theirs, at least it has an air of greatness about it. He should behave like 
those archers who, if they are skilful, when the target seems too distant, know the 
capabilities of their bow and aim a good deal higher than their objective, not in order 
to shoot high but so that by aiming high they can reach their target" 
Machiavelli The Prince: 49 
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Introduction 
Classical political theory, for example, by which I mean the kind of political 
theory traditionally taught to students of politics and history, the kind that 
begins with Machiavelli or Hobbes and ends somewhere in the nineteenth 
century, seemed to be of little direct help in comprehending the process by 
which states unite with one another after the fashion of the Treaty of Rome. 
Murray Forsyth 1981: ix-x 
Recent attempts to constitutionalise sui generic associations such as the European 
Union (EU), have largely failed to achieve their aims: namely, to get to grips with the 
'nature of the beast'. One consequence of these failures has been to highlight the 
weaknesses of contemporary constitutional theory when applied to a non-statal or sui 
generic association. There are three main aspects to these weaknesses. First, the 
constitution is a by-product of the creation of the 'modem state', which began to 
emerge in Reformation Europe and was consolidated by the Treaty of Westphalia 
(1648). Consequently, to apply a 'state dependent' concept to a sui generic 
association is akin to a taking 'fish out of water'. Second, the use of the 'constitution' 
in unfamiliar political associations is further weakened by the nature of the 
vocabulary of contemporary political thought. The argument that constitutions are the 
basis of states, while treaties are the basis of international organisations is still 
prevalent in political theory. While correct, this stance nevertheless overlooks two 
related factors: first, there is no common definition for either term; second, what 
happens if the political association has evolved from a traditional international 
organisation, but will never evolve into a 'traditional' state; as is the case of the EU? 
Or what if an association is purposefully founded, but neither as an international 
organisation or a state? The limited nature of political vocabulary results in there 
being insufficient terms to describe the structure of the sui generic association. 
Third, the understanding of sui generic constitutionalism is laden by the nature of 
political theory. The vocabulary and practices that are the basis of modem political 
activity originated in a political canon, or collection of political thinkers, that began 
with Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan (1651) and culminated in Thomas Paine's The 
Rights of Man (1791-2). Consequently, 'non-statal' or sui generic political theories 
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are often viewed as utopian or trivial, as they do not reflect the dominant trends of 
political theory. 
The aim of this thesis is to further the revival of lohannes Althusius' Politica 
Methodice Digesta, Atque Exemplis Sacris Et Profanis Illustrata1 (1603) (Politica), as 
in this work can be found a comprehensive and coherent model of constitutionalism 
that was written before the dominance of the modem state. The thesis will offer a 
contribution to the study of Althusius, who has in the late 20th Century experienced 
increased attention from scholars (Hueglin 1999, Camey 1995, Elazar 1995a). This 
'revival' can either be viewed in relation to the search for constitutional understanding 
of sui generic associations, such as the EU, or in the wider context of the 
'rediscovery' of medievae political thought. As Nederman argues: 
... large numbers of previously unknown or unavailable texts have been edited 
or translated, surprising new connections have been uncovered, and entirely 
fresh lines of interpretation have been explored. Scholarly interest in 
medieval topics has been stimulated, in particular, by growing recognition that 
we must abandon a strict division between 'medieval' and 'modem' political 
mentalities (1996: 180). 
Although taking the EU as an example of a sui generic association, the thesis will not 
solely focus on contributing to the increasing literature on the constitutionalisation of 
the EU. Rather, using Politica as a guide, the thesis will present a theoretical system 
of constitutionalism that can be used to understand sui generic associations, of which 
the EU is a prime example. 
The Constitutionalisation of the European Union 
The European Union has undergone a continual process of constitutionalisation since 
its initial inception in the Schuman Plan (1950): indeed, the initial years of the 
I Politics Methodically Set Forth, and Illustrated with Sacred and Profane Examples. 
2 Although 'medieval' is used in the existing literature, the author's preference for the period in which 
Althusius wrote would be 'Reformation' or 'late-Reformation', as the term 'medieval' can be used to 
include history from centuries before. In this way, 'late-Reformation' reflects the precise few decades 
in the late 16th and early 17th Century, in which Politica was written. 
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European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), saw constitutional progression, the like 
of which was not seen again until the Laeken Declaration (1999) announced a 
Constitutional Convention was to be convened to write a constitution for the 
European Union. As Figure I shows, in the period from 1948 to 1955, the leading 
European nations: Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, discussed issues ranging from customs union to the creation of a 
European Army. Although this constitutional process was principally stopped by the 
French Prime Minister, Paul Mendes France's refusal to discuss the European 
Political Community treaty in the French Parliament,3 valuable lessons were learnt in 
the drafting of the Treaties of Rome, which led to the creation of the European 
Economic Community. 
The next 'round' of constitutionalism came in the mid-1960s, when the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) published two rulings that were to fundamentally alter the legal 
foundations of the EC. Ironically, Alter, quoting Weiler, notes that much of the 
landmark cases occurred 'at the same time that member states were scaling back the 
supranational pretensions of the Treaty of Rome and reasserting national prerogatives' 
(Alter 1998: 128): but, it must be noted here that in this early period the ECJ decision, 
although bold, were cautious; "Although bold in doctrinal rhetoric, the ECJ made sure 
that the political impact was minimal in terms of both financial consequences and 
political consequences" (Alter 1998: 131). The two most important decisions at this 
time were the Van Gend en Loos and the Costa v. Enel cases.4 
The ECJ, in the Van Gend en Loos case, found that the EEC law gave rise to 
individual rights, which could be invoked, in national courts. Interestingly, this 
decision could not have been derived from specific provisions of the Treaties 
(Douglas-Scott 2002: 282). Karen Alter continues 'the ECJ was not designed as a tool 
for domestic actors to challenge national policies; these powers the ECJ created for 
itself' (1996: 491). 
3 By 1954, all countries except France had both signed and ratified the Treaty European Political 
Community; Mendes France's refusal to discuss the treaty in the French Parliament meant that France 
could not ratify the treaty. 
4 These have been discussed in greater detail elsewhere and will only be briefly covered here. See 
Renaud Dehousse The European Court of Justice (1998) Chapter 2, Sionaidh Douglas-Scot! 
Constitutional Law of the European Union (2002) Chapters 7 & 8, Anthony Amull The European 
Union and its Court of Justice (1999) Chapter 3 & 4, and A.W. Green Political Integration by 
Jurisprudence (1969) Chapter 5 & 6. 
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Figure 1: European 'Constitutional' Activity 1948-1955 
Year Treatyilliscussion Purpose of Discussion 
1948 BENELUX Treaty Facilitate free flow of goods between Belgium, 
The Netherlands and Luxembourg 
1948 Brussels Treaty Established the Western Union Treaty of 
economic, social and cultural collaboration and 
collective defence 
1950 Stikker Plan Plan of action for European economic integration 
1950 Mansholt Plan European Collaboration on Agriculture 
1950 Pleven Plan On the Creation of a European Army 
1950 Schuman Declaration French proposal to place Franco-German coal and 
steel production under a common High Authority 
1951 Paris Treaty Established European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) 
1952 Luxembourg Resolution Adopted by ECSC Foreign Minister concerning 
the drafting of a Treaty constituting a European 
Political Community 
1952 European Defence Treaty to establish a European Army 
Community 
1953 European Political Designed to democratically control the European 
Community Defence Community 
1954 Paris Protocols to the Western Union Treaty becomes the Western 
Brussels Treaty European Union, as West Germany and Italy join 
1955 Messina Declaration Launched negotiations that led to the Treaties of 
Rome 
Source: the author 
In the Costa case, the Court established the Supremacy of Community law over that 
of Member States; this meant that 'Community laws could trump national laws, even 
if the latter were constitutional entrenched'. Weiler, in a similar vein to Douglas-
Scott, argues that the Court acted beyond its sphere of competences, as there is no 
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supremacy clause specified in the Treaties (1994: 514). Weiler continues on to 
explain the full impact of the two decisions in tandem: 
... in the Community because of the doctrine of supremacy, the EC norm, 
which by the doctrine of direct effect must be regarded as part of the law of 
the land, will prevail... The combination of the two doctrines means that the 
Community norms that produce direct effect are not merely the law of the 
land, but the "higher law" of the land (Weiler 1994: 514). 
What is also important is the principle of 'preliminary ruling' in which national courts 
ask the Court for an initial advice. This principle, coupled with the two other 
doctrines not only enabled the Court to transform the preliminary ruling procedure 
from a mechanism designed to allow individuals and national courts to question EC 
law, into a mechanism for individuals to challenge national law (Alter 1996: 472. 
Emphasis in original), but also meant that by using the two doctrines as legal crutches, 
the Court does not exceed its authority by reviewing the compatibility of national law 
with EU law (Alter 1998: 126). This procedure also meant that the 'battle to reassert 
national government control then involves harnessing national courts and not just a 
supranational court than can be cast as 'foreign' (Heisenberg & Richmond 2002: 
207). 
The EC] was allowed to act as 'political entrepreneur' (Heisenberg & Richmond 
2002: 206), due to vague reference to the Court's powers in the Rome Treaty. This 
coupled with the limited relationship between the Court and national and sub national 
courts have allowed the Court to an even greater extent to 'fill in the gaps'. More 
importantly by defining these 'grey areas' the Court has been able to retain the right 
to determine their scope. In effect, an organ of the sui generic association now 
reserves to itself the power to determine the extent of its power to define the conduct 
parameters of all subordinate entities. 
The importance of these decisions is that it took the constitutional initiative away 
from the Member States, and placed it with the EC] and national courts. While there 
was rhetoric from Member States about the actions of the EC],s the decisions, coupled 
'The then French President, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, called on the Council to do something about the 
'European Court and its illegal decisions' (Brown & Kennedy 1994: 371), and one unnamed British 
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with the increasing promotion of EC law to sub-national courts, meant that 
increasingly sub national (and increasingly national) courts spoke EC law, but 
remained national courts. In this manner, while governments can relatively easily 
ignore the rulings of international tribunals: 
... an ECl decision now meant disobeying national courts, and all the 
enforcement power of the national courts could be used in the enforcement of 
EC law (Alter 1996: 460). 
The next major constitutional event of the EC was the Draft Constitution written by 
Alterio Spinneli (1984). Whilst Spinelli's fellow European Parliamentarians warmly 
received the Draft Constitution, the nature of the document appears to have been too 
radical in terms of power transferral for the Member States. Whether Spinelli 
seriously expected the Constitution to adopted is open to contention, but it did act as a 
focal point for both the European institutions and Member States, and this is reflected 
in the fact that many of the Constitutions features, such as European citizenship and 
the institutionalisation of the principle ofsubsidiarity, were subsequently adapted into 
the Maastricht Treaty (1992). 
The most recent period of constitutionalism covered the period from 2002 to 2005, 
and included the Enlargement of 2004, the European Constitutional Convention, the 
European Council negotiations on the text the convention produced, and the 
subsequent ratification process. While the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by 
the French and Dutch electorate represented a postponement of the constitutional 
process, it also highlighted three theoretical problems associated with 
constitutionalising such a sui generic association: firstly, the sporadic nature of the 
EU constitutional history means that it is difficult to trace a continual process. What is 
more, even during times of constitutional 'idleness'; when there are no obvious 
significant changes, there are subtle changes occurring 'behind the scenes', that may 
have a significant affect on the community's structure or everyday processes; 
secondly, there is a lack of a definition of the EU, and as will be discussed in Chapter 
Three, the failure to identify or define the actors in any political process leads to 
confusion, and this is replicated in the EU constitutionalism to date; thirdly, whilst the 
MP stated that a ruling of the Court 'had set aside the British constitution as we have understood it for 
several hundred years' (in Alter 1996: 474). 
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EU exists, but nobody can produce a convincing definition to explain its political 
structure, due to the limitations of the contemporary statal political theory in a sui 
generic setting. While the thesis does not propose to address the former, it does 
propose that using a constitutional theory that is not dependent on contemporary 
theory will address many of the problems caused by the latter: and this proposal is 
increasingly reflected in the EU constitutional literature as authors attempt to define 
alternative approaches to overcome these limitations. 
Alternative Approaches to Constitutionalism in the Literature 
Due to its predominance in the contemporary political arena, the majority of 
alternative approaches to constitutionalism have focused on redressing the 
constitutional issues of the EU, but this is not to say that alternative approaches are 
confined to the EU. Indeed, due to its 'detachment' from the specifics of the EU 
debate, Tully's Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (1995), 
appears to go to the very source the problems of contemporary constitutionalism: 
What we need to understand today is the extent to which the solutions 
advanced by Hobbes and the other modem theorists of constitutionalism are 
now part of the problem ... hence, to overcome the partiality of the inherited 
language of modem constitutionalism we need to retrace our steps, recover the 
arguments the modem theorists used to set this imposing edifice in place ... 
(1995: 15 & 59). 
In the literature of the constitutionalisation of the EU, there are two arguments that 
encapsulate a similar position: Joseph Weiler's (1999: 27) and Neil Walker's (2003: 
27) 'problems of translation'; and Jo Shaw's concept of 'post-national 
constitutionalism'. (1999: 581-582) The fundamental aspect of both is the problems 
that arise from 'translating' statal constitutionalism onto the EU arena. As Shaw 
argues 
... such attempts to match theory and reality have quickly demonstrated that 
constitutionalist ideas and thinking are not capable of simple transmission to 
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the supranational level, without considering how many of the conditions 
underpinning them at national level are changed by the shift in register (1999: 
586). 
The problem identified here is one of adapting statist constitutionalist theory in order 
for it to be of relevance for the EU. In his discussion on 'translation', Neil Walker 
notes two positions. The first he terms 'refuseniks', who are those authors who view 
... constitutionalism as a state-centred idea in terms of its historical 
elaboration, preconditions of a settled political community and symbolic 
associations ... [and so] would reject the transposition of constitutionalism to 
non-state contexts as illegitimate, and perhaps impossible (Walker 2003: 28). 
In contrast, the second group Walker identifies are those who have a tendency to: 
... measure many of the supposed shortcomings of post-state associations such 
as 'deficits of democracy, legitimacy, accountability, equality and security' in 
terms of a statist template and against the benchmark of a (real or imagined) 
statist standard (Ibid: 30). 
One concurrent thread in both sides of the debate is the view that the state is the 
predominant mode of political association. However, Walker argues that the issue of 
translation 'requires us to demonstrate that there is something of value in our statist 
constitutional heritage that is worth preserving and applying to the non-state context 
of political organisation'. (Ibid: 32) Subsequent authors writing on the EU have 
explored this challenge. Dehousse, addressing the idea of representative democracy, 
notes that 'this model is analytically weak, and normatively ill-adapted to the 
specificity of the European Union'. (2003: 136) Poiares Maduro, in tackling the issue 
of constitutionalism, argues that: "in many respects, the problems of the European 
Constitution are simply reflections of the limits of national constitutionalism that we 
have for long ignored" (2003: 75). 
While Walker concentrates on the issues of translation, Shaw focuses on identifying 
the weakness of the process of applying statal constitutionalism to the EU and argues 
that there needs to be: 
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.. .inquiries into alternative state fonns of participation and representation 
which examine the roles of the states and sub-state associations such as 
regions, the 'people' themselves, as well as intennediate representative 
associations such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), trade unions 
and finns (1999: 581-582. Emphasis mine). 
The resemblance to Daniel Elazar's paradigm of shifting post-national federalism 
(I 995b) in this definition is striking. In this paradigm there is a shift from "a world 
modelled after the concept of the nation-state developed in the seventeenth century to 
a world of reduced state sovereignty and increasingly constitutionalised interstate 
linkages of a federal character" (Watts 2000: 166). The resemblance here is that both 
Shaw and Elazar recognise both the constitutional role of sub- or non-state actors and 
that representation contains a non-territorial aspect, that is, that individuals do not 
have to be represented solely in territorial tenns. 
Having identified the inadequacy of statal constitutional theory in explaining the 
constitutional nature of the sui generic association, in this case the EU, this thesis 
proposes to elaborate on the political writings of AIthusius in order to be able to offer 
a theory of constitutionalism that can be used to describe and help our understanding 
of sui generic associations. To achieve this aim, it is important to define the 
theoretical actors and concepts that will feature in our discussion. 
The Statal or Societas canon 
Traditional constitutional theory is derived from a canon of political thinkers linking 
Thomas Hobbes in 1651 to Thomas Paine in 1791. These dates are offered as 
representing the beginning and end of the canon, as after this time constitutional 
theory began to give way to constitutional practice, in that, as we shall see in 
Chapters Two and Four, the French and US revolutions used the theory of this canon 
to solve their respective constitutional questions. Thereafter, a significant proportion 
of constitutional problems facing other countries and sui generic associations have 
been solved, not by turning to political theory directly, but by referring to and 
adapting features of existing constitutional models. 
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The spectrum of authors from Hobbes to Paine will be called the societas canon, 
which is a description borrowed from a traditional distinction between two opposing 
forms of political association: societas and universitas. The use of these terms can be 
found throughout much of medieval history, but in this context, they are based on the 
distinction initially made by Otto von Gierke (1841-1921), who identified societas 
and universitas as two forms of association in the 'pre-modern' or medieval era. 
Most recently, Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990) refined this distinction by arguing that 
due to' their use in the Middle Ages these terms 'came to represent two exclusively 
alternative interpretations of a state, such that to cleave to the one was to reject the 
other' (1975: 200). 
The societas mode of association was ruthlessly individualistic and absolutist, 
favoured by rulers seeking to remove all challenges to their authority. By contrast, 
the universitas mode of association was communal, consensual and protective of its 
members (O'Sullivan 2000: 135). Of significance to this thesis, and an explanation for 
the dominance of the societas canon, is the argument that the communal life of the 
universitas was destroyed by the increasing predominance of societas contractarian 
forms of association, and especially by the idea of the state as a contractual grouping 
(O'Sullivan 2000: 141) that began to be exemplified in the Reformation era in 
Western Europe. 
The societas mode of association was associated with the social contract treatises of 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and also writers such as 
Niccolo Machiavelli, Spinoza, Montesquieu, de Tocqueville, Burke, Paine, Kant, 
Fichte and Hegel, while the universitas authors were typified by the writings of 
Calvin, Bacon, St. Simon and more recently Marx and Lenin (parekh 1979: 498). The 
two canons, first, reflect the historical victory of the societas conception of the 'state'; 
where one canon ends, the second one begins. Secondly, Althusius does not appear in 
either canon, although he can be viewed as the rearguard of the universitas canon,6 
6 Not only does Althusius use the term Universitas with reference to community or city, (Politico: 39-
40) but also he 'does not attribute systematic importance to the word Societas, probably because of its 
individualistic connotations' (Friedrich 1932: Ixxxiv). 
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since we shall see that Politica represents the last comprehensive universitas model, 
before the societas authors became dominant. 7 
Figure 2: Diagrammatical representation of AIthusius v. the Societas canon 
Social Contract 'Modem' constitutionalism 
Sovereignty Federalism 
• I 
1568 1603 1651 1690 1752 1762 1787-9 1790 1791 
Bodin Hobbes Locke Hurne Rousseau Publius Burke Paine 
- Althusius 
Key: 
The Societas canon. 
AIthusius v. The Societas Canon 
Although pitting one man against an entire canon can be viewed as a grandiose 
ambition, the enterprise becomes more realistic when the overall approach of 
Althusius' work is recognised, a fact not overlooked by analysts of Althusius' 
writings. Thomas Hueglin claims that in Politica, Althusius covered the three main 
'constitutional' issues of the societas authors namely: sovereignty, the social contract 
and federalism. Indeed, Hueglin argues that Althusius composed a thorough working 
definition of sovereignty almost half a century before the celebrated Leviathan of 
Thomas Hobbes. In this way, and as can be seen in figure 2, the comprehensive 
7 This thesis does recognise the role played by Marxism in the latter half of the 20" Century as a form 
of political association, but the 'victory' of the West in the Cold War reinforced the dominance of the 
societas canon. 
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nature of Althusius' discussion in Politica enables us to compare one man's work 
against an entire canon of thought. 
The Theoretical Basis of the 'State': The Societas 'Scientific Approach' v. the 
Althusian 'Natural Approach' 
Inspired largely by Hobbes' rejection of Aristotle's method of political thinking, and 
reflecting the academic backgrounds of the early societas thinkers, the societas canon 
adopted a 'scientific approach' to the understanding of politics. As we shall see in 
Chapter Three, Hobbesian and post-Hobbesian discussions started with a 'state of 
nature', not because this was the state of man in pre-political times, but because it 
represented a descriptive tool with which to argue for the theoretical foundation of the 
state. Likewise, the social contract represented a logical manner in which individuals 
could come to an agreement to form an association, which in this case was the state. 
In this scientific approach, 'man,8 through the social contract, agreed with others to 
form the state, which provided a framework in which each individual actor could 
make autonomous decisions. Although this individualism was championed by 
Hobbes, it is also evident in the work of Locke, Rousseau, the Publius authors, Burke 
and Paine. In opposition to this 'scientific individualism', the universitas authors 
developed the Aristotelian view of man as a Zoon Politikon, whereby man could only 
realise himself within the confines of naturally occurring groups (such as the family) 
or political groupings (such as the guild etc.) Althusius takes this argument to its 
logical extreme: 
The commonwealth, or civil society, exists by nature, and that man is by 
nature a civil animal who strives eagerly for association. If, however, anyone 
wishes not to live in society, or needs nothing because of his own abundance, 
he is not considered a part of the commonwealth. He is therefore either a beast 
or a god, as Aristotle asserts (Politica: 25). 
• The gender bias in political theory will be discussed later in the chapter - see pp. 23-26. 
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Ultimately, however, by the time of the French Revolution, this communitarian view 
of society had been attacked to such an extent that 'the medieval notion of a society 
made of smaller societies was utterly discredited' (Riley 1976: 16). 
It is apparent that Althusius' work cannot simply be transposed onto the modem 
world. Politica was written in 1603, with further editions in 1610 and 1614, and 
Europe in this period differs fundamentally from Europe at the beginning of the 21 st 
century. Consequently, any interpretation of Althusius will need to take into account 
certain methodological issues, which will be addressed below. 
Methodological Issues 
Vocabulary Used in Politica 
The first issue revolves around the vocabulary used by Althusius in Po/Wca. Whilst 
some contemporary words, such as 'city', 'senate' or 'confederation' are used, they 
are done so in a specific context, which changes the meaning of the word. In 
addition, the issues of the Holy Roman Empire and the Latin language need to be 
borne in mind. Politica was greatly influenced by the structure of the Holy Roman 
Empire, and many of the terms in Politica, such as 'nobility', 'burghers' and 'ephors' 
reflect this fact. With regards to the Latin language, it must be remembered that 
although the edition of Politica used in this thesis is an abridged translation, many of 
the original Latin terms remain. Due to these factors, it is paramount to offer a 
definition of the key terms that will be used in the thesis, in order to avoid confusion. 
Consociatio: 
Symbiotic: 
The subject matter of politics is therefore association 
(consociatio), in which the symbiotes pledge themselves each 
to the other, by explicit or tacit agreement, to mutual 
communication of whatever is useful and necessary for the 
harmonious exercise of social life (Politica: 17). 
Politics is the art of associating (consociandi) men for the 
purpose of establishing, cultivating, and conserving social life 
among them (Politica: 17). 
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Symbiote 
(symbiotici): 
Symbiosis: 
Simple and private 
Association (family 
& guild); 
The family (Natural 
simple & private 
Are co-workers who, by the bond of an associating and uniting 
agreement, communicate among themselves whatever is 
appropriate for a comfortable life of soul and body. In other 
words, they are participants or partners in a common life 
(Politica: 19). 
Living Together (Politica: 17). 
A society and symbiosis initiated by a special covenant 
(pactum) among the members for the purpose of bringing 
together and holding in common a particular interest (quid 
peculiare) (Politica; 27). 
consociation): An association in which married persons, blood relatives, and 
Conjugal 
association: 
in-laws, in response to a natural affection and necessity, agree 
to a definite communication among themselves (Politica: 28). 
There are two types; the first is conjugal (conjugalis), and the 
second is kinship (propinqua) (Politica: 29). 
An association in which the husband and wife, who are bound 
each to the other, communicate the advantages and 
responsibilities of married life (Politica: 29). 
Kinship association: An association in which relatives and in-laws are united for the 
Collegium, guild 
or corporation (civil 
simple & private 
purpose of communicating advantages and responsibilities 
(Politica: 30). 
Consociation): An association in which "three or more men of the same trade, 
The Community 
training, or profession are united for the purpose of holding in 
common such things as they jointly profess as duty, way oflife, 
or craft" (Politica: 34). 
(Public Association): The public association exists when many private associations 
are linked together for the purpose of establishing an inclusive 
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City (civitas): 
Free City: 
Municipal City: 
Mixed City: 
Metropolis: 
Prefect or superior 
political order (politeuma). It can be called a community 
(universitas), an associated body, or the pre-eminent political 
association (Politica: 39). 
It is formed by fixed laws and composed of many families and 
collegia living in the same place. It is elsewhere called a city 
(civitas) in the broadest sense, or a body of many and diverse 
associations (Politica: 40). Furthermore, this community is 
either rural or urban. An urban community is composed of 
those who practice industrial functions and pursuits while 
living an urban life (Politica: 42). A rural community is 
composed of those who cultivate the fields and exercise rural 
functions (Politica: 41). 
A community of citizens dwelling in the same urban area 
(urbs), and content with the same communication and 
govemment. (Politica: 42). May either be free, municipal, 
mixed or metropolitan (Politica: 45). 
Recognises as its immediate superior the supreme magistrate, 
and is free from the rule of other princes, dukes, and counts 
(Politica: 45). 
A city subject to a territorial lord. It recognises a superior other 
than the supreme magistrate (Politica: 45). 
Recognises partly the emperor and partly a duke or count as its 
superior, and enjoys both imperial and provincial privileges 
(Politica: 45). 
The mother of other cities that it brings forth as colonies, or 
because it is pre-eminent among them and is recognised by 
them as a mother by whom they are ruled and defended as 
children. The metropolis is therefore a large and populous city 
(Politica: 45-46). 
of the city: The administrator and leader of the citizens, having authority 
and power over individuals by general mandate of the 
organised community, but not over the group (Politica: 42). 
15 
The Senate: 
The senatorial 
Collegium: 
The Rural Community 
Hamlet (vicus): 
Village (pagus): 
A collegium of wise and honest select men to whom is 
entrusted the care and administration of the affairs of the city. 
This collegium, when legitimately convoked, represents the 
entire people and the whole city. It does not, however, have as 
much power, authority, and jurisdiction as the community, 
unless it is given such by law (lex) or covenant (Politica: 43). 
Composed of the president and senators, the collegium binds 
itself by oath at the beginning of its administration to the 
prescribed articles of administration, and collectively fulfills 
the functions of the entrusted office (Politica: 42). 
A settlement of a few houses situated around a small open 
place (Politica: 41). 
Consists of two or more hamlets without fortifications or 
surrounding wall (Politica: 41). 
Town (oppidum): A larger village girded and fortified by a ditch, stockade, or 
wall (Politica: 41). 
Province, region, 
district, diocese, or 
community The 
particular public 
Association: Contains within its territory many villages, towns, outposts, and 
Nobility (status 
nobilitatis) Burghers 
(status civitatum) 
Agrarians (status 
cities united under the communion and administration of one 
right Ous) (Politica: 51). 
Agrariorum): The three levels of secular estate identified within the province 
Universal Public 
Association 
(consociatio 
universalis) : 
(Politica: 60). 
Is a polity in the fullest sense, an imperium, realm, 
commonwealth, and people united in one body by the 
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Mutual 
Communication: 
Communication of 
agreement of many symbiotic associations and particular 
bodies, and brought together under one right (Politica: 66). 
A sharing, making common. Involves (I) things, (2) services, 
and (3) common rights (jura) by which the numerous and 
various needs of each and every symbiote are supplied, the self-
sufficiency and mutuality of life and human society are 
achieved, and social life is established and conserved (Politica: 
19). 
Things (res): The bringing of useful and necessary goods to the social life by 
Communication of 
the symbiotes for the common advantage of the symbiotes 
individually and collectively (Politica: 19). 
Services (operae): The contributing by the symbiotes of their labors and 
occupations for the sake of social life (Politica: 19). 
Communication of 
Right (jus): The process by which the symbiotes live and are ruled by just 
Lex Communis: 
Lex Propiae: 
Zunftbilcher: 
laws in a common life among themselves (Politica: 19). Also 
called the law of Association and Symbiosis (Lex consocationis 
et symbioticum) or the symbiotic right (Jus symbioticum) and 
consists of common law (lex communis) and proper law (lex 
propriae). 
Unchanging law that indicates that in every association and 
type of symbiosis some persons are rulers (heads, overseers, 
prefects) or superiors, others are subjects or inferiors (Politica: 
20). 
Those enactments by which particular associations are ruled. 
They differ in each specie of association according as the 
nature of each requires (Politica: 21-22). 
The corporate book of a collegium in which the covenants and 
laws (pacta et leges) of the colleagues relating to the 
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Jus regni: 
Jus majestatis: 
Jus majestatis 
et regni: 
Posestas regni: 
Covenant(s): 
Ephors: 
communication of things, services, right, and mutual 
benevolence are described (Politica: 34-35). 
The right of the realm (Politica: 66). Also called the; 
The right of sovereignty (Politica: 69). 
The rights of sovereignty and of the realm (Politica: 71). 
The power of the realm (Politica: 71). 
The basic agreement of an association. In Politica examples 
are offered for the covenants that establish the association, such 
as the family 'special covenant (pactum), (Politica: 27) or the 
Collegium (Politica: 34-35), the covenants of which are held in 
the Zunjibucher. The term is also used to denote the contract 
that mandates of the rulers, such as the Supreme Magistrate 
'(contractum mandati)' (Politica: 121). 
One of the two kinds of the Administrators of this universal 
association, the Ephors are the representatives of the 
commonwealth or universal association to whom, by the 
consent of the people associated in a political body, the 
supreme responsibility has been entrusted for employing its 
power and right in constituting the supreme magistrate and in 
assisting him with aid and counsel in the activities of the 
associated body (Politica: 99). Ephors can either be permanent 
(rendered hereditary by the consent of the universal 
association) or temporal. Permanent Ephors have their 
responsibility so assigned to them that they may even transfer it 
to their heirs. Temporary Ephors, on the other hand, perform 
this office for a prescribed time only, after which they lay it 
aside (PoIWca: 115-116). 
Supreme Magistrate: He who, having been constituted according to the laws (leges) 
of the universal association for its welfare and utility, 
administers its rights (jura) and commands compliance with 
them (Politica: 120). 
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Confederation: The augmentation and extension of the goods of the associated 
body is accomplished through confederation or association with 
others, or through other legitimate means and titles. In such a 
confederation other realms, provinces, cities, villages, or towns 
are received into and associated with the communion and 
society of the one body. By their admission, the body of the 
universal association is extended, and made stronger and more 
secure (Politica: 89). 
Confederation with a foreign people or another body is either complete or partial. 
(Politica: 89) 
Complete 
Confederation 
(Plena consociatio 
& confederatio): A confederation in which a foreign realm, province, or any 
Partial 
Confederation 
(Non-plena 
confederatio & 
consociatio): 
other universal association, together with its inhabitants, are 
fully and integrally co-opted and admitted into the right and 
communion of the realm by a communicating of its 
fundamental laws and right of sovereignty. To the extent that 
they coalesce and are united into one and the same body they 
become members of that one and same body (Politica: 89-90). 
A confederation in which various realms or provinces, while 
reserving their rights of sovereignty, solemnly obligate 
themselves one to the other by a treaty or covenant made 
preferably for a fixed period of time. Such a partial 
confederation is for the purpose of conducting mutual defense 
against enemies, for extending trust and cultivating peace and 
friendship among themselves, and for holding common friends 
and enemies, with a sharing of expenses (Politica: 90). 
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Modern Intemretations of Politica 
The second methodological issue focuses on the methodology of exploring and 
understanding any political text. In any such document, there are two foci: the author, 
or the society in which it was written. The first approach focusing on the author, and 
termed the Cambridge School by John Dunn, argues that 'the key to understanding 
every such text, is the fact that it was the product of a human author and focuses 
accordingly on the preoccupations and purposes that led the author to compose it at all 
and to do just as they did' (1996: 19). 
The second, or Marxist approach emphasises the importance of societal influences in 
the fact that it: " ... stresses aspects of the historical society in which the text was 
composed, of which the author may not have been perfectly aware, but which 
prompted him to think and express themselves as they did" (Ibid: 20). 
There is a third approach that fuses the Cambridge and Marxist approachs, treating the 
text with indifference and as a repository of potential intellectual stimulation for a 
contemporary reader, and permitting themselves to respond accordingly, just as the 
fancy takes them (Ibid). In other words, the interpretation is dependent on the 
normative aspirations of the reader, who will borrow or use arguments out of context 
in order to support their original hypothesis, here Dunn identifies four key questions 
that need to be asked of the text: 
1. What did the author mean by his text? 
2. What does the text show about the author's own society? 
3. What has the text meant to others reading it then or subsequently, and why 
has it meant that and not something else? 
4. What do the great texts of the hist0!Y of political theory mean today and 
mean for us? (Ibid.) 
These questions are especially relevant to the study of Althusius. The first two 
questions, for example, presuppose a level of empathy. If Politica is approached from 
a present day stance, then it appears to be dated and thus offer little to a discussion on 
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sui generic constitutionalism; yet such a stance fails to take into account the 
theoretical and practical influences that were evident on Althusius during his life. 
Instead, it is essential to present Politica in the historical context of being written 
before the dominance of the state, in order to be able to understand its significance. 
Questions three and four also raise interesting topics. Due the dominance of the 
societas state, alternative models of political association have either been forgotten or 
relegated to the league of Utopianism, and, thus Althusius has been largely forgotten 
by traditional political thought. Indeed, it was due to the work of Otto von Gierke and 
Carl Friedrich that Althusius' thought was revived and came to be discussed in 
relation to other political theorists, such as Bodin, Hobbes and Rousseau. This 
forgotten nature of Althusius is reflected in the fact that Politica has not been 
completely translated into any modem language. Portions have been translated for 
private work by individual authors, and the Johannes-Althusius-Gesellschaft e.V. 
have recently translated parts of Politica into German, but the most widely used 
version in Frederick Carney's abridged translation into English (1964 & 1995). It is 
possible to identify six major reasons as to why Politica has been forgotten: infancy, 
time, relevance, theoretical originality, language and methodology, but these will be 
explored in greater detail in next chapter. 
The final question asked by Dunn will be addressed throughout the thesis, and has 
also been addressed by several authors. In discussing the federalism of Althusius, 
both Elazar and Hueglin argue that despite writing 400 years ago, Politica offers great 
potential to current understanding of political theory, by offering an alternative 
understanding of political association, due to its ability to acknowledge the individual, 
but in relation to the different groupings in a society, and also its ability to 
accommodate sub-state and non-geographical representation. 
The Structure and Content of Politica 
The third methodological issue that must be addressed is the structure and content of 
Politica. As Althusius did not leave behind a model of his constitutional thought, any 
subsequent representation of Politica is a normative interpretation and so open to 
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methodological criticisms. Although in the most recent abridged edition of Politica 
(1995) there is a diagram entitled 'Politica, A Schema by Johannes Althusius' 
(Politica: lviii-lvix), this differs considerably from a structural diagram. The purpose 
of the 'schema' is to simplify the structure of Politica, and its main headings concern 
the principal discussion points of the book including 'the subject matter of politics, 
types of associations, administration of symbiotic right and types of administration 
(Ibid.). Although this is a useful tool in understanding Politica, it cannot be taken to 
represent the organisational structure Politica proposes. 
One possible explanation for the lack of a diagram, is that Althusius was far more 
concerned with the procedural aspect of the association, than with the specific 
composition of the different levels of association. Indeed, this fact is also reflected in 
Politica itself, where a significant proportion of the discussion is devoted to 
organisational issues, such as the efficient and legitimate running of the different 
associations, how the leaders of the associations are elected and the roles and 
responsibilities they exercise. The composition of each office or level of association 
will depend on individual circumstances. 
Despite the logical nature of Politica, confusion arises when a general structure of the 
universal association is sought. For instance, in the discussion on the rural 
community, Althusius argues that a village is formed when several hamlets join 
together. Althusius then proceeds to the discussion of the town, which is a larger 
village that is fortified, but, if the town is large it is also called a city. From this 
interpretation, there appears to be no connection between a village and a town, and 
subsequently it is unclear as to the role or location of a village within the rural 
community, unless the village is an autonomous actor within the community that has 
no need of further association, but this is unclear from the text. 
A second case in point is Althusius' discussion of the urban community, which is 
composed of those who practice industrial functions and pursuits while living an 
urban life (Politica: 42). According to Althusius, the urban community is a large 
number of hamlets and villages associated by a special legal order (jus) for the 
advancement of the citizens, and guarded and fortified against external violence by a 
common moat, fortress, and wall. Furthermore' a community of citizens dwelling in 
the same urban area (urbs), and content with the same communication and 
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government (jus imperii) is called a city (civitas)' (Politica: 42). The confusion here 
is the relationship of the guild to the urban community. Althusius never explicitly 
mentions the guild in relation to the community, but by default they must play an 
active role due to fact that the community is composed of those who 'practice 
industrial functions and pursuits', which must refer to employment. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that while Althusius is clear what a is 
and how a relates to b, b to c etc., this methodical logic does not always led to a 
clarified structure, and subsequently this results in Politica being very much open to 
normative interpretation. One explanation for this lack of clarity is that while the 
initial edition of Politica was written when Althusius was in academia, the latter 
editions of Politica were influenced by his practical experiences Emden.9 
Subsequently, while Althusius was undoubtedly influenced to write Politica by 
political theory, later editions were influenced by Althusius' daily struggle to preserve 
Emden's autonomy, and so the marriage between political theory and Althusius' 
political practice may have resulted in the uncertainty that, in hindsight, can be 
identified in Politica. 
Gender Bias in Political Vocabulary 
Similarly to the first, the fourth methodological issue focuses on the vocabulary used 
in Politica. The term 'man' will be used in the thesis, and this is done to reflect the 
vocabulary of the political texts used, two points warrant further examination: First, 
the role of women in the 21 sI century; second, the 'de-genderisation' of the term 
'man' in political theory. 
It is apparent that the role of women in both the workplace and society has been 
transformed in comparison to the era in which Althusius was writing, and 
subsequently, it is self-evidently no longer the case that it is only the paternal head of 
the family who works, or who has civic rights. Despite Althusius' use of the term 
'man', he actively promotes 'women's rights' in their relationship to men. In relation 
9 As will be seen in Chapter One, Emden was the city in which Althusius was Syndic or legal 
representative from 1604 to 1638. 
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to the family, Althusius sees that the man is the head of the family and so the wife has 
responsibilities to the husband (Politica: 29-30), but, in turn, the husband has 
responsibilities to the wife (Politica: 29). There is also a further discussion of the 
'common advantages and responsibilities that are provided and communicated by 
both spouses' (Politica: 30). 
The importance Althusius places on the family is dependent on his interpretation of 
Christian ethicslO (Friedrich 1932: lxxii), rather than in any apparent desire to 
subjugate women, and this is exemplified in a section of Politica in which Althusius 
refers to the role of women. In discussing the 'constituting of the Supreme 
Magistrate' (Ch. XIX), Althusius discusses which type of person is preferable to 
become Supreme Magistrate. He dismisses 'atheists, impious or wicked men, 
strangers to true orthodox religion, men from ignoble or servile stations, or ones who 
are unappreciative toward a good predecessor, bastards or men inclined to 
drunkenness, vice or crime' (Politica: 129). Interestingly, Althusius also refers to 
women and states 'concerning the election of a woman, see my earlier comments' 
(Ibid.). Although in the abridged version of Politica these earlier comments do not 
appear, Frederick Carney does leave a brief outline of the discussion in a footnote, 
relating to Althusius' observation that 'the female sex does not bar one from office 
when the function is suitable to the sex' (Politica: 53, fn 6). 
Without the full discussion it is only possible to speculate upon Althusius' motives 
behind this statement. For Althusius, the Jewish polity, which is the best of all 
(Politica: 131), allowed only male heirs until the 'fall of Jerusalem under 
Nebuchadnezzar.' (Politica: 131) The reasoning behind Althusius' preferences is hard 
to comprehend. Frederick Carney offers one possible explanation: 'AIthusius 
apparently fears that the marriage of a female supreme magistrate, or of a female in 
the line of succession to the supreme magistracy, may introduce a foreign influence 
10 In this discussion, Friedrich does note a criticism (which could be deemed feminist) of Althusius' 
emphasis on the family: " ... the institutional aspects of marriage are super-imposed and have the 
purpose of regulating sexual life and the position of children, and such institutional order is founded 
upon a pre·existing social order, and that it does not spring from instinct.. .instinct only leads to the 
sexual act" (1932: Ixxi). In response to this criticism, Friedrich notes that Althusius would argue this 
position is inadmissible 'because in addition to the natural individual and the super-imposed 
governmental regulation, he expounds the idea of the biological foundation of social relations' (Ibid). 
Also on a personal level, Friedrich notes that Althusius was married with several children and so is 
more inclined to value the institution, in comparison to someone like Hobbes, who never married 
(1932: Ixxi). 
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and royal house into the realm' (Politica: 131, fn 31). From this one speculative 
conclusion can be made regarding Althusius' position on the role of women. 
Althusius, while not denying the importance of women within the universal 
association, appears to view them in adopting a maternal, caring role, while the man 
worked or engaged in political life. Althusius' view of class should also be borne in 
mind at this point. In the Province, Althusius identifies three secular estates: the 
nobility (status nobilitatis), the burghers (status civitatum), and the agrarians (status 
agrariorum) (Politica: 60), each of which has its specific task: 
The order of the nobility is constituted principally for defense, for repelling 
and driving force and violence away from the province. Whence in Germany 
it is called der Wehrstand ... The order of burghers and agrarians is constituted 
principally for the adequate procurement of those things necessary and useful 
to civil life in the province ... And their occupations are of three kinds. First are 
merchants and businessmen, then farmers and herders, and finally craftsmen 
and mechanics ... (Politica: 61) 
This passage highlights that Althusius does not look upon certain classes or gender as 
superior or others inferior; rather, he argues that as 'God distributed his gifts unevenly 
among men', this led to a situation where: " ... some persons provided for others, and 
some received from others what they themselves lacked, all came together into a 
certain public body that we call the commonwealth, and by mutual aid devoted 
themselves to the general good and the wealth of this body" (Politica: 18). 
The second methodological point that needs to be clarified is the different ways in 
which the term 'man' is used in the classical political texts. Indeed, while 'man' is 
used in the majority of political texts, it is done so to represent so many different 
meanings that it is possible to argue that it has undergone a process of 'de-
genderisation'. In support of this idea, the use of 'man' will be briefly explored in 
John Locke's Second Treatise of Government (1690). While it is no exaggeration to 
claim that Locke is the precursor of modern liberalism, the use of the term individual 
and 'man' by Locke differs greatly from the modern understanding. Although Locke 
spends some time at the beginning of The Second Treatise discussing the difference 
between 'paternal' and 'parental' power, this is done so largely in reference to, the 
Patriarchal debate of the First Treatise and so will not be discussed here; rather, what 
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will be focused on is the individual in relation to the state. As it will be shown in 
Chapter Two, the role of the government for Locke was the preservation and 
protection of propertyll and accordingly the right to vote in the legislative elections 
was limited to those who had property; indeed Locke forwards the idea of the level of 
representation based on the level of taxation (Treatise: 82-83). 
The result of this it can be interpreted that while Locke discusses 'man' he does not 
mean 'man' as a descriptive term of gender, rather he means a small group of land 
owning men. The de-genderisation of the term 'man' in this sense occurs because of 
the fact that while Locke does indeed refer to males as 'man', he only refers to a 
specific propertied elite, rather than man as biological category. In this sense, the 
gender specific aspect of the term is thus removed, as 'man' no longer equates with 
man as a biological entity. 
It is possible at this stage to argue that 'man' in the context of political theory no 
longer refers to a biological category. Rather, it refers to either an elite group or a 
generic grouping of humanity, possibly derived from the term 'mankind'. 
The Nature of Sui Generic Constitutionalism and Modem Political Vocabulary 
In addition to the gender aspect, two further points need to be clarified in relation to 
the use of vocabulary in this thesis. The first point is centred on the use of the term 
'constitution' throughout the work. While this may not seem problematic, it must be 
remembered that Althusius himself never used the term in Politica, and so to use the 
term could be seen as a misrepresentation or misinterpretation of Althusius. Rather, 
we use the term, albeit anachronistically, to represent the organising of the 
relationships that define the political structure of the sui generic association. The 
modem equivalent of this idea, or 'constitution', will be used in this work for 
convenience and clarity. 
The second point that deserves clarification is what is meant by the different variants 
of 'constitution' that will be used in the thesis, namely constitution, constitutionalism 
11 Or as C.B. MacPherson notes in this introduction to the Second Treatise: ' .. .life, liberty and estate' 
(Treatise: xix. Emphasis in original). 
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and constitutionalisation. Despite being based on the word 'constitution', each 
variation has a subtly different meaning and as all three versions will be used in the 
thesis, it is essential to offer a definition of each. First, in the broadest sense, the term 
'constitution' is used to denote the agreement or statute that organises the political 
relationships within any given association. As will be seen in Chapter Two, in the 
present interpretation of the word this organisation is carried out by a written legal 
agreement that distributes political responsibilities to various parties within the 
association. There are disagreements as to how specifically the constitution achieves 
these aims, and questions as to the content and application are continually discussed at 
both the theoretical and the practical level. Despite these ongoing discussions, the 
essential feature of the definition offered here is the emphasis on organisation. The 
constitution offers the association the basic framework in which to conduct political 
activity. 
In contrast, the term 'constitutionalism' is used to denote actions, or a concept, in this 
case the practices, whether theoretical or practical, that occur as a result of the 
constitution of an association. An example of this could be the 'constitutionalism of 
the United States centres on the separation of powers and the protection of individual 
rights' . 
Finally, 'constitutionalisation' is used to refer to the fixed process, or set of sporadic 
actions, that leads to the association adopting an agreement, or a constitution, to 
organise their political relationships. The difference between constitutionalisation as 
a 'fixed process' and as 'sporadic actions' is dependent on the purpose and aims of 
the members of the association in question. For the former, a good example can be 
offered in the American Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the European 
Constitutional Convention (2002-2004). In both instances, delegates were 
purposefully sent to the convention to draw up a constitution, and so the entire 
Convention processes can be seen as reflecting both America's and the EU's 
'constitutionalisation'. The process as 'sporadic actions' can be exemplified in the 
'constitutional' process of the European Union, largely from the mid 1960s with the 
1963 "Van Gend en Loos" and the 1964 "Costa v. Ene!" decisions. The key feature 
of this variant of constitutionalisation, is its unintentional nature. Rather, several 
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actions by different actors led to a position in which the adoption of a constitution for 
Europe was openly discussed in the Constitutional Convention (2002-2004). 
Having identified 'the constitution' as a means of organisation, it is possible to 
identify its constituent parts. In this sense, the social contract, sovereignty and 
federalism, can all be viewed as denoting integral parts of the constitution. First, the 
social contract, especially that espoused by John Locke, represents a rudimentary 
form of constitution in which individuals agreed to form a political structure that 
would allow them to organise their political relationships in a more amenable manner. 
Second, the constitution is concerned with the allocation of power and the power 
relationships of the structure, with the power or sovereignty, in current constitutional 
theory, emanating from the people. 12 Third, as mentioned previously, the constitution 
is concemed with the allocation of power and responsibilities of the structure, and the 
principal manner in which this allocation is achieved in a structure in which several 
power centres exist is through federalism. In this manner, while Chapter Two focuses 
on the definitional problems inherent in constitutional theory, Chapters Three, Four 
and Five are concerned with the fundamental organisational aspects of 
constitutionalism, as a means of better understanding sui generic constitutionalism. 
The Fall and RiseC?) of Sui Generic Associations 
While the term sui generiC become increasingly popular with the emergence of the 
EU, it has also been used to describe the Holy Roman Empire, The Hapsburg Empire 
and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The point that needs to be clarified 
is that in this thesis, the term 'sui generic' is taken to mean an association that is 
without comparison; sui meaning of its own or itself and generic meaning group or 
class. As a result of this, there cannot be a single model of sui generic 
constitutionalism that fits all sui generic associations, as this is both contradictory, 
and more importantly, is not the aim here. Rather, Althusius' Politica is presented as 
a constitutional example that is more apt at describing or explaining sui generic 
associations, than the traditional constitutional models of the societas canon. This 
12 There are of course exceptions to the constitutional theol)' explicated above; in the example of 
sovereignty being vested in the people, the United Kingdom is an exception with sovereignty being 
vested in the people's representatives, or Parliament. 
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does not mean that Politica will be able to describe every sui generic association, but 
this is not the claim of the work. 
There appears to be an inverse relationship between the existence of the state in its 
current form and sui generic associations. The relationship appears to be very simple: 
in the example of Europe, the rise of the state meant the end of the sui generic 
association, such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Holy Roman Empire.13 
Eulau (1941: 647) argued that the Treaty of Westphalia spelt the end of the 
constitutional development of the Empire, as a sui generic association. The 
dominance of the state is further reflected in political thought: starting with Niccolo 
Machiavelli'sl4 The Prince (1516), closely followed by Jean Bodin's Six Books o/the 
Commonwealth (1576), political theory began to advocate centralised forms of 
political association as a means to secure peace. Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan (1651), 
most famously put forward this argument and, as was discussed above, the influence 
of this work was to be seen on the remaining societas authors. The idea of the 
centralised state and sovereignty became so potent and compelling that, as will be 
seen in Chapter Five, even those political theorists attempting to characterise the Holy 
Roman Empire, such as Samuel von Pufendorf and Immanuel Kant, invented new 
societas-inspired terms, such as 'a league of states', to describe the once sui generic 
Empire. 
Despite the 'Euro-centric' nature of the discussion to date, this does not mean that 
examples of historic sui generic associations are limited to the European continent. A 
prominent example on the American continent was the Iroquois League, formed in the 
16th century by five (later six) Indian nations. While both the League, which was 
institutionalised by the Great Law of Peace (or the Great Binding Law) and the tribes 
acted as democracies, (Crawford 1994: 357) the League could not be equated with a 
federation, or even confederation in the present day understanding of the term, and 
13 Today, only the confederatio Helvetica remains, but despite this the Swiss structure, as will be seen 
in the Chapter Five, has adopted increasingly 'state-like' characteristics. 
14 Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), Florentine statesman whose works include the Prince (1513) and 
the Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius (1513-21). The former presented a practical 
handbook for how a ruler may take and keep power in a Republic and is often cited as the beginning of 
'Real Politik', while the latter was concerned with 'Republics' controlled by an active citizenry. Due 
to the ruthless nature of the Prince, Machiavelli's name has become synonymous with ruthless and 
underhanded politics. 
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one of the main reasons behind this was the society in which the Iroquois lived; as 
Samuel Payne reasoned, 'the Iroquois lived in anonstate society'. (1996: 614) 
The problem with this example discussed is that it does not serve the purpose we ask 
of it: if the aim of the thesis is to further our understanding of current sui generic 
constitutionalism, then we could argue that the use of such historical examples is 
irrelevant. In the current political climate there are two examples of sui generic 
associations: the European Union; and the relationship between the native population 
and the federal government in Canada and Australia. With regards to the latter 
examples, in the decision of R v. Sparrow [1 S.C.R 1075) on the fishing rights of 
aboriginal people and its applicability to the Canadian constitutional act (1982), the 
Canadian Supreme Court found that: 
Courts must be careful to avoid the application of traditional common law 
concepts of property as they develop their understanding of the "sui generis" 
nature of Aboriginal rights. While it is impossible to give an easy definition 
of these fishing rights, it is crucial to be sensitive to the aboriginal perspective 
itself on the meaning of the rights at stake. [1 S.C.R 1075) 1990 
http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/ 
A second example of this sui generic relationship can be found in the Canadian 
Court's finding in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia in which, with reference to 
property rights, the Court found that: 
"Aboriginal title" is based on the continued occupation and use of the land as 
part of the aboriginal peoples' traditional way of life. This sui generis interest 
is not equated with fee simple ownership; nor can it be described with 
reference to traditional property law concepts. [3 S.C.R. 1010] 1997 
http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/ 
Similarly, focusing on the relationship between art, culture, identity and the 
applicability of the law of copyright, Bums Coleman asks whether or not Australian 
aboriginal art should be protected under sui generis legislation (2004: 22). 
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What is suggested by the three examples above is an underlying theme of how to 
reconcile the differences between two different legal, cultural and political cultures. 
In this sense, sui generis is used to describe the unique and somewhat confusing 
relationship between Australian and Canadian federal law on the one hand and the 
rights of the aboriginal people who reside in these countries, on the other. 
Clearly while the relationship between indigenous peoples and the state is not the 
concern of this thesis, the underlying theme evident in the above examples may still 
play a role in furthering our understanding of sui generic constitutionalism. 
Structure of Work 
In addition to the tackling the issues identified above, the thesis will also address the 
underlying question, namely: 
1. How specifically does an Althusian perspective aid our understanding of sui 
generic constitutionalism? 
In order to be in a position to do this, the thesis will be divided into three main parts: 
biographical, definitional and theoretical. The first, or biographical part of the work, 
Chapter One, will present a biographical account of the life, works and influences of 
Johannes Althusius. We saw above that because Althusius wrote in pre-Hobbesian 
times (1603), his political work has largely been overlooked, and this chapter is 
designed to redress this. In addition, in this part we emphasise the political period in 
which Althusius wrote, which is one in which the societas mode of state had yet to 
become dominant, and so where examples of both societas and universitas existed 
side-by-side. 
Althusius presents the most coherent and dominant constitutional theory in his 
Magnum Opus Politica. In this text, Althusius not only deals with issues of 
federalism, but also of the social contract as well as offering a critical response to Jean 
Bodin's discussion on sovereignty. In regards to federalism, Thomas Hueglin notes 
that: "Althusius certainly will not be the ultimate measure but it should be hoped that 
his political theory, based as it is in coordination, rather than confrontation, might 
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provide us with at least some elements for a truly federal theory of politics. In this 
sense we may call him a modem federalist" (1979: 41). 
The second, or definitional part of the thesis, Chapter Two, will offer a definitional 
discussion of the term 'constitution' and 'treaty'. The historical evolution of 
constitutionalism has not been uniform, yet the term 'constitution' is used in political 
discussions in a manner that suggests that there is a concrete definition. It is possible, 
however, to gather characteristics that most constitutions share and this is the closest 
that we can get to a concrete definition of a constitution; this is needed if an 
exploration of Althusian constitutionalism is to be undertaken. In addition to this, the 
discussion will also offer the Althusian definition of both terms, as it is possible to 
locate systems of agreements akin to both 'constitution' and 'treaty' within Politiea. 
The third, and theoretical aspect of the discussion will focus on the three main aspects 
of constitutionalisation as identified by Althusius and the societas canon: the social 
contract, sovereignty and federalism. Chapters Three, Four and Five will explore 
respectively the societas discussion on each topic, before contrasting this with the 
Althusian alternative, in order to develop in more depth Althusius' position on the key 
issues of constitutionalism. The observation of each chapter in this section is that 
while there is both a societas and Althusian variant of the social contract, sovereignty 
and federalism in political theory, due to its dominance it is the societas variant that is 
used as a tool to understand the constitutionalism of sui generic associations, such as 
the EU. The main contention here, is that it is the application of the societas variant 
that has lead to the present confusion, and that many of the present constitutional 
'problems' of the EU would be solved if they were approached from the Althusian 
perspective. 
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Chapter 1. Johannes Althusius: Life, Work and Times 
AIthusius is ... one of those thinkers who anticipate the future to such an extent 
that they appeal only to a small group of contemporaries. 
Friedrich 1932: xviii 
In effect, since the publication of Carl Friedrich's 1932 edition of Politica, there has 
been a steadily growing interest in AIthusius' work, of which Friedrich, Frederick 
Camey and Thomas Hueglin have been at the forefront. Yet, Althusius' work 
remains unknown to most; as noted by Elazar, 'Althusian ideas remain peripheral, 
even to students of modem federalism' (1995b: 445). Nevertheless, Althusius' 
influence can be found in the works of Martin Buber (1949), and as will be explored 
later in the chapter, also in the recent works of consociational theorists, Arendt 
Lijphart (1969) and Dimitris Chryssochoou (1994). 
As was noted in the Introduction, a central aim of this thesis is to add to this revival of 
Althusius' work, in this instance in relation to furthering our understanding of sui 
generic constitutionalism. In order to be in a position to attempt this aim, the purpose 
of this chapter is to 'introduce' Althusius by firstly outlining Althusius' academic and 
political life, in order to be able to locate Althusius' life within the broader European 
historical context. This is necessary as Politica was a product of the period in which 
it was written. Second, the chapter will summarise the structure of the Althusian 
'state', as it will become clear that the contemporary sovereign state has little or no 
resemblance to the Althusian Universal Public Association. This outline is necessary 
at this stage as throughout this thesis, our discussion will refer to different aspects of 
the Althusian 'state' or Universal Association, and so for the clarity of the argument it 
is paramount to offer a definition and description of the Althusian 'state'. 
Third, the chapter will discuss the different influences that evidently played a part in 
shaping AIthusius' thought in order to aid our understanding of why Althusius 
proposed the political theory that he did. Fourth, to compare the ideas of AIthusius 
with those of other political writers writing at the same time, since it is evident that 
AIthusius wrote in response to his contemporaries, and that subsequent authors have 
written in response to AIthusius. Fifth, this chapter explores the influence that 
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Althusius had posthumously on constitutional theory: characteristics of Politica can 
be identified in writers such as Leibniz and Proudhon who wrote after the societas 
canon theoretically became dominant. Sixth, the chapter will also explore the 
influences of Politica on the constitutionalism of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia or Titoism, as there is direct evidence that Yugoslav constitutional writers 
and ideologues used Althusius as a counterbalance to Marxism (Elazar 1990). 
Seventh, and finally, the chapter will explore the occasions on which Althusius has 
been invoked. 
Pre-Politica AIthusius 
Little is known of lohannes Althusius' early life. The basic outline of his formative 
years can gathered mainly from a few books written predominantly by German 
historians or constitutional theorists. Arguably the most informative biography 
written in English is Carl Friedrich's 99-page introduction to his 1932 edition of 
Politica, which appears to have been written after extensive research in German 
Church and Council archives (Friedrich 1932: xv-xcix). 
From this study, it is possible to hypothesise that Althusius was born in 
'Dieden(s)hausen in the County of Wittgenstein-Berleburg in 1557. The County of 
Wittgenstein was part of the Westphalian Circle, bordering on the County of Nassau-
Dillenburg'. (Friedrich Politica: xxiii) As is demonstrated in figure 3, Althusius is 
recorded as commencing his Doctorate studies in Cologne in 1581, before moving to 
Basel in 1586 to complete his studies in civil and eccJesiasticalla-:v 
34 
Figure 3: Key Places, Dates and Influences in Althusius' early academic life 
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1581 Studies Aristotle and commences Doctoral studies in Cologne 
1586 Obtains Doctorate in both civil and ecc1esiasticallaw (UJD) in Basel 
1586 Visits Geneva and possibly taught by Denis Godefroy (Dionysius Gothofredus 
1549-1622), a Hugenot Professor of law at Geneva, Strasbourg, Heidelberg. One of 
the leading 'Reformed' (i.e. Calvinist) scholars of the day, who narrowly escaped the 
st. Bartholomew's Day massacre (1572). 
Source: 
http://www.dean.llsma.edulhistorv/atlases/dawnmodemwarfare/holyromanempireI618.html 
(accessed 7/7/5) 
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Figure 4: Key Places and Dates in Althusius' Academic and Professional Life 
Key: 
15577 Althusius born in Diedenshausen in the County of Bad Berleburg 
1581 Cologne studying Aristotle and commences Doctoral studies 
1585 Basel continuing Doctoral studies 
1586 Awarded Doctorate in civil and ecclesiastical studies (UJD) at Basel 
1586 Invited to join Academy in Herborn 
1592 Teaches in Gymnasium in Steinfurt 
1594 Spring: Returns to Herborn 
1594 Autumn: College moves to Siegen 
1599 Academy moves back to Herbom, Althusius stays in Siegen 
1601 Althusius returns to Herborn 
1603 Writes Politica 
1604 - 1638 Syndic of Emden 
Source: 
http://www.dean.usma.edulhistory/atlases/dawn modern warfare/holy roman empire 1618.html 
(accessed 7/7/5) 
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Upon completion of his doctorate in 1586, and as displayed in figure 4, Althusius was 
invited to join the Academy in Herbom to lecture in Institutiones Juris and 
philosophy (lbid: xxvi). After a brief spell teaching at the gymnasium at Steinfurt in 
1592, Althusius returned to teach at Herbom, the college was subsequently moved to 
Siegen by Count Johann the Elder in late 1594. In 1597, Althusius became rector of 
the college at Siegen, and when the Count moved the College back to Herbom in 
1599, Althusius remained at Siegen, until he to returned Herbom in 1601. 
While a Professor at Herbom, Althusius became a leading scholar in what was termed 
"the school of federal theology", which was the world view and the intellectual 
foundation (Elazar 1991a: 119, 139) of the Calvinists or Reformed wing of 
Protestantism: 
First, it is based on a network of covenants beginning with those between God 
and man, which weave the web of human, especially political, relationships in 
a federal way - that is, through compact, association, and consent (Elazar 
1991a: 119) ... the writings of Calvin and Bullinger not only contributed 
directly to the "new federalism" of Althusius but inspired an entire political 
thought that strongly influenced modem republicanism and shaped the two 
federal polities of the time, Switzerland and the Netherlands, both of which 
were dominated by Reform Protestants (lbid: 139). 
It was during this period that Althusius wrote the first edition of Politica, in which he 
attacked the doctrine of undivided territorial sovereignty that had found favour 
through the writings of Jean Bodin. As we shall see in Chapter Five, Althusius' 
attack centred on attributing the rightful ownership of sovereignty to the federally-
organised body of the people (Hueglin 1994a: 3) rather than to the Prince, as was 
argued by Bodin. Althusius' view was largely influenced by his desire 'to rescue the 
autonomy' of religious and municipal self-determination from the new centralised 
territories (Hueglin 1994b: 82) that were beginning to emerge at that time. 
Shortly after publishing Politica in 1603, a student of Althusius', Johann Alting sent a 
copy of Politica to his father, Menso who was one of Emden's distinguished 
clergyman (Camey 1995: xii & Friedrich 1932: xxix-xxx). The Council of Emden 
subsequently took a favourable view of Politica, as it served the Council's cause in its 
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battle to protect Reformed Church liberties from encroachment by the counts of East 
Friesland (Murdock 2004: 73). Consequently, Althusius was offered the position of 
Syndic or legal advisor of Emden, with Politica representing a theoretical 'blueprint' 
and 'justification' for this position. As Syndic, Althusius' roles were defined as 
advising the Council, representing the city at the county courts as well as at the 
Imperial Diet and elsewhere, and assisting the Mayor and Council in legislation (Ibid: 
xxxiv). 
Character of Althusius 
To supplement this brief biographical note, a further point regarding Althusius' 
personality seems appropriate. There were reported incidents in Althusius' political 
and academic life, which due to his loyalty to the institution he served, whether the 
College or Council, led to him being confrontational to people who he perceived as 
posing a threat either to him, or to the institution. There are four prominent examples 
given in the literature and the purpose of these examples is to highlight two points 
about Althusius and his approach to politics. Firstly, Althusius was not afraid to 
adopt a confrontational approach if the circumstances needed one. Secondly, and 
more importantly for our discussion, Althusius was in a rare position to 'practise what 
he preached'. The theoretical underpinnings of Politica got him the job of Syndic of 
Emden and while in this position he was able to 'update' Politica to reflect his 
practical experience of city life in Emden. 
Firstly in 1601, Althusius became involved in a theological controversy that 'caused 
quite a stir among the worthies of the county of Nassau' (Friedrich 1932: xxxviii). 
The argument centred on to what extent the government had the authority to 
determine the extent to which the will of God was revealed in the scripture. The exact 
sides taken by Althusius and the Theologians on the matter is less important than the 
fact that the Council had to become involved as a mediator between the two opposing 
sides1s (Ibid.). The second incident involved Althusius' work as a Professor at 
Herbom. The job of one important local dignitaries Joharmes a MUnster in Vortlage, 
IS During the incident an exchange of letters occurred of one specific letter written by Althusius to the 
Council, Friedrich notes that Althusius was 'peeved' and that the trouble with theologians is that they 
never make sure first what the question is about, but immediately fly up in the air (Friedrich 1932: 
xxviii). 
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was to intervene on the behalf of students, who were deemed to have been treated too 
severely. On one occasion, Althusius' treatment of a student who had 'hit a man in 
the street after dark with a sword and wounded him badly' was called into question 
(Ibid: xxix). As Friedrich notes: "Althusius showed himself once more as a very 
forceful and intrepid defender of the rights of the institution which he served, not 
swerving from the path of duty, nor hesitating to provoke an open clash with a cagy 
opponent, when it seemed desirable to do so" (1932: xxix). 
This loyalty was also evident in Althusius' actions while Syndic of Emden. Due to its 
position as the only Protestant port on the Northern European coast and as a result of 
the Spanish blockade of the other ports, the Council of Emden aspired, due to the 
increase in trade, to rise to the status of a free Imperial city. At the same time, the 
territorial lord of East Friesland, in which Emden was situated, wanted to increase 
taxes in order to establish himself as the absolute ruler over a modernised territorial 
state (Hueglin 1994b: 78). 
This conflict between the two factions resulted in the Count's army invading the city. 
The response by the Emden war council, led by Althusius, was to lock the city gates, 
which are apparent in Figure 5, and arrest the Count in his own residence (Hueglin 
1979: 17). After a brief period and a strenuous series of negotiations, which included 
the King of England, (Hueglin 1999: 15) the Count was released. 
The final incident occurred in 1625, and again involved the relationship between the 
Count and the City. When the newly enthroned Count of Eastern Friesia arrived at 
the city walls expecting to be greeted by the Emden Council, no-one did. Eventually, 
a delegate from the Council went to the Count's residence and explained no-one had 
been there to greet him as they were unsure of which Gate the Count would use 
(Hueglin 1979: 9). As Thomas Hueglin notes, the feeble excuse given by the City was 
meant to readdress the power relationship between the Count and the City. No longer 
would the City alone swear allegiance to the Count, but the contract would entail 
mutual obligations for both parties. 
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Figure 5: Map of Emden circa 1575 
source: http://historic-cities.huji.ac.il/germanY/emden/mapsibraun hogenberg II 32 m.jpg accessed 
271712005 
The Importance of this exploration into Althusius' character is that it demonstrates 
that in addition to the theoretical writings of Politica, Althusius was able to apply and 
elaborate on these ideas, during his long and distinguished political career: 
The first edition of 1603 had been written by a professor ... who had not been 
involved yet in political affairs. The second edition, however, contained much 
new material that was inspired by Althusius' actual involvement in the affairs 
of Emden, including its relations with its neighbour, The Netherlands, and its 
disputed with the Counts of East Friesland. In essence, he could see his 
theory in action in the struggle for rights of the burghers against the count and 
the nobility (Baker 1993: 34). 
While it is not the aim of the thesis to attempt to practically apply Althusius to the 
EU, the theoretical and practical experiences of Althusius gives his argument a 
rounded and thought-through nature, which augers well for being used as the basis of 
a theoretical investigation. 
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The 'State' of Althusius 
Our hypothesis, that using Althusius' work furthers our understanding of the 
constitutionalisation of sui generic associations, is based on the nature of the 
Althusian 'state'. As we shall see in the discussion on constitutionalism in Chapter 
Two, rather than adopting a societas contractual vision of the state comprising of an 
agreement between individuals, Althusius viewed the 'state' or Universal Association 
as comprising of different levels of consociatios, such as villages, cities, provinces 
and guilds. 
Althusius attempted to conceptualise the complex real world of the whole and of the 
part and the universal and particular order, as a many-layered problem requiring a 
multilevel constitutional solution (Hueglin 1999: 114). In these constituent parts, there 
are two differing types of consociatios; simple and private, and mixed and public 
(Politica: 27). The family and the Collegium are the former; the city, the province and 
the realm/commonwealth the latter. The important fact to remember at this juncture is 
that unlike the Societas canon, all the consociatios are political - even the family. In 
this manner each, of the individual consociatios has its own compact (or constitution) 
on which it is agreed. 
The simple and private association is a society and symbiosis initiated by a 
special covenant (pactum) among the members for the purpose of bringing 
together and holding in common a particular interest (quid peculiare). This is 
done according to their agreement and way oflife, that is, according to what is 
necessary and useful for organised symbiotic life. Such an association can 
rightly be called primary, and all others derivative from it (Ibid: 27). 
In this way, the covenant of the family is not a grandiose single document designed to 
serve the purposes of the entire realm, it is a purpose-designed document!6 that serves 
only the needs of the initial Consociatio. This step-by-step approach to 
constitutionalising the Commonwealth carries on when several families, hamlets or 
villages!7 join together to form the Collegium. 18 For Althusius, this is the first 
16 Although this does not have to be necessarily written: Althusius does not mention if this has to be the 
case or not. 
17 Each of which will have been based upon a mutual covenant. 
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example of a civil association as the common bonds that unite the differing 
consociatios are no longer reliant on blood. In this respect it is also a spontaneous 
and voluntary association, as it can be discontinued by mutual agreement (Ibid: 33). 
Each of these Collegiums is governed by a set of covenants and laws that are 
described in the corporate book (Zunjibiicher). This corporate book highlights the 
communication that should occur between members, and helps uphold the plan of 
social life set forth in the agreements; this communication pertains to things, services, 
right and mutual benevolence (Ibid: 35). 
The communication of things refers to the contribution of the Colleagues or the legal 
acquisition of resources to fund the necessary running of the collegium. Quite simply, 
communication is the medium through which symbiotic life is practiced (Hueglin 
1979: 25). The communication of service revolves around what each member of the 
Consociatio can bring to the collective. The services provided are again part of the 
constitutionalisation process as they are 'determined by mutual agreement among the 
Colleagues' (Politica: 30). While mutual benevolence is that affection and love of 
individuals toward their colleagues because of which they harmoniously will and 
"nm" on behalf of the common utility (Politica: 37). 
Rather predictably, this process of layered constitutionalism applies to the city. For 
Althusius the community [city] is an association formed by the fixed laws and 
composed of many families and Collegia living in the same place (Ibid: 40). An 
important transformation occurs here, however. As persons coming together, they 
now become not spouses, kinsman, and colleagues, but citizens of the same 
community. The consociatios have now become mixed and public (Ibid: 40). 
The Province 'contains within its territory many villages,towns, outposts, and cities 
united under the communion and administration of one right (Jus)' (Ibid: 51). Again 
the main concerns of this legal order are the communion of provincial right in which 
the goods needed for the province are attained and the administration of this right 
(Ibid.) 
18 Althusius also uses the tenns 'guild' and 'voluntary association' interchangeably with the term 
'Collegium'. The thing they share in common is that they are a Consociatio of at least three members 
(because among two people there is no third party to settle disputes) how are united for the purpose of 
holding in common such things they jointly profess as duty, way of life, or craft (Ibid: 29). 
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The final level of the Althusian realm19 is the Universal Realm or Commonwealth: 
In this association many cities and provinces obligate themselves to hold, 
organise use, and defend, through their common energies and expenditures, 
the right of the realm (Jus Regni) in the mutual communication of things and 
services. For without these supports, and the right of communication, a pious 
and just life cannot be established, fostered, and preserved in the universal 
social life (Ibid: 66). 
The bond of this Commonwealth is a tacit or expressed promise to communicate 
things, mutual services, aid, and counsel, and the same common laws (jura) to the 
extent that the utility and necessity of universal life of the realm shall require. (Ibid. 
Emphasis mine.) In other words the Commonwealth is a larger version of a Province, 
a province is a larger version of a City etc,. down to the building block of the 
Commonwealth - the family. 
Influences on Althusius 
It is possible to identify many factors that influenced Althusius: Aristotle; the Calvin 
religion; both classical and modem literature; the Dutch provinces; the German 
Empire, and his own personal experience and character, as we saw above. The 
importance of Calvinism is evident, not only for Althusius, but also in Emden; many 
of the French Huguenots who survived the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of 1572 
moved to Emden, as it had become the source of the mother church for northern 
European Calvinism - at times called the 'Geneva of the North' (Elazar 1995: xi & 
Hueglin 1979: 17). 
Moreover, Emden played a key role in the Reformation, as it was one of the first cities 
in the Empire to adopt the Reformed faith (1526) and its position was strengthened 
when in 1542, Countess Anna of East Friesland invited the Polish Calvin, John it 
Lasco (John Laski 1499-1560) to 'reorganise' the city's life (Camey 1995: xi). This 
19 Not taking into the possibility of a confederation being entered into, but the possibility of entering 
into a confederation will be discussed in Chapter Two, when we explore Althusius relationship to a 
'treaty' . 
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predominant role played by Emden in the reformation was recognised by Calvin 
himself, who dedicated the Latin Catechism (1545) to 'the faithful ministers of Christ 
throughout East Friesland' (McNeil 1962: 259). Moreover, during the 1550s and 
1560s, Emden, along with the Church of Antwerp and the Calvinist Church in 
London, were the centres of the Dutch Revolt and the Reformation in northern 
Europe. For a short time, when Queen Mary closed the London Church in 1553 
(Pettegree 1992: 24), and the Church in Antwerp was unable to function due to 
Spanish occupation, Emden became the focal point of both the Reformation and 
Dutch revolt sending ministers to preach in the Netherlands and advising Dutch 
congregations in ecclesiastical matters (Pettegree 1992). 
Calvinist Influences on Althusius 
While the religious teachings of Calvinism played a significant part in Althusius' life, 
he did go to great lengths to develop a covenantal theory of human society that was 
not based on theology (Elazar 1995b: 443). Hence, Profanis in the full title of 
Politica. Whilst it is possible to perceive Althusius' work in a secular mannero 
(Baker 1993: 19), it must not be forgotten that Althusius' study on sovereignty and 
the administration of the commonwealth has both a secular and an ecclesiastical 
aspect. Indeed, Althusius argued in Politica in the discussion on ecclesiastical 
administration that: "For a sound worship and fear of God in the commonwealth is the 
cause, origin, and fountain of private and public happiness. On the other hand, the 
contempt of God, and the neglect of divine worship, are the causes of all evil and 
misfortune" (Politica: 161). Despite this, Friedrich offers the suggestion that 
Althusius tends to interpret religion politically, and to subordinate ecclesiastical to 
govermnental considerations (1932: Ixxxi) and this does reflect the practical nature of 
Althusius' thought. Thee main instances of Calvinist practical influence are apparent 
on Politica. 
Firstly, Calvin emphasised the importance of the family unit as a patriarchal unit in 
which the father set the moral tone (Green 1952: 181). In Politica, Althusius argues 
that the family was paramount to the understanding of any political association, 
20 That is, devoid of the influence of God 
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writing that: "The knowledge of other associations is therefore incomplete and 
defective without this doctrine of conjugal and kinship associations, and cannot be 
rightly understood without it" (Politica: 31). In addition to this emphasis on the 
family, Calvin emphasised the role of the mutual agreement between the husband, 
wife and children, which became Althusius' "conjugal association". For Calvin: 
"Husbands are bound by mutual duties to their wives, and parents to children" 
(Institutes: 673). 
Secondly, Calvinism offers a key to Althusius' view of man within the consociatio. 
The consociatio was fundamental to Althusius work, indeed he called it the 'subject 
matter of politics' ,as it was within these groups that the individual 'symbiotes pledge 
themselves to each other, by explicit or tacit agreement, to mutual communication of 
whatever is useful and necessary for the harmonious exercise of social life' (Politica: 
17). For Calvin: 
Govemment makes possible the right ordering of life which is necessary to all 
communal living, and is equally as necessary to mankind as bread and water, 
light and air, and far more excellent. For it enables men to secure the 
accommodation arising from all these things and enables them to live together 
(Hudson 1946: 180). 
From this description, it is evident that for Althusius, man was to find himself within 
some form of social organisation: 
Therefore, as long as he remains isolated and does not mingle in the society of 
men, he cannot live at all comfortably and well while lacking so many 
necessary and useful things ... and almost impelled, to embrace it if he wants to 
live comfortably and well, even ifhe merely wants to live (Politica: 18). 
Finally, as the right of resistance was a central component of Calvinism,21 according 
to Calvin, and despite not defining how this was to be done (Hudson 1946: 188), it 
21 The main points of this right of resistance were recorded in the Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos (1579), 
written by Philippe Duplessis-Momay (1549-1623) and Rubert Languet (1518-1581). The basic 
argument of Tyrannos was that there had been an original contract between God and the King and his 
people. In the earthly relationship, the people are the superior partner as the King, who holds his power 
from God, is bound by his obligations to them. If the King breaks either of the contracts, either 
between himself, the people and God or between himself and the people, 'he stands condemned as a 
tyrant and the people are released from their allegiance to him' (Green 1952: 179). 
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was the right and duty of the inferior magistrates to resist tyranny in a King and to 
protect the people against him (Hoetjes 1993: 124). As Calvin argued: "Private 
persons ought not meddle with the affairs of state, or rashly intrude themselves into 
the office of magistrates, or undertake anything of a public nature" (Hudson 1946: 
186). Rather, than taking action against the tyrannical magistrate, the individual must 
"implore the help of the Lord, in whose hands are the hearts of kings, and inclinations 
of kingdoms" (Institutes: 674). This is mirrored verbatim in AIthusius' discussion on 
the role and duties of the Ephors, as AIthusius argued that individual consociatios 
could not resist a tyrannical Supreme Magistrate, as this was the duty of the Ephors, 
who: 
... are the representatives of the commonwealth or universal association to 
whom, by the consent of the people associated in a political body, the supreme 
responsibility has been entrusted for employing its power and right in 
constituting the supreme magistrate and in assisting him with aid and counsel 
in the activities of the associated body' (Politica: 99). 
In the case of a usurper, however, Althusius argues that 'each and every optimate and 
private person who loves his fatherland can and should resist, even by his private 
authority without awaiting the command of another' (Politica: 196-197). This feature 
is also found in the Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, which noted that the actual right to 
resist lies with individuals only in exceptional circumstances; namely, when a ruler 
has usurped power and does not have any rightful claim to Kingship (Hoetjd 1993: 
125). In many respects, Politica's argument on Tyranny can be seen simply as a more 
sophisticated version of Momay's Vindiciae (Baker 1993: 38). 
Despite Althusius' best attempt at keeping Politica secular, the very climate in which 
he was both educated and was politically active, did inevitably influence his political 
writings. As Henry Cohn notes: 
Althusius had spent nearly twenty years at Herbom before he assembled in his 
Politics .. .ideas which he had absorbed at the Academy, notably federalist 
theories which dovetailed with abortive Nassau plans for a Calvinist political 
union in the Empire and Europe. From 1604 AIthusius was able as syndic in 
the City of Emden to put into practice against the Counts of East Friesland the 
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resistance theories that had been nurtured by princes of William of Orange's 
family and their predecessors (1985: 158). 
Despite the religious undertones, for much of his academic life, Althusius was 
exposed to the theoretical arguments for a Calvinist political union; these included the 
'bottom-up' nature of power, and subsidiarity2 as a tool of organisation, and these 
religious aspects were politicised by Althusius and used as the basis of Politica. 
The Influence of Classical and Contemporary Literature 
In his introduction to Politica, Carney goes to great lengths to discuss 'his 
[Althusius'] major literary sources' (1995: xxiv-xxix). In this, Carney identifies eight 
categories of authors who in some way influenced Politica, due to limitations of 
space, these will only briefly mentioned here. Carney notes such diverse groups as 
those who are 'characterised by a common interest in political prudence' such as 
Giovanni Botero and Justus Lipsius; Calvinist and Catholic constitutional authors 
such as Femando Vasquez and George Buchanan, through to the legal writers and 
historians such as Andreas Gail and Theodore Zwinger. The purpose of this brief list 
is to emphasise that although Althusius appears to have definite Calvinist influences, 
he was a well-read and educated scholar, who was capable of adapting other's work to 
serve his own purposes, when the need arose, in doing so avoiding dogmatic beliefs. 
The Influence of 'Practical' Politics 
The geographical position of Emden on the border between the United Provinces and 
the Holy Roman Empire ensured that United Provinces' resistance against the Spanish 
monarchy (1555-1618) influenced Althusius' struggle against the Count of Friesland. 
This spirit of resistance shown by the Calvinist Dutch against a larger enemy 
influenced Althusius, and the support Althusius showed the Dutch Province in their 
22 As will be seen in Chapter Four, subsidiarity as a political term was never explicitly used by 
Althusius; rather, the correlation between Althusius and subsidiarity is the result of retrospective 
observation made by current political theorists, namely, Politica displays the features of the political 
term 'subsidiarity' as understood in a modem sense of the word. 
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struggle against Phillip of Spain, resulted in the Dutch posting a garrison of Troops in 
Emden (Hueglin 1979: 17), which Althusius described as the 'fundamentum et 
conservatio' ofthe city's 'freedom' (Israel 1995: 252). 
The influence of the structure of the Empire is also evident in Politica, The role of 
the Ephors in the Althusian commonwealth is crucial, and it is apparent that: "The 
model that Althusius employs most frequently in his advocacy of Ephors is the seven 
electors of Germany. He also manages to find somewhat comparable officials in other 
nations. They are usually distinguished rulers of provinces who possess at the same 
time this general function in the commonwealth" (Carney 1995: xxi). 
In addition, the influence of the Empire is evident in the vocabulary of Politica, 
Althusius refers to different kinds of 'imperial cities' (Politica: 45) and refers to the 
peasant class as the 'Commons' (Politica: 60-61), both of which were common terms 
used in the Empire. Althusius' own political experience as Syndic of Emden must 
also be taken into account, for the subsequent editions of Politica (1610, 1614) 
contained a more elaborate structure than that found in the original version, including 
the role of the city. 
Althusius' Place in Political 'Canons' 
Burgess differentiates between an Anglo-American and a Continental variant of 
federalism, and argues that the latter originates with Althusius,23 and was developed 
by Proudhon, the Protestant Reformed tradition and the Roman Catholic papal 
encyclicals (2000: 11). Similarly, Elazar argues that after Althusius, 'all subsequent 
federalist grand designs until Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's in the mid-nineteenth century' 
were 'derived from or somehow related to [the] scriptural precedent', which was so 
influential to Althusius (1995a: xxxviii). 
Eulau (1941) argues that Althusius is part of a larger contingent of authors including 
Hippolithus a Lapide, Hoenonius, Besold, Ludolph Hugo, Leibniz and Pufendorf, all 
of whom attempted constitutionally to define the Empire, while Riley explores the 
23 Burgess calls Althusius 'the first great European theorist of modem federalism' (2000: 8), while J. 
Wayne Baker argues 'Althusius' Politico contained the first federal political philosophy' (1993: 34). 
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relationship between sovereignty and federalism in the Empire, by exploring 
Althusius, Hugo and Leibniz (1976: 19-38). 
In his literary discussion in the introduction to Politica, Frederick Camey identifies 
Althusius as belonging to the category of 'both Catholic and Calvinist who had an 
interest in constitutional government' such as the Catholics Fernando Vasquez, Diego 
Covarruvias and Juan de Mariana and the Calvinists Junius Brutus, George Buchanan 
and Lambert Daneau (Carney 1995: xxv). Camey argues that: 
Althusius may be considered the culminating theorist of this group, for he 
provided their ideas on limiting the power of a ruler with a politically 
systematic basis they had previously lacked. He did this, of course, by making 
symbiotic association and its needs the foundation of political doctrine, and by 
showing what kind of constitutional considerations can be understood to arise 
therefrom (Ibid). 
While a central point of the thesis is that the Althusian variant of the 'state' 
subsequently lost out to that of the societas canon, we note here that there are 
Althusian characteristics to be found in the writing of those authors who wrote in the 
societas era. Unsurprisingly, these authors reflect Althusius' own political and 
geographical background: the Dutchman Hugo Grotius, the German Leibniz, the 
popular sovereigntist Rousseau and the anarchist Proudhon.24 Furthermore, 
Rousseau's relationship to Althusius will be explored in Chapter Four, when we 
explore the possible influence Politica had on Rousseau's theory of sovereignty. 
Finally, we note that Marx displays a significant degree of Althusian characteristics, 
yet the connection between the two authors has only been made in passing references 
within a wider discussion between Daniel Elazar and Jovan Dordevi6 (Elazar 1990). 
Returning to the influence Althusius had on Grotius, Leibniz and Proudhon, Friedrich 
sees Hugo Grotius as being opposed to Althusius' idea of popular sovereignty, but for 
Friedrich, Grotius: " ... did share his concept of federal union. Writing specifically 
against the background of the Netherlands, Grotius too sees the political 
24 Although Althusius was not an anarchist in the modem sense of the word, if we view his work from 
a modem viewpoint i.e. from a centralised sovereign state, Politica can be deemed to displays anarchic 
tendencies, such as the lack of a centralised state and the corporate nature of the political structure. 
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commonwealth as a perpetual UnIon of lesser communities, united through 
consociatio, or union,,25 (Friedrich 1968: 13). 
Ward argues that Leibniz was undoubtedly taken by Althusius' quasi-federal model 
for a united Europe (2001: 33), and there are Althusian characteristics to be found in 
Leibniz's work including humanism, and the maintenance of the medieval thread of 
jurisprudence against that of Hobbes (Ibid: 34). For Friedrich, not only did Leibniz 
display many of the Germanic structural similarities espoused by Althusius, but he 
also wrote in opposition to the Anglo-French authors. First, not only did Leibniz 
accept the doctrine of the Ephors or estates as Calvin had first enunciated it (Friedrich 
1972: 64), but he also favoured German liberty in opposition to the absolutism of 
France and England. Within the Imperial system, Leibniz praises the large number of 
princely courts: "Is not the large number of princely courts a wonderful means by 
which many people can distinguish themselves who otherwise would have to lie in the 
dust" (quoted in Friedrich 1972: 58). 
Second, Leibniz disagreed with Bodin, Hobbes and Pufendorf on the subject of 
sovereignty. Rather than being 'indivisible' as was claimed by these authors, Leibniz 
argued for a concept of 'relative' sovereignty, which enabled Leibniz to speak of a 
'multitude of sovereignty' within a state (Friedrich 1972: 62). Indeed, the concept of 
'Majesty' replaces Leibniz's sovereignty - that is the highest political quality - and in 
assigning it to the Empire, Leibniz is attempting to realise one of his main political 
ambitions: the revival of the universal authorities, both secular and ecclesiastical 
(Riley 1976: 26). 
Proudhon's conception of the state-society relationship, in his Du Principe jederatif 
(1863) was like that of Althusius, very much an organic view based on corporatism 
and subsidiarity. For Burgess, Proudhon's similarities with Althusius were quite 
" "Again it happens that many states, fonning each an independent body, may have one head. For 
political are not like natural bodies, to only one of which the same head can belong. Whereas in the 
fonner, one persons can exercise the function of the head to many distinct bodies. As a certain proof of 
which, when the reigning house has become extinct, the sovereign power returns to the hands of the 
nation. So it may happen, that many states may be connected together by the closest federal union, 
which Strabo, in more places than one calls a system, and yet each retain the condition of a perfect, 
individual state, which has been observed by Aristotle and others in different parts of their writings. 
Therefore the common subject of sovereign power is the state, taken in the sense already explained. 
The proper subject is one or more persons according to the laws and customs of each nation. This is 
called by Galen in the sixth book DE PLAClTlS HlPPOCRA T ET, PLA TONIS, the first power of the 
state" (Law of War and Peace: 49). 
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striking. Not only did Proudhon emphasise corporatism, subsidiarity and society as a 
multi-layered association consisting of families, groups, economic units and local 
communities, but, as with the zoon politikon of Aristotle, Proudhon viewed 
individuals as becoming 'whole' persons through interactions with and responsibility 
to other humans (2000: 10-11). 
Some of [proudhon's] formulations sound like Althusius, more especially his 
emphasis on contract. Proudhon claimed that under a federal contract the 
contractants - the heads of families, the communes, the cantons, the 
provinces, and eventually the states - "not only oblige themselves bilaterally 
and mutually toward each other, but in concluding such a pact they also 
reserve to themselves more rights, more freedom, more authority, and more 
prosperity than they give up (Friedrich 1968: 26). 
The purpose of this discussion is to recognise both that Althusius can be viewed in 
relation to several different 'canons' and yet that his work is in no way unique or 
original. What makes Politica useful to the understanding of sui generic 
constitutionalism is the manner in which Althusius combined these different 
influences and applied them to his contemporary surroundings. 
Althusius' Influence on Titoism 
In addition to Althusius' influence on certain political canons, it has also been claimed 
that Politica played both a theoretical and practical role in the constitutional project of 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), especially from 1963 to the 
country's dissolution in 1991. This claim was made by Jovan Bordevic, who in 
discussion with Daniel Elazar in 1973, noted the influence Althusius had on the 
constitutional writers in Yugoslavia, especially as a counter-balance to Marxism. 
(Elazar 1990). While, the culmination of the influence of Althusius on Titoism can be 
found in the 1974 constitution; as early as the mid-1960s, Jovan Dordevic argued that 
the 1963 constitution instigated a process for Yugoslavia that was sui generis (1967: 
211). What this meant by this was that under Titoism, Yugoslavia was increasingly 
becoming a self-managing community of working people, nations and nationalities 
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(Kardelj 1953: 94 & Jovic 2003: 176), as opposed to a "state" in the contemporary 
understanding of the word. It is possible to identify Althusian characteristics in three 
main areas of Titoist constitutionalism: The structures and practices that the 
constitution established; the theoretical underpinnings of Titoism; and the electoral 
system. 
There are four main AIthusian characteristics in the structures and practices 
established by the 1974 constitution: 
Simple Consociations and Residual Nature of Power 
The first is a replica of the AIthusian emphasis on the simple consociatios as decision-
making entities, and the residual nature of power at each successive level of 
government as found in Politiea. Under the 1974 constitution, the idea of social seIf-
management reached into all areas of Yugoslav life, and this meant that the 
traditionally economic principle of self-management became the 'cornerstone of the 
social system' (Kardelj 1953: 91). Social self-management resulted in a system in 
which decisions and actions are fonned and start out from 'the bottom' (Matic 1977: 
28). This in itself led to the position where executive functions remained the 
prerogative of the lowest possible level; People's Committees and Social SeIf-
Management Organs, while the Republican and Federal government only retained the 
executive functions, which 'by their nature can only be carried out at the federal or 
republic level' (Kardelj 1953: 92). 
This in itself demonstrates both the Althusian emphasis on the simple consociatios, 
and the Althusian principle of subsidiarity: the division of powers between the 
Yugoslav federation, republics and communes follows 'the principle that specific 
powers are given to the higher bodies and that all residual powers belong to those 
lower down' (Lydall 1984: 105) and an 'increasing stress on the prerogatives of the 
communes', which are 'the smallest units of political aggregation of power' (Denitch 
1977: 115) and the basis of the whole system (Rusinow 1977: 328). 
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Complex Nature of Checks and Balances 
The second Althusian feature is found within the complex system that Althusius 
introduced between the Supreme Magistrate and the Ephors; each was vested with 
certain powers and each was designed to be the 'counterbalancing' force for the other. 
The 1974 constitution similarly established a complicated power relationship between 
the executive body of the assembly, which is formed out of the executive council, and 
the council, which is the collegiate executive organ of the assembly ofthe commune. 
(Article 149) Dennison Rusinow echoes this sentiment when he highlights: "The 
system thus described [that of the 1974 Constitution] therefore included a far more 
complicated and multidimensional version of the American Constitution's 'checks 
and balances' (1977: 328). 
The Politicisation of Society 
A third Althusian feature is the fact that both Althusius and Titoism 'politicised' the 
whole of society. In social contractarian theory there is an area of society that remains 
outside of the political world. For Althusius, largely under Aristotelian influence, 
although there are private and public associations, all are politicised. Similarly, as the 
project of 'constructing socialism' was the cornerstone of Yugoslav society, this had 
the direct influence of affecting 'grass roots' self-management, thus turning all of 
Yugoslav society into a political society (Golubovi6 1986: 6). 
Shift of Power from Centre 
The fourth Althusian feature is that the shift of power, both political and economic, 
from Belgrade to the Republics was so thorough, that in many respects the federal 
organisations resembled the position of the European Commission in the EU; namely 
the real power and decision-making was undertaken by the Presidents of the Yugoslav 
Republics, while the Federal Yugoslav level dealt with specially designated 
competences, a situation not dissimilar to that between the European Commission on 
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the one hand, and the European Council and Council of Ministers, on the other. As 
Kardelj noted in 1974, 'the Federation itself became more the initiator, executor and 
agent of adjustment than an autonomous decision-maker'. In this, a basic Althusian 
influence was evident, as the federal bodies were not independent of the Republics, 
but formed directly by them (Jovic 2003: 177). 
Althusius and the Theoretical Basis of Titoism 
As will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Two when we explore the individual 
in both Politica and the societas canon, Althusius saw the individual in his 'real' state, 
rather than the 'abstract' individual of the societas canon. Similarly, Edvard Kardel/6 
argued that the Yugoslav political system should not be based on the liberal notion of 
'abstract citizens', because an 'abstract man' is 'non-existent': "Such an abstract and 
isolated individual can be represented only by an alienated, general deputy who 
pursues some sort of fictive general interest" (Todorovic 1974: 3). This abstract 
individual existed only in liberal models, which 'try to transform man into a God' 
(Jovi6 2003: 178), instead of accepting the fact that man's life was dependent on both 
society and nature. For Kardelj, subsequent liberal criticisms of man were not based 
on man as he was, they criticised him from the position of man 'such as he ought to 
be' (Ibid. Emphasis mine). As a result, for Kardelj the aim of socialist self-
management was to identify and solve the actual problems of individuals, rather than 
solving abstract problems: 
This goal, however, carmot be achieved if man is viewed as an "abstract 
political citizen", or if the working class is viewed as an abstract ideological 
concept; rather we must champion on the one hand the real person ... on the 
other the actual working class, which is not simply an agglomeration of 
people but rather a complex system of relationships among these people ... 
(Kardelj 1980: 134). 
26 Edvard Kardelj (1910-1979) was the leading ideologue of League of Communists of Yugoslavia 
(SKJ), and increasingly from the 1960s the most dominant theoretical force in Yugoslav politics, to 
such an extent that Slobodan Stankovic described him as'Tito's right hand; he was also his left hand, 
and, occasionally, even "Tito's head" - producing theories and ideas that the aging leader then 
propagated in simpler terms, understandable to everyone' (1981: 68). 
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Althusius and the Titoist Electoral System 
Kardelj saw that the best way to achieve this realisation of the individual, was through 
the system of socialist self-management, as opposed to parliamentary representation: 
In the first place, in the multiparty system the citizen can rarely voice his 
preference as regards to the taking of a decision or as regards the decision 
itself, but can only participate in electing a candidate who is supposed to 
represent him. This candidate is actually not even nominated by the ordinary 
citizen but by the party caucus or at least under the decisive influence of the 
party leadership. The election of a party candidate, therefore, is in fact simply 
giving an endorsement to someone else's choice, so that in the end the right to 
vote in the parliamentary system can be said to be a form of the political 
alienation of the citizen (Kardelj 1980: 189). 
The 1974 constitution introduced an 'indirect' electoral system that was meant to 
introduce 'direct' democracy, by ensuring that 'delegates' who were given mandates 
by 'delegations', who in turn were mandated by the voters, now officially ruled 
Yugoslavia. Delegates to communes elected delegates to Republican and Federal 
assemblies, so that Republican and Federal legislators were three stages away from 
their basic electorates (Lydall 1984: 103). As Sharon Zukin notes: 
Officially, the Yugoslavs call this delegate system the 'most direct' form of 
democracy, but the election of each higher territorial assembly by delegations 
in a lower organ really excludes mass participation at all but the 
neighbourhood level (1984: 262). 
This electoral system can be found in the Althusian structure, as only those levels 
below that of the city provided 'the opportunity for direct participation of individuals 
as such in the process of rule' (eamey 1995: xix). The introduction of this 
'Althusianesque' system allowed Kardelj to search pre-societas theories to solve the 
perceived constitutional weaknesses of the societas canon, as he argued that neither 
the one-party system or the bourgeois parliamentary system could sufficiently 
represent individuals 'real' needs (Kardelj 1980). 
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The aim of this electoral system in its Titoist guise was to avoid replicating the 
weaknesses of the liberal, or societas model, by introducing 'new and more advanced 
forms of democratic life' (Stankovi6 1981: 32); an assembly system based on 
mandated representation. The objective of this system was to force the delegates to 
protect their primary interests first, then to look at the broader picture (Vuckovi6 
1997: 113), thus introducing a variant of subsidiarity. This was an important fact as it 
broke with ideas of parliamentary representation, which by this period had become 
the standard form of representation. As Kardelj explained: 
.. .in the system of political pluralism of bourgeois society, the citizen, in 
elections, gives his deputy general powers to decide on all matters concerning 
his own and the public interests falling within the competence of parliament, 
whereas the worker-manager and citizen in the system of self-management 
pluralism gives specific powers to his delegations, or delegates, to negotiate 
the adoption of specific decisions in the realm of his personal and common 
public interests (1980: 191). 
Kardelj argued that the different interests that an individual may have are too varied 
and fluid to be 'represented by political parties and reduced to generalised political 
formulas' . Indeed, parliamentary politics does just this and 'denies the genuine 
expression of this diversity in the administration of society' (Ibid: 170). Furthermore, 
within the system of socialist self-management the 'genuine political interest of the 
working class is unanimous' (ibid: 174) and so does not require being split into 
artificial 'parties' of representation. 
The long-term aim of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) and Socialist 
Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia27 (SA WPY) was to provide a 
superstructure, or a specialised public service (Stankovi6 1981: 30), in which socialist 
self-management: 
... will not cause a political differentiation of the working class and working 
masses in the form of political parties, but which will secure their direct 
participation in the political decision-making on the basis of free airing of 
27 The SA WPY, or Popular Front as it was known until February 1953, represented the different 
groups, some non-communist, that opposed the Nazis in the Second World War. 
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opinions on specific problems. In this way, in the system of pluralism of self-
management interests, the majority and minority are not represented in the 
from of monopolistic political parties but are formed and re-formed for every 
specific decision (Ibid: 180). 
For Tito the introduction of this system was ' ... a determined break ... with all the 
remnants of so-called representative democracy which suits the bourgeois class' 
(Singleton 1976: 274) and offers no more than the possibility of a popularity contest 
(Lydall 1984: 102). 
A second Althusian characteristic of the Titoist electoral system was the emphasis on 
the delegate system, which differed from a 'representative system' by the fact that the 
'direct and virtually day-to-day responsibility of the delegates to their delegations and 
of the latter to the neighbourhood or 'working community' that had elected them 
(Singleton 1976: 332-333): 
Instead of the classical political deputy as the representative of a given 
political party, our delegate assembly has a collective delegation from the 
community of self-management interests, which acts as the spokesman for the 
real individual, who has specific personal and social interests (Kardelj 1980: 
232). 
Not only did this provide continuity and a direct linkage between the different 
political levels, but also, as the Constitution specified that all questions on the agenda 
had to be discussed within the delegations first, this enabled the delegate, who was a 
member of both assemblies, to be in a position to bargain for the lower level 
preferences at the higher-level meeting. This does not mean, however, that Delegates 
were merely 'transmission belts' (Ramet 1984: 73) or are simply there to be a 'rubber 
stamp' spokesman (Kardelj 1975: 44) for their respective Assemblies. 
Each delegate was not restrained by an 'imperative mandate' (Ibid: 44); instead they 
were given a general set of instructions by their delegations, but not told how to vote 
on the decisive issues. Instead, each delegate consulted the other delegates within the 
assembly, and with his own delegations instructions in mind, sought to arrive at 
solutions that were acceptable to everyone and in the general public interest. In doing 
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so they represented the needs and interests of their self-managing community (Ibid: 
45). 
As the basis of the political system was residual, elections became practical 
experiments in managing the welfare of the association, rather than political contests 
as to who was going to exercise political power for the next n years. The Yugoslav 
delegates when acting within assemblies, consciously sought to reconcile their 
position to that of other delegates in order to find a consensus in which all benefited; 
we shall see in Chapter Three that this procedure is replicated in the Althusian 
decision-making procedure in the town and city. 
Although there was a degree of flexibility and autonomy within the system it did not, 
however, give the delegates a position akin to a Western representative politician. If a 
delegation felt that a delegate has ceased to represent the interests of the self-
managing community, the delegation is in a position to recall them. Likewise, the 
delegate could resign if they were not in agreement with the instructions forwarded to 
them by the delegation (Kardelj 1975: 45). 
Although the Titoist system consciously dispensed with any recognisable notion of 
the 'direct' elections, it did have the potential to increase both accountability and 
ensure widespread participation. As Tito told the Tenth Congress of the SKJ in May 
1974, over 7000,000 citizens or 1 in 20 of the eligible voters were serving on some 
kind of delegation, and this meant that there was an increased emphasis on 'grass-
roots' politics. By 1981 this figure had risen to 1,000,000 and writing in 1986, Seroka 
and Smiljkovic speculate that as 'rotation in office, circulation of functions, and short 
terms of office are the rule, the proportion of the population that has served, or will 
serve, as a delegate or a member of a delegation may eventually include everyone' 
(1986: 16). 
The use of the mandate system representing a common collective view and forcing 
representatives to try to reconcile their communal and regional interest in decision-
making is repeated in Althusius' discussion on the decision-making process in the 
guild and the city. Likewise, as will be seen in Chapter Two, making consensual 
decisions the optimal form of decision-making can also be found in Politica. 
Although often derided for producing weak decisions, a consensual decision is more 
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likely to have been thoroughly discussed and have taken into account all points of 
view, than if all decisions are put to a majority vote. The use of consensus was also 
reflected in interrepublican discussions, Kardelj favouring the method of negotiations, 
as excessive state coercion could lead to an 'extremely serious political crisis' (Burg 
1983: 20 I). Instead, Kardelj argued that: 
... we turned primarily to the method of negotiation and agreement making 
among the republics. Because in such direct negotiations by the republics, on 
the occasion of the harmonisation of their interest, it will be easier to find 
appropriate forms of mutual compensation in situations when someone's 
legitimate interests are affected (Ibid.). 
The aim of this system was to avoid the failings of both the conflictual system of 
multiparty democracy of bourgeois capitalism or the single party state system 
(Kardelj 1975: 41) and to create a 'new historical type of democracy' which is 'more 
progressive and more human' than parliamentary democracy (Kardelj 1975: 18). 
The dogmatists who champion the political pluralism of the bourgeois state 
seem to think that the history of democracy has reached its culmination in the 
bourgeois system of democracy, and that any other form of political system is 
contrary to democracy ... fortunately, however, there are and will be many 
systems much more democratic than the bourgeois parliamentary state 
(Kardelj 1977: 394) ... it is, therefore, pure political hypocrisy when a socialist 
society is accused of an absence of democracy and rule by dictatorship, while 
bourgeois society is said to be free of dictatorship, to have a rule of 
democracy (Kardelj 1980: 137). 
Althusius and The Withering of Yugoslavia? 
In addition to the influence Althusius had on Kardelj's work, this 'Kardeljianism' has 
recently been proposed as a reason for the dissolution of the country in 1991. In 
reviewing Dejan Jovic's recent book Yugoslavia, the State which Withered Away: The 
Rise, Crisis and Fall of Kardelj's Yugoslavia (1974-1990), Aleksander Pavkovi6 
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argues that Jovic identified the greatest tension in Yugoslavia in the 1980s and 1990s 
as between those who wished to defend the constitutional structure, such as the 
Slovenes, and those who wished to reform the structure to stop the 'erosion of the 
powers of the federal state' (2003: 301), such as the Serbs. Increasingly, in the late 
1980s there was also a third party, 'the revolutionaries' such as Milosevic, who relied 
on Serb national pride and communist rhetoric, and wished to act quickly to achieve 
their political goals, using revolutionary that is, 'non-institutional', means. The 
tension reached its peak at the 14th Congress of the SKJ in January 1990, when the 
Slovenian delegation, realising that stalemate had been reached, and "not being able 
to defend Kardelj's doctrine of Yugoslavia from the constitutional reformists and, 
later, 'revolutionaries' ... decided to leave Yugoslavia" (2004: 303). Interestingly, 
Jovic argues that this action was: 
... quite close to the spirit if not the letter of Kardelj's doctrine ... a return to a 
centralised Yugoslav state, from the viewpoint of this doctrine, would have 
been historically retrogressive and, in comparison, the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia appeared a preferable if not necessarily much more progressive 
development (2004: 303). 
In support of this claim, Jovic highlights the fact that in 1967 Kardelj warned that the 
'unitarists' of the SKJ, not to provoke ethnic separatism, but to allow all nations to 
create their won states within Yugoslavia' (Jovic 2002: 170). 
Jovic further supports this hypothesis in his earlier chapter "Yugoslavism and 
Yugoslav Communism: From Tito to Kardelj" in Dejan Dokic's "Yugoslavism. 
Histories ofa Failed Idea 1918-1991"; where he argues that: 
Edvard Kardelj believed that the main danger to post-Tito's Yugoslavia would 
come from the renewal of a centralised state, either in its interwar (bourgeois) 
form or in a form of Soviet statist (' Stalinist' or - as Kardelj called it - 'Great 
Statist') socialism. If this happened, Kardelj argued, the results of the 
Yugoslav revolution would be annulled (2003: 168). 
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AIthusius in Contemporary Political Writings 
As a theorist, Althusius is rarely mentioned in discussions on political thought, let 
alone in the EU constitutional debate. One of the most prominent authors to realise 
the potential of Althusius' work was Daniel Elazar (l991a, 199Ib), writing on 
Althusius' relation to federalism and covenantal constitutional structures. Indeed, 
Elazar's belief in federalism as a political system is reflected in his claim that Politica 
represents the basis of a 'post-modem' federalism, which in many respects, would 
bridge the divide between the liberal and communitarian canon. His reason for this is 
that this post-modem model would recognise the need for the individuals in civil 
society to be secure in their individual rights while simultaneously acknowledging 
group associations as also having real, legitimate collective rights in an appropriate 
constitutional or political status. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the political ideas of 
Althusius cannot be literally transposed into what Elazar calls the 'post-modem' 
epoch' at the end of the Twentieth century, because of the significant political, social 
and economic changes that Europe has undergone in the past 400 years. Nonetheless, 
Elazar claims that 'much of his [Althusius'J system, its ideas, and even its 
terminology, may be adaptable or at least from the basis of post-modem federalism' 
(Elazar 1995b: 447). 
The potential Althusius offers to political theory has also reached the discussion on 
cosmopolitan democracy and other forms of globalisation. Keane argues that while 
traditional notions of cosmopolitan democracy favoured Kantian principles, 
'cosmocracy' or a variant of global democracy, is a: " ... much messier and far more 
complex type of polity ... it is a conglomerate of interlocking and overlapping sub-
state, state and supra-state institutions and multi-dimensional processes that interact, 
and have political and social effects, on a global scale" (2002: 8). 
For Keane, the role Althusius plays is clear, for which Politica is 'deserving of a 
revival' , as despite various weaknesses and anachronisms: 
Althusius has much to say to us about the need to think normative1y and 
strategically, in more nuanced ways, about complex systems of power. 
Cosmocracy resembles a thoroughly modem version of the political world 
pondered by Althusius, a strangely 'medieval' melange of overlapping legal 
61 
structures and political bodies that come in all shapes and sizes - a many-
sided world of overlapping and potentially conflicting political structures, 
primordial groups, differently sized political associations, and federalist 
strivings for both particularism and universalism, ecumene and community 
(2002: 58-59). 
While the aim of this thesis is to further understanding of sui generic 
constitutionalism, and not enter a discussion on either post-modernism or cosmocracy, 
the use of Althusius in both these discussions allows us to make two interrelated 
points. First, the increased attention paid to Althusius' work appears to be the result 
of the growing recognition of the limitations of 'traditional' constitutional theory; for 
example its inability to accommodate non-state or non-geographical actors in the 
constitutional process. Second, and this point will be elaborated below, a weakness of 
Politica is that there are specific methodological issues involved in the normative 
interpretation of the text. 
Unsurprisingly, due to Althusius' limited 'existence' in the theoretical world, it is the 
same authors who discuss Althusius within both the realm of political theory and 
within the realm of EU constitutionalism. The two most prominent authors in this 
category are Thomas Hueglin 1994a, 1999) and Daniel Elazar (199Ia, 1995a, 1995b). 
In fact, Hueglin's paper entitled Federalism, Subsidiarity and the European Tradition 
was one of the first attempts to take an aspect of Althusius' work, in this case 
subsidiarity, and explore its potential for the understanding of the EU (1994a). With 
regard to the theme ofsubsidiarity, Hueglin's idea of'societal federalism' (1999: 109-
135), which is understood as a 'general form of social organisation' rather than 'a 
specific type of government' (Ibid: 109), has been further explored by Markus 
Jachtenfuchs, who argues that within 'unitary and hierarchical states' the centre is 
usually far away from the individual's every day lives. In order to combat this, there 
needs to be a redistribution of 'rights to people on the local and the regional level and 
with regard to those areas which are of direct relevance to them' (1998: 55). 
Largely due to the work of Elazar and Hueglin, subsequent discussions of Althusius in 
relation to the EU predominantly relate to either subsidiarity (Endo 1994, Friesen 
2003), or to federalism (Elazar 2001: 34, Hueglin 1999: 2), or due to the fact that 
Althusius wrote at a time in which the sovereign state had yet to become the dominant 
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form of political association. As will be explored in more detail in Chapter Five, 
there are those authors who locate Althusius as being either a 'common wellspring of 
modem federalism and consociationalism' (Koslowski 1999: 567) or alternatively as 
the source of a continental, as opposed to an American federal canon (Burgess 2000: 
8). 
Probably the most productive and well-known fields of Althusian literature are not 
those theories that are direct interpretations of Althusius, but those theories that are 
influenced by him. The classic example of this is Arendt Lijphart's Consociational 
Democracy (1969) which attempted to explain why certain European countries were 
stable democracies, despite adopting neither Anglo-American nor Continental 
European styles of democracy. Although Consociational Democracy was not 'EU-
specific', not only has it been subsequently applied to an understanding of the EU 
(Taylor 1990, 1993, 1996), but it was also the basis for Dimitris Chryssochoou's 
(1994) Confederal Consociationalism, which adopted Lijphart's original work in an 
EU context. In addition, there have been more recent 'consociational interpretations' 
and discussions of the European Union, most notably in the form of an EU 
consociational discussion between Matthij s Boogards, Markus Crepaz and Andre 
Kaiser (2002), but also Ann Peters (2003), who made a plea for a European 'semi-
parliamentary and semi-consociational democracy'. Finally, it must not be forgotten 
that consociationalism as a political theory, is discussed in a significant number of EU 
textbooks (Hix 1999, Chryssochoou et a11999, Rosamond 2000). 
Another possible example of an Althusian influenced work is Phillipe Schmitter's 
Condominio (1996). Written in a chapter entitled Imagining the Future of the Euro-
Polity with the Help of New Concepts and very much in the Lijphart vein of 
thinking28, Schmitter argues that: 
Instead of one Europe with recognised and contiguous boundaries, there 
would be many Europes. Instead of Eurocracy accumulating organisationally 
distinct but politically co-ordinated tasks around a single centre, there would 
28 Both consociational democracy and Condominio were one example taken from a matrix of possible 
scenarios. For Lijphart's consociational democracy, the other examples were Centripetal democracies, 
Centrifugal democracies and Depoliticised democracies; while for Schimtter's Condominio, the other 
possible outcomes were Consortio, Confederato, StatolFederatio. 
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be multiple regional institutions acting autonomously to solve common 
problems and produce different public goods (1996a: 136). 
The commonality that both Consociational democracy and Condominio enjoy is the 
promotion of a regionalisation of power and a shift in the decision-making away from 
a central authority to the peripheral powers. What Lijphart brings to the discussion, 
and something that Althusius discusses in Politica, is the possibility that 
representation and 'federalism can be analysed along non-territorial, functional lines 
as well as upon territorial lines' (Burgess 2000: 7). 
Conclusions 
There has yet to be a concerted effort to use Althusius' Politica as the basis for an 
alternative theory of constitutionalism. There are many possibilities as to why this is 
the case, but only six win be discussed here: infancy, time, relevance, theoretical 
originality, language and methodology. 
The first two reasons, of infancy and time, are related. Althusius' work is relatively 
newly rediscovered and so Politica, unlike Hobbes' Leviathan and Locke's Two 
Treatise, will not have been explored in the numerous political scenarios in which it 
could be applied. In this way, Politica's potential as a source of theoretical 
constitutionalism has yet to be realised. Yet to undertake such a lengthy exploration 
of Politica and compare it to a societas canon requires a significant amount of time be 
spent, not only on research, but also on formulating the comparisons. In addition to 
the time taken, there is also the issue of author preference; namely, authors may not 
wish to undertake such an investigation, as the perceived benefits may be limited. 
A third reason why Althusius has yet to be explored in depth could be due to the 
perception that Althusius has little or no relevance to the modern contemporary world, 
but this is unlikely. If this were the case, why would respected authors such Daniel 
Elazar, Thomas Hueglin and Michael Burgess attempt to further hypothetical 
solutions if no possible good were to come from it? It is the finding of this thesis that 
Politica does have relevance to the modern world, but only to certain aspects. 
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Reaffirming the aim of the thesis, namely to further the understanding of sui generic 
associations, the potential displayed by Politica enables it to be applied to a 
contemporary setting, but in relation to the understanding of sui generic associations, 
as opposed to the understanding of the sovereign state. 
A fourth reason, partially stemming from the third, is the theoretical originality of 
Althusius' work. The authors, who have studied Althusius' Politica in detail, may 
have been discouraged by its limitations or by its confrontation with modem 
democratic ideas. Althusianism is a direct and holistic challenge to the liberal 
political ideals that have evolved over 300 hundred years. 
The fifth reason is centred on the problem of language. Althusius wrote the original 
version of Politica in Latin. Although the Latin version is available, there is 
understandably, a reliance on the abridged English version of Frederick Carney. This 
problem is further compounded by Carney himself, who in the introduction to the 
1995 edition of Politica discusses with a refreshing honesty the problems of 
translation from Latin to English (1995: xxix-xxxiii). Subsequent authors have also 
commented on these problems, and there have been attacks on Carney's work. The 
most malicious of these appeared in an article by Robert V. Friedeburg entitled Self-
Defence' and Sovereignty: The Reception and Application of German Political 
Thought in England and Scotland, 1628-69 (2002), in which in a footnote, the author 
attacks Camey's work thus: 
The abridged English translation The Politics of Althusius, ed. Frederick 
Carney (London 1964), is useful for a first glance at the text at best, but both 
the translation itself and the substantial omissions make this edition almost 
useless for any more serious approach (2002: fnSl. Emphasis Mine). 
In support of Carney, and a glaringly obvious point that Friedeburg appears to 
overlook is that in the modem age, there are limited scholars who read Latin 
competently enough to read Politica in its original Latin version. Whilst this fact 
does not remove the problems with Carney's translations, it does put it into some kind 
of perspective. If contemporary non-Latin readings scholars were not meant to read 
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Politica, then Althusius' work would remain largely unknown.29 However, and 
despite the translation problems, if the aim of Carney's work was to re-introduce 
Althusius into political debate, by translating Politica he widens the scope of 
involvement. One of the authors who Carney has enabled to join the Althusian 
debate is the 'Doyen of Modern Federalism' Daniel Elazar, who in the introduction to 
the 1995 edition of Politica, openly admits he lacks a sufficient command of Latin 
(1995a: xliv). In this respect: 
We owe Professor Carney a great debt for providing the English-reading 
public with the opportunity to read Althusius' magnum opus in translation and 
not to have to rely upon assessments ofthe Latin text by others (Ibid: xlvi). 
The final possible explanation for the lack of attention to Althusian thought is 
methodological. The problem here is two-faced: first there is a massive shift in the 
political and social world between 1603, when Politica was first written and the 
present time. Subsequently Politica, as a complete work, has yet to be explored in 
relation to modern constitutionalism, rather individual aspects, such as subsidiarity 
(Hueglin 1994a), have been adopted. Second, there is the issue of context and 
recognition of sources. While Politica was the source of the key aspects of Arendt 
Lijphart's consociational democracy, in much of the subsequent discussion on 
consociational democracy, Althusius' role is ignored. Rather than criticising the 
initial work of Althusius and consociational democracy, subsequent critics (such as 
Barry 1975 and Halpern 1986) have focused solely on Lijphart. The methodological 
problems here occurred as a result of the fact that Lijphart took one aspect of 
Althusius out of context. The result of this, and something that is evident in the 
subsequent EU literature is that the initial context in which Althusius wrote is 
forgotten, thus the full impact of the Althusius theory is either lost or misinterpreted 
with a completely different outcome. 
This point is reiterated in the concluding chapter of Thomas Hueglin's (1999) Early 
Modern Concepts for a Late Modern World. Althusius on Community and 
Federalism. In a discussion on the 'lineage of Althusius', Hueglin argues that 
29 The present author has had first-hand experience of Friedeburg's view. Upon submission of an 
article entitled Back to Althusius: Pre-Westphalian Suggestions for a Post-Westphalian World to the 
Journal of International Relations and Development, one of the reviewers opened their criticism by 
arguing that the author has made no attempt to refer to the original Latin version of Politica. 
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although both the term and the concept of consociationalism have been derived from 
Althusius (1999: 210), there are 'significant differences' (Ibid: 211) between the two 
versions. The most pressing of these is the fact that for Althusius, consociatios were a 
'generic unit of political organisations'. Citizens who were organised in the 
consociatios were to be empowered to make autonomous decisions about what they 
would consider as useful and necessary in social life (Ibid.): 
Modem consociational practice, on the other hand, has been described as elite 
accommodation reducing rather than enhancing the complexity of social life. 
Consociational democracy in this understanding constitutes a descending form 
of elite control over the segments of society which are to be brought to 
peaceful coexistence, not an ascending form of organised popular control over 
the process of governance (1999: 211). 
The problem here arises from the misrepresentation of the word 'consociation' as the 
term originates in a non-liberal model. For Althusius it represents an integral part of a 
system that allows individual groups to make decisions over their own lives at the 
lowest possible level, rather having an elite making them on their behalf, as is the case 
in consociational democracy. The point to be made here is that despite Althusius' 
increasing relevance, especially to the EU constitutional discussion, the fact is that 
much of Politica is taken out of context and so the original Althusian meaning is lost. 
In order to avoid this methodological problem, this thesis has consciously 
distinguished between the societas (i.e. Hobbesian) canon of constitutionalism and 
Althusius, and presents the latter as an independent constitutional theory in relation to 
the former. 
Before the theoretical discussion can begin, it is important to define what is meant by 
the terms' constitution' and 'treaty', since the fact that there is no single definition for 
either term is a serious flaw of their usage within constitutional debates. Both terms 
are used ad infinitum in the societas literature, but also increasingly in relation to sui 
generic associations, such as the EU, but there is no single agreed definition for either 
term. How can it be that two theorists or politicians can discuss the same text and yet 
have a different understanding of its meaning? What are the consequences of such a 
position? After establishing a working definition of 'constitution' and 'treaty', the 
chapter will then explore Politica in relation to these working definitions to gather the 
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differences between the societas and Althusian understanding of the terms. The aim 
of such a discussion is to demonstrate that Politica represents a fundamentally 
different version of constitutionalism to the societas canon, and that Althusian 
constitutionalism is better suited to explain the constitutionalisation of sui generic 
associations. 
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Chapter 2. What Constitutes a Constitution? The Need for a 
Definition 
It should be borne in mind that there is nothing more difficult to arrange, more 
doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through than initiating a 
change in a state's constitution. The innovator makes enemies of all those 
who prospered under the old order, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming 
from those who would prosper under the new. 
Niccolo Machiavelli The Prince: 51 
One of the principal problems in constitutionalising a sui generis association is the 
lack of definition of the term 'constitution'. How can something be 
constitutionalised, if no one is completely sure what a constitution is? Although this 
may initially appear to be a matter of semantics and philology, it has the potential to 
lead to a position in which one person using one definition may legitimately argue 
that an association has become constitutionalised, while at the same time a different 
actor may present an equally valid case as to why it has not. This leads to a position 
of confusion and, relating to the importance of language in any form of law, this is not 
an agreeable position to be in. In saying this, this does not mean that if there were an 
agreed definition of the term all problems of political practice would be eradicated. 
Far from it. The issue of the 'constitution belonging to the state' is just one problem 
that can be cited from an ever-increasing list of difficulties, which would also need to 
be overcome. 
The issue of the lack of a definition of a constitution, and the objective of the first part 
of this chapter, is to review constitutional theory and to attempt to define the common 
structural, political and legal characteristics that modem constitutions share. This in 
itself is not a major task, but the point of locating these 'consensual aspects' of the 
constitution is to produce a 'consensual definition' or a 'catalogue of characteristics' 
that can be used as a working definition for a comparison with Althusian 
constitutionalism. The purpose of this comparison between Althusian and societas 
constitutionalism is to locate the differences between the two approaches, and allow 
us to explore Althusian constitutional and its potential for furthering our 
understanding of sui generic constitutionalism. 
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The second part of the chapter will focus on the second form of political association 
of the societas canon: the treaty. It is a commonplace that whilst the constitution 
deals with the domestic governance of the state, the treaty deals with its international 
relations. Although this duopoly represents a legitimate legal distinction between the 
foundation of domestic and international relations, it has not only been surpassed by 
political practice, but also aspects of jurisprudence have long questioned its validity. 
In addition to the questions asked by jurisprudence over the legitimacy of the distinct 
division between the two terms, there is a more fundamental weakness that very much 
negates its usefulness for the contemporary EU discussion: this simplistic division 
between a 'treaty' and a 'constitution' fails to consider the possibility of a third, or 
even fourth, political relationship between different associations. In this manner, the 
failure of this dichotomy to adapt itself to the increasing emergence of sui generis 
associations can be seen as a serious weakness of the societas canon. 
The Attempt to Identify a Definition or 'Catalogue of Characteristics' of the 
Constitution 
From constitutional theory, a broad consensus can be reached regarding a constitution 
and its workings. Yet each constitution also has several distinguishing features linked 
to the very specific context in which it was written. In addition to this, there are 
many differing theoretical and ideological styles of constitutionalism. 
For instance, amongst the current Member States of the European Union, there is a 
whole range of constitutional styles: ranging from federalist, presidential 
parliamentarism, parliamentarist, presidential and monarchical parliamentarist. 
Although it would be convenient to pigeon-hole each constitution in this way, is 
increasingly not possible to do so. For instance, Spain is a Monarchical 
Parliamentary regime, but is undergoing a process of federalisation due to the 
growing autonomy of the regions. Belgium, although remaining a monarchy, has 
adopted a federal structure. Nevertheless, four broad theoretical elements emerge: a 
written text, a separation of powers, a Bill of Rights, and the supremacy of the 
Constitution. 
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As these theoretical groupings have been deduced from constitutions in general, in 
theory they will all be similar if not the same, yet in practice there may be differences. 
The theory behind a separation of powers will be identical in all constitutions, but the 
actual form this takes will be different. A presidential separation of powers will 
differ, for example, from a parliamentary one. Likewise, a federal separation will 
differ from that found in a unitary system. In the same way, while the theory behind a 
Bill of Rights is to ensure the Rights of the citizen within the society, in practice not 
all Bills of Rights will contain the same rights. Finally, although the majority of the 
documents are written some are written, but contain parts of previous constitutions or 
treaties as annexes. A good example of this is the Austrian constitution that has, 
under article 149 [Old Laws], given constitutional status to previously enacted laws. 
A point that is evident from the discussion, even at this stage, is the influence of the 
Societas canon on these common characteristics. The topic of the separation of 
powers originated in the work of James Harrington, John Locke, Baron de 
Montesquieu and the Publius authors. Likewise, the issue of natural law and the bill 
of right is an archetypal Societas discussion originating in the Hugo Grotius and 
Thomas Hobbes, before being famously discussed by Thomas Paine and Edmund 
Burke. 
Unwritten v. Written 
The issue of the written text in constitutional theory has long been a point of 
contention amongst scholars. One the one hand, there is a simplistic differentiation 
between 'written' and 'unwritten' texts, but in reality this distinction is misleading; as 
C.F. Strong points out: " ... this is a false distinction, because there is no constitution 
which is entirely unwritten and no constitution that is entirely written" (1963: 66). 
Moreover, K.C. Wheare argues that the distinction between written and unwritten 
constitutions should be discarded. 'The better distinction is that between those 
countries that have a written constitution and those that have no written constitution' 
(1963: 20-1). The difference between an unwritten and a no(n)-written constitution, as 
identified by Wheare, is a subtle one and focuses on the nature or existence of 
'constitutional laws'. The former example, despite being called 'unwritten', will 
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contain written laws that are of constitutional importance, but these laws will not be 
consolidated in a central document called the 'constitution'. Rather these laws exist 
on the statute books of the country alongside 'ordinary' legislation. The possible 
confusion that may arise from this situation, is that even where there exists a central 
constitution, there are laws that are constitutional that may not be included in the 
single document. On the contrary, in an example of a 'no(n) -written constitution', 
no constitutional laws will exist. 
Adopting a broader point, but in many ways supporting Wheare's position, Vemon 
Bogdanor notes that; "In addition to the basic meaning of 'constitution' - a document 
containing, at the very least, a code of rules setting out the allocation of functions, 
powers and duties among the various agencies and officers of government - there is a 
wider meaning of constitution, according to which every democratic state has a 
constitution" (1988a: 4). 
Despite this, there is a common practice in the constitutional literature to explore the 
written constitution, with the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Israel cited as 
examples. Does this mean that constitutionalism is possible even in the absence of a 
written constitution? Unfortunately, the answer to the question depends very much on 
the definition of constitution used. If we use the example given by Strong, then the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand and Israel do have constitutions, despite their lack of 
a single document, and in this instance constitutionalism can occur within the 
confines of an unwritten text. Thus, constitutionalism can occur despite the absence 
of a written constitution, which very much negates the need for a written text. What 
this fails to explain, though, is why the vast majority of constitutions are written? 
Several possible reasons can be suggested for this. 
In the first instance, the constitution needs to be a written text in order for all political 
actors to be aware of the 'rules of the game', namely, the single document lays out the 
political structure and rules, and the constitution may also limit the term of office of 
officials. In addition, the bill of rights will also inform the citizens of their rights. 
Secondly, the written document has a symbolic nature. As well as serving as the 
fundamental law of the state, the text can also be used as a form of 'social adhesion' 
to bind a citizenry or provide a focus of loyalty. Thirdly, a written text is often 
viewed as more democratic, than an unwritten constitution, due to its openness; that is 
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no single party can 'hide' rules from another within the political process, and this is 
evident when the unwritten constitution is explored. In the scenario of an absence of 
a written text, in many ways the government becomes the constitution, leaving it in an 
irrefutable position in terms of power and legitimacy within the state. As the 
constitution is seen as a legitimate tool to control the power of government, if the 
government is the constitution then this perverts the whole idea of constitutionalism. 
Also, a written text can act as a safeguard to individual's rights, and so if the 
assurances and protection contained within the text are missing, this leaves the 
citizenry open to potential exploitation and oppression by those in power. 
Equally, however, even when the constitution is written, it remains a piece of paper 
with no power. The power it enjoys emanates from the citizens' perception of it. It 
will only enjoy the prestige and power it deserves as long as the citizenry perceives 
the constitution's importance. If the text is seen to effectively control the powers and 
actions of the ruling parties, this will add to its precedence, as it will be seen as having 
a legitimate role. As Samuel Finer notes; "Constitutions are otiose: if the power-
holders exercise self restraint, the written constitution is unnecessary, and if they do 
not then it is useless" (1995: 1-2). 
If this claim is true then there is no real point in continuing this discussion about 
constitutions; under this premise money would also be useless. A €5 note is only 
worth €5 because we perceive it to be and we respect the authority of the 'piece of 
paper'. The actual value of the paper the note is printed on would be a few Cents, but 
it can buy €5 worth of goods. 
So here we have an interesting paradox. The written text is only relevant when it is 
respected, but a written text is essential as not only does it layout the political rules, 
but it will also remove much of the fear that is naturally generated by different 
factions within the state. In this respect the written text is largely symbolic, as it 
psychologically reassures the citizenry that the government can be held in check, and 
so represents the resolution of the paradox. 
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The Separation of Powers 
The aim of the separation of powers, when the American constitutional writers first 
significantly discussed it in the 1770s, was to ensure individual liberty. The 
separating of powers between the differing branches of government was essential for 
Montesquieu (1748) and the Publius authors (1788) in order to ensure that liberty was 
not encroached upon. For such authors, the very notion of all powers of the 
legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands, whether hereditary, self-
appointed or elective may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny 
(Madison Publius: 245). 
However, in this context the definition of liberty is unclear. Indeed, Montesquieu 
argues that for some people liberty meant the ability to wear a long beard, (Spirit of 
Laws: 149); but despite this lack of clarity for Montesquieu, the term liberty from 
James Madison onwards is synonymous with freedom. Undeniably, the Lockean-
influenced idea of individual liberty was so important to the American Founding 
Fathers that not only was each branch of government given a distinct and separate, but 
inter-dependent role, but if the differing branches did collaborate and pass a liberty-
encroaching Act, individual liberty could be maintained by the Supreme Court. 
The first effective separation of powers was enacted in the American Constitution in 
1787. In this the three main branches of government were allotted with powers, but 
more importantly were independent of each other, but not autonomous, because they 
cannot operate on their own (Saj6 1999: 74). It was Madison's ideal that, unlike in the 
British system where Parliament is supreme, no one branch could become stronger 
without making another weaker, so each would guard against the other's activities 
(Ibid: 72). So a form of 'Pareto Optimality,30 was created amongst the differing 
branches of government. Apart from its relative simplicity, another original aspect of 
the Madison's theory was that it also contained a system of checks and balances. In 
terms of the separation, this adoption of a system of checks and balances is neither a 
positive addition nor a negation (Lane 1996: 95). For Montesquieu the two could not 
mix, as checks and balances would negate the initial separation, but for Madison the 
30 Devise by the Italian economist and sociologist, Viflredo Pareto, (1848-1932), Pareto Optimality is 
an economic term to describe an economic situation, where the riches of one person cannot be 
increased without decreasing another's. 
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process of 'intra-regulation' of government would ensure that liberty was continued. 
The American system of checks and balances resulted from Madison's fear of human 
weakness when partaking in the political process (Saj6 1999: 3), and because of this 
was not meant to be efficient. It was meant to ensure that individual liberty could 
never be curtailed: 
The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, 
not to promote efficiency, but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The 
purpose was, not to avoid friction, but by means of the inevitable friction 
incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among the three 
departments, to save the people from autocracy" (www.supremecourtus.gov 
272 V.S. 293. Emphasis mine). 
The style of separation discussed above is specific to a presidential system, where the 
President is elected independently of the legislature and exercises the executive 
powers. Clearly this separation cannot function in a parliamentary monarchy or a 
republic in which the symbolic president has limited executive powers, so how does a 
parliamentary separation work? 
This style of government, often found in continental Europe, but not in all countries as 
France is an exception, revolves around the position of the executive vis-a-vis the 
legislative. In this scenario, the members of the Cabinet are responsible for filling the 
executive role and usually must also be members of the parliament (Wheare 1951: 
37). This system relies more on party politics than the personality politics of the 
Presidential system, as the voters will vote for a particular party and its leader, if 
elected, will form the cabinet. Due to the symbiotic nature of the relationship 
between the executive and the legislative, it is unlikely that the Cabinet could be 
impeached or removed in the same way as a President can; furthermore, the changing 
of the Cabinet is often a decision of the Prime Minister, not of the electorate. So what 
of a separation of powers where the executive and legislative are combined? For this 
parliamentary system, the separation of powers is applied with regard to the judiciary. 
As long as the constitution establishes the judiciary as separate from the 
executive/legislative, then parliamentary separation is in existence. 
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As well as the styles of separation between the different branches of the state, there is 
another style of separation, which can supplement those discussed above. The 
government may be restricted both at the "centre" and the "periphery" (Saj6 1999: 
95). Within a federal constitution a natural separation of powers already exists within 
the system between the federal and state level, but for those who advocate that "power 
is in unity", separation does not come naturally (Ibid: 69). Can there be a separation 
of powers within a unitary state? 
The simple answer is yes, but it will depend on the form of political system the 
constitution entails. For instance, France is a unitary state, and yet it has a 
presidential separation of powers, whereas Germany is a federal state, with a 
parliamentary separation. In this manner there is a spectrum of the separation of 
powers, not only between the differing branches of government, but also between 
federal and state level. 
Figure 6 shows only the two extreme positions in the relationship between the 
separation of powers and the state type, and just from the examples of France and 
Germany above, there are many differing examples to be found within the two 
extremes. 
Figure 6: Location of power in relation to the separation of power and nature of 
state 
Power Most Dispersed Power Most concentrated (State 
(State type/Separation of type/Separation of powers) 
powers) 
Federal/Presidential e.g. UnitarylParliamentary e.g. The 
The United States of United Kingdom 
America 
Source: The author 
In summary, a separation of powers of some form, whether presidential or 
parliamentary, is needed if individual liberty is not to be encroached upon. Although 
the classic authors on the subject have influenced this, it is clear that the main fear of 
both Montesquieu and Madison, that is the preservation of liberty, is still the main 
preoccupation of a societas-influenced constitutional separation. 
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Unlike many areas of constitutionalism, the separation of powers does lose its otiose 
nature once it is put into practice. As Andnis Saj6 notes; "Wandering cattle are not 
restricted by a clear boundary, only a barking dog on the neighbouring property" 
(1999: 70-71). 
The Bill of Rights 
The bill of rights is an essential feature of the Societas canon for two main reasons. 
Firstly, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three when we discuss the role 
of the individual in the societas canon and Althusius, the constitution can be seen as a 
social contract which individuals enter into; and in order for the rights surrendered to 
the state not to be lost, they need to be written in a single text. Secondly, a written 
Bill of Rights is needed in order to stop governments, or a minority from curtailing 
the rights ofthe majority. 
The idea of natural rights arguably originated from The Ten Commandments, but it 
was Hugo Grotius' The Law of War and Peace (1625) that introduced the notion of 
natural law (jus naturae), and Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan that introduced the idea of 
natural rights into political theory. Indeed, it was Hobbes who distinguished between 
the jus (law) and lex (rights), as before this time, in the Latin language, jus had been 
required to mean both law and rights (d'Entreves 1970: 61). This was not a solely 
linguistic matter though.31 What was clear was that in the American Declaration the 
theory of natural law had been turned into a theory of natural rights, and in this 
respect the theory of natural rights was acquainted with the idea of a fundamental law , 
which was the American version of the European law of nature (d'Entreves 1970: 61-
62). 
The purpose of this discussion is not however, to trace the idea of natural rights from 
Grotius, Hobbes, to Pufendorf, Locke and Rousseau, but to look at one particular 
aspect of the discussion of natural rights, namely the 'golden era' of both 
constitutional theory and practice that was the thirty years between 1762 and 1792. In 
this period, starting with Jean-Jacques Rousseau's The Social Contract, there were 
31 Another distinction between natural law and natural rights can be found in the definition of passive 
rights and active rights. Passive rights are ones given by somebody else, active rights are rights that 
are inherited at birth. 
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two defining revolutions of the time, in America and France, which both influenced 
and were influenced by the idea of 'Liberty'. Indeed: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness - That to secure these 
Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers 
from the Consent of the Governed ... (The Declaration of Independence 1776). 
It is not so much this practical aspect of 'liberty' that interests us in this part of the 
discussion however. What is of interest, and what arguably highlighted two opposing 
ideals of natural rights, was 'the most crucial ideological debate ever carried out in 
English' (Dishman 1971: 67) between Edmund Burke32 and Thomas Paine, conducted 
between 1790 and 1792. 
Until the French Revolution, both Burke and Paine shared both mutual respect and 
friendship, with Paine spending some time with Burke at his estate in Beaconsfield. 
The disagreement between the two originated in Paine's letters to Burke describing 
the events in Paris of the French Revolution, and it was these descriptions that 
gradually turned Burke away from the revolution (Dishman 1978: 59-68). 
Burke's opposition to the Revolution stemmed from the fact that his view of radical 
democracy of the French Revolution as negative for the French people. Rather, Burke 
preferred a moderate democracy in which the will of the people was tempered by 
other constitutionally entrenched institutions such as the Monarchy, Lords and Church 
(Muschamp 1986: 142-3). Although believing in rights per se, having fought for the 
rights of the American colonists against unfair taxation, Burke believed these had to 
be within a frame of continual, hereditary government, rather than the base of a 
government - that is the government, aristocracy and monarch ensures the rights of 
the people and the stability of the nation. Indeed, Burke offered the Bill of Rights Act 
(1688), as a more suitable manner in which to assure rights. Of the cementing nature 
of the 1688 Act, Burke wrote: "They [the Lords] knew that a doubtful title of 
32 Reflections is without doubt one of the major writings of English constitutional history and was 
partially written as an attack on the National Assembly and partially as an attack on Dr. Richard Price's 
speech to the Revolution Society on the 4th November 1789 entitled "On the Love of Our Country". See 
http://oll.libertvfund.orglTextsILFBooks/Sandoz0385IHTMLslLoveOfCountry.html 
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succession would but too much resemble an election; and that an election would be 
utterly destructive of the "unity, peace, and tranquillity" of this nation' (Reflections: 
86). 
In addition, those rights of the people, which were not forsaken in Acts of Parliament, 
were to be found in the history of the country. That is, each country found its unique 
rights in its own unique history (Stirk & Weigall 1995: 107). Indeed for Burke, the 
French universal Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizen was not only 'so 
"pedantic" in its "abuse of elementary principles as would have disgraced boys at 
school", but more importantly it was "a sort of institute and digest of anarchy" 
(Dishman 1978: 65). 
Whereas Burke despised the Declaration, it was very dear to Paine. Indeed, in much 
of his writings he argued for the notion of natural rights. David Powell in his book 
Tom Paine, the Greatest Exile and recalling the claim of William Cobbett, claimed 
that it was Paine, and not Thomas Jefferson, who wrote the American Declaration of 
Independence (1985:76). In the Rights of Man (1791-2), Paine acknowledged the 
existence of natural rights and argued that man's 'natural rights are the foundation of 
his civil rights' (The Rights of Man: 275). In this respect, when man enters civil 
society from the 'state of nature', he has to relinquish some of his natural rights to the 
state: 
The natural rights that he retains are all those in which the power to execute it 
is as perfect in the individual as the right itself. Among this class ... are all the 
intellectual rights, or rights of the mind; consequently religion is one of those 
rights. The natural rights which are not retained, are all those in which, 
though the right is perfect in the individual, the power to execute them is 
defective. They answer not his purpose ... (The Rights of Man: 276. Emphasis 
in original). 
For Paine, as was demonstrated in both America and France, and in complete 
opposition to Burke's idea, the Rights of Man are the basis of a 'modern' state and it 
is this emphasis on the past that is probably the key difference between the two 
authors. In Reflections, Burke accepts the constitutional history of Britain as being 
the best example and possibly hopes for the Revolution in France to falter, thus 
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enabling a British system to be installed. In this sense, Reflections is merely a 
continuation of a constitutional order and reflects the fact that Burke was not a 
philosopher, but a realist and a man of affairs. Politics for him was not about 
speculation or theory, but about practicality and prudence (Germino 1972: 217). 
Conversely, The Rights of Man rejects this 'old world'. Tradition was often not only 
simply a means of masking the denial of those human rights, which Paine regarded as 
the only proper basis for making decisions about government, (Muschamp 1986: 151) 
but also it acted as a restraint to the living generation (Stirk & Weigalll995: 107). As 
Paine explained in a somewhat macabre example, 'the dead have no rights'. Paine 
dismisses the hereditary style of government and the unwritten style of constitution in 
Britain in favour of a new style of government based on the individual rights and 
liberty of its members. In this sense, The Rights of Man is not a continuation of a 
constitutional order, but the originator of a new chain. 
From the result of the debate between Burke and Paine, it is clear that it is the style of 
the latter that, via the French and American revolutions, has had more of an influence 
on rights-based constitutionalism, than the 'traditional' style of Burke. Indeed, the 
influence of rights has so perforated present day society, that there are comparable 
texts in international organisations. Both the United Nations' Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948) and the European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(2000) are examples of 'supranational' bill of rights. 
But, what if constitutions did not contain a Bill of Rights? In terms of political 
theory the state would be unjust, as the individual joins civil society to be better off, in 
comparison to the 'state of nature' and if these civic rights are not codified and 
enforceable, then in certain instances, the individual is actually worse off. In a state 
of nature, the individual can dispense his own justice on others, but in a state where 
there is no Bill of Rights man has given up certain of his natural rights only to have 
them not guaranteed by the state, so these are then lost, as in civil society the 
individual is bound by laws and cannot enact his own punishment to the guilty. In a 
way, the Bill of Rights is a receipt. The parties to the contract place certain natural 
rights into the care of the government as they cannot execute them perfectly 
themselves and in return they are given a receipt, the Bill of Rights. 
What if the majority believe that their rights are enforceable via an unwritten 
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constitution? In this example the majority would be deceived into believing that their 
rights were guaranteed, but in reality the government, that is a small minority, could 
either easily amend, remove, or simply not respect these rights. Furthermore, there is 
the potential for an inconsistency between what the state believes is in the Bill of 
Rights and what actually it does contain. As the majority would not know what 
exactly was in the Bill of Rights, then this leads to the position where individual rights 
are flaunted by government without their knowledge. 
Samuel Finer's argument about the otiose nature of constitution is again here relevant. 
However, unlike the other parts of the constitution the writers of the constitution can 
establish a Constitutional Court that acts as the Supreme Court that upholds the rights 
of the citizen enshrined within the Bill of Rights. 
Constitutions and Law 
In most constitutional structures the constitution is viewed to be a higher law than 
'normal' laws. As K.C. Wheare argues the constitution 'by nature, is not just an 
ordinary law. It is fundamental law, it provides the basis upon which law is made and 
enforced' (1963: 9). John Elster and Rune Slagstad similarly argue that; "Under that 
theory, "higher" law-making in the form of constitutional polities, produces the 
particular norms placed in a constitution itself ... The other, lower track of law-making 
consists of normal politics ... " (1993: 330. Emphasis mine). 
Admittedly the argument in its original context was for a federalist system, but if we 
also look at unitary states we see evidence of the same relationship. The question 
here is not that it is widely agreed that constitutional laws are superior, but how 
should these laws be used in the everyday political and legal life of a state? This 
leads to further questions. Who ensures that it is not violated by legislative acts? 
Who has the authority to interpret its meaning? Alexander Hamilton argues that the 
constitution: " ... must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore 
belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act 
proceeding from the legislative body" (in Mueller 1996: 279). 
K.C. Wheare highlights five methods of constitutional interpretation, but only in two 
81 
may the judicial branch legitimately become involved in constitutional politics. The 
first, as Hamilton argues, is the role of a Constitutional Court, whose job is to 
interpret, maintain and uphold the constitution. The second is found mainly in 
continental Europe. In this system judges may review acts of the legislative body, but 
they may not enforce the constitution on the legislative body (in this sense they are an 
advisory body). The final three constitutional interpretations involve either firstly, 
putting no restraints on the legislative, as in New Zealand, or applying constitutional 
controls on the legislative, but trusting their acts not to violate these (1963: 146-155). 
As Wheare himself says; 
Why should judges be thought more trustworthy than legislators or 
administrators? Or why should judges be thought better equipped to decide 
what the constitution means than the members of other institutions of 
government? (1963: 152). 
The final structure is found in the Dutch constitution, which states that: "The 
constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by the 
courts" (art.120) 
Bearing in mind the differing examples of judicial review, is one variant better than 
others in their interpretation of constitutional laws? In order to answer this question, 
an exploration of examples of the differing structures needs to be undertaken. The 
more frequent of two styles is that of a Constitutional Court. This style is usually 
found in federal constitutions, but is also found in unitary states, such as Slovenia and 
Ireland. So what is the role of the Constitutional Court? In America this is clear, as 
Chief Justice Marshall of the Supreme Court explained; 
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the 
constitution apply to particular case, so that the court must decide that case 
conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the 
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these 
conflicting rules govern the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. 
if, then, the courts are to regard the constitution and the constitution to any 
ordinary act of the legislative, the constitution, and not such ordinary act must 
govern to which they both apply (www.supremecourtus.gov lcranch37. 
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Emphasis mine.). 
So one of the roles of the court is to interpret the 'validity of any law having regard to 
the provisions of the constitution (Chubb 1991: 60). The same ideal is enshrined in 
the constitutions of Germany (art.93), Austria (art.140), Ireland (art.34)33, France 
(art.61-62) Italy (art.127), Portugal (art.277-283), Spain (art.159-160) and to some 
extent Switzerland (art.189i4 In this regard, the Constitutional Court provides a 
safeguard to the 'safeguard provided in our state by the fundamental law of the 
constitution' (McIlwain 1969: 245). 
This style of legal interpretation is reactive, whereas there is a pro-active 
interpretation that can be adopted, namely the Constitutional Court as an advisory 
Council. 
The role of the French Conseil Constitutionnel, which consists of nine members is to 
rule on the constitutionality of acts of parliament. If the Conseil should rule an act to 
be unconstitutional, the act may not be promulgated or implemented. Furthermore, 
the decisions of the Conseil shall be not subject to appeal as they are final. In this 
case the Conseil works alongside the legislative bodies in order to maintain the 
constitutionality of their acts. Furthermore the impartiality of the Conseil should be 
ensured firstly, by the fact that it is working within the confines of the text of the 
Constitution and secondly, the fact that it is jointly appointed by the Presidents of the 
legislative and executive branches; however, it should be borne in mind that many of 
the appointments are politically motivated. 
There is a possible problem with Constitutional Courts in that their members are 
humans interpreting a constitution written by humans, and because of this there are 
several different interpretations that can be reached from the same text. Samuel Finer 
argues that the same article of a constitution can have four meanings, depending on 
the school of interpretation. Firstly; what the drafters meant, secondly; what the text 
means, thirdly; what the reader understands and finally; what the judges say it to 
l3 The Bunreacht na hEireann (Irish constitution), amongst others, forbids the legislative from 
p,assing any laws that are repugnant to the constitution (art. 15:4: I) 
4 The Jurisdiction of the Bundesgericht as laid out by the Swiss Constitution gives power to preside 
over intercantonallaw, but article 189(4) states "acts of the Bundesversammlung and the Bundesrat 
cannot be brought before the Bundesgericht. Exceptions are established by statute. (Italics mine) This 
list of examples is by no means exhaustive, but is intended to highlight the point of the argument. 
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mean (1995: 4-5). 
This leaves constitutional theory with a problem. If the constitution is going to be the 
fundamental law of the state then it needs to be written in a precise and unambiguous 
manner. As K.C. Wheare argues; 
It [the constitution] should confine itself, therefore, as completely as possible 
to stating laws, not opinions, aspirations, directives or policies ... The language 
employed, though inevitably general and wide in some matters, should at the 
same time avoid as far as possible, the ambiguous, the emotional and the 
tendentious3S (1963:73). 
The constitution needs to elevated above 'nonnal' laws in order for it to maintain its 
fundamental position, not only within the state, but also within the legal system. 
Despite this, this is not always the case. There are certain constitutional systems in 
which 'constitutional' laws can be changed in the same manner as 'ordinary' laws. In 
these examples, there can be either no constitutional law or no ordinary law. If both 
laws are changed in the same way, then the distinction between them is lost. 
Secondly, when the constitutional law is not supreme, and if a government can change 
laws with relative ease, what is to stop them acting dictatorially? Certainly not the 
constitution or the courts. Finally, with regards to the otiose nature of the 
constitution, the difficulty or special process needed to amend it will add to its stature. 
When the government distinguishes between these laws and ordinary laws, then the 
laws are raised on to a higher pedestal (the so-called lex-superior ideal, Lane 1996: 8). 
Althusian Constitutionalism 
Recalling the definition offered of the Althusian 'state' in Chapter One, and having 
identified a catalogue of characteristics of the 'modem' constitution consisting of a 
bill of rights, a separation of powers, a written text and the supremacy of law, let us 
compare these features to Althusian constitutionalism. In general tenns, the 
constitutionalisation of the differing Consociatios is dependent on a set of common 
" Royce Hanson argues that as 'constitutions are written by politicians and not by philosophers, the 
values embedded within a constitution are often vaguely stated or implicit' (1966: 106). 
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factors: a set of common laws and a means to communicate things, services, rights 
and mutual benevolence. This method of constitutionalisation can be seen as both 
tiered and collectivist, which is a stark contrast to the Societas constitutionalism that 
revolves around the individual and a single agreement to establish a State. Another 
interesting difference can be found in the work of both Hobbes and Rousseau. For the 
latter, the agreement centred on subjects of a state willingly gave up political power to 
a government through fear of other subjects (Rousseau Social Contract: 130), while 
for Hobbes man the agreement joined civil society due to partially due to mutual fear 
of others. For Althusius, this is quite the reverse, as can be identified by the fact that, 
as we shall see in Chapter Three, Althusian political theory needed no fictitious 'state 
of nature' in which to start. In addition to the sociability of man, for Althusius, the 
communication of things, services, rights and mutual benevolence is for the good of 
the immediate Consociatio and indirectly for him, as the individual can only realise 
himself within the Consociatio, thus it is in this individual interest to foster 
communication. 
The Need for a Written Text? 
Whether or not the covenant needs to be written will depend largely on the level the 
Consociatio occupies within the system. The covenant for a Collegium of three 
members may opt for a verbal agreement, as a necessity of efficiency. Likewise, it 
would be rather strange if a family, although a political Consociatio, had a covenant; 
this is more likely to be based on the marriage between the man and the woman. 
The need for a written covenant increases with the number of members. If the cities 
and provinces that comprise the Commonwealth all have written covenantal 
agreements, then the likely outcome is that the Commonwealth will also have a 
written agreement as: " ... the Universal Association [Commonwealth] has been 
constituted under the fundamental law of the realm, and this law is nothing but those 
pacts by which many cities and provinces agree upon the establishment of a 
commonwealth" (Hueglin 1979: 19). 
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The Bill of Rights 
The need for a Bill of Rights to protect individual liberties and/or rights is removed. 
In the Societas canon, the individual can realise his rights perfectly within the state of 
nature, but on leaving and joining the state, he surrenders some of these rights to the 
government created by contract, as the individual can no longer perfectly realise all of 
his rights. In this Thomas Paine inspired notion, the Bill of Rights can be viewed as a 
receipt for those rights that the individual surrenders to the government. In this way 
the Bill of Rights, usually through the enforcement of a Court, can be seen as a safety 
barrier as it ensures that rights are not encroached by government actions. 
In the Althusian Politica, the emphasis on individual rights in a centralised document 
is removed. The emphasis here is shifted onto the individual in direct relation to his 
immediate consociatios and the subsequent rights and duties that result from 
membership. In the Althusian 'state', man joins into consociatios in order to realise 
himself. Through the communication of rights each member of the consociatio agrees 
with every other to be ruled by a certain set of rules, but this does not necessarily refer 
to a Bill of Rights in the Societas sense. The shift away from individual rights, via a 
bill of rights, is also affected by the removal of the conflictual nature of the political 
system. If a majority makes a decision, there is always the potential for a minority to 
feel that they have had their rights infringed. In Politica, the emphasis is on 
consensual politics within each consociatio, thus the possibility of rights being 
'infringed' is greatly reduced, if not removed, as due to the efficiency of size, each 
member has the ability to participate. If one member of the consociatio does act in a 
selfish and individualistic way, this will not only be to the detriment of himself, but 
also to the consociatio as a whole, as the individual's self-improvement is directly 
linked to that of the consociatio. 
Secondly, and also in relation to the nature of man within the Societas canon, this 
individualism creates a position in which rights are the predominant feature. This 
position is clearly influenced by the natural right theorists such as Locke, but even if a 
Societas position that does not rely on a 'state of nature' is observed, such as that of 
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Burke36 or Paine, the important aspect is the natural and civil rights that man enjoys in 
relation to the government of the society. 
In comparison, Althusius has no interest at all in theories about human rights (Carney 
1995: xvi), whether natural or civil. What does interest him is the extent to which any 
association fulfils the purpose for which it was intended, and this intention will be 
satisfied by the differing members of the consociatio fulfilling their duties in relation 
to the consociatio as a whole. This is not to deny the absence of rights in Althusius' 
work, but due to man's mutually dependent nature, if the individual is to realise 
himself fully, it will be through his service to the respective consociatio of which he is 
a member. In this respect, Althusius would oppose tyrannical government, not 
because it is 'undemocratic' or endangers individual rights, but because it is 
ineffective in supporting the ends for which each person originally entered into the 
association (Ibid.). 
The Separation of Powers 
Although Althusianism mayor may not be written and mayor may not contain a Bill 
of Rights in the Societas sense of the word, the text or covenant will be the supreme 
or fundamental law and it will contain a very intricate separation of powers. The 
covenant will be the fundamental law of the Common Rights (jus commune) of the 
Collegium (Politica: 36), which Frederick Carney notes is the fundamental law or the 
constitution of the association (Ibid: fn 11). Indeed for Althusius it is 'indeed the 
pillar of the realm' (Carney 1964: 128). 
In Politica, we find a separation more elaborate than that advocated by Locke, 
Montesquieu or Madison. Subsidiarity, a term fully discussed in Chapter Five where 
we explore its relationship to federalism, is inherent in the Althusian system, and 
meant that no one body could dominate the others. The Commonwealth was merely 
the product of previous consociatio and so dependent on these agreements for its 
36 Despite the fact that Burke was adamantly opposed to the revolutionary nature of the French 
Revolution and the notion of basing a Government on rights, he did not deny that man did have natural 
rights; however these were relevant to a pre-civil, natural society and were to be exchanged for real 
rights, which could actually be enjoyed by living in a particular community (McClelland 1996: 390). 
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existence. If the Commonwealth began to act in a tyrannical way, its constituent parts 
would simply either dissolve it or cede from it and form a new one. The presence of 
subsidiarity within the system (Politica: 197) ensures this. 
The second 'prong' of the Althusian separation of power is that in each level of 
consociatio, although the prefect was elected to oversee the general running of the 
consociatio, he only has power over his colleagues individually, not as a whole. In 
this way, although the prefect is superior, he is inferior to the Collegium that elected 
him and to whose pleasure he must serve37 (Politica: 34): "And so these general 
administrators of the community are appointed by the city out of its general and free 
power, and can even be removedfrom office by the city. They are therefore temporal, 
while the community or city may be continuous and almost immortal" (Ibid: 41. 
Emphasis mine). 
At the level of the Commonwealth, this separation is further complicated. The 
Supreme Magistrate: " ... exercises as much authority as has been explicitly conceded 
to him by the associated members or bodies of the realm. And what has not been 
given to him must be considered to have been left under control of the people or 
universal association. Such is the nature of the contractual mandate" (Politica: 126). 
In keeping with the practices found in the other consociatios, the Supreme Magistrate 
is supreme in relation to individuals, but he is not supreme in relation to his subjects 
collectively, nor to the law, to which he himself subject' (Politica: 120). 
In addition to this, the Supreme Magistrate is also checked by the Ephors, to whom 
Althusius gives five fundamental rights, of which four are imperative for the 
separation of powers: 
1. The Ephors contain the supreme magistrate and general administrator that 
they have constituted within the prescribed and accepted limits of his 
universal administration (Politica: 103-104). 
2. To constitute themselves guardians, trustees, and administrators of the 
realm upon the supreme magistrate's capacity, death, madness, imbecility, 
37 Although this reference was taken from Althusius' discussion on the Collegium, it can be found 
throughout his structure. 
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minority, prodigality, or other disorder and impediment rendering him 
incapable or harmful in administration (Ibid: 107). 
3. To resist a supreme magistrate who abuses the rights of sovereignty, and to 
discharge and remove him when he scorns and violates the rights and laws 
of the realm, and practices tyrarmy (Ibid: 108). 
4. To defend the supreme magistrate and his rights against the ambitions, 
conspiracies, and plots of subjects, against the pride of the nobles, and the 
factions and seditions of the mighty, against those who act improperly 
towards the supreme magistrate's royal power, weakening him or 
impeding him, depriving him of it, or inflicting force and violence upon 
him (Ibid.). 
In this way neither the Ephors nor the Supreme Magistrate can usurp the power of the 
other, as although they are both powerful, in relation to each other they are mutually 
checked. 
If we take the separation of powers to refer to the relationship between the legislative 
and executive branches of government then this can be found in Politica. For the 
consociatio that are lower than the Commonwealth, i.e. cities, Collegiums or 
province, the executive is mandated in the prefect, who in turn is not only checked by 
the consociatio as a whole, but also by elected representatives (a form of Ephors). 
The separation can best be found within the relationship between the Supreme 
Magistrate and the Ephors within the Commonwealth. While the Supreme Magistrate 
is clearly the executive, his powers are checked not only by the mandate he is given, 
but also by the Ephors themselves. This arrangement, to an extent, also applies to the 
Ephors, they check the Supreme Magistrate, but in turn are also checked by him. 
The final prong of the separation of powers emanates from the subsidiarity principle 
and thus continues largely from the first. Within each consociatio there will be two 
sets of agencies, one representing the lower levels, which must retain as much power 
as possible, the other representing the higher levels, whose jurisdiction is limited by 
the lower levels (de Benoist 2000a: 33). 
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From the discussion above, it is evident that the variant of constitutionalism presented 
by Althusius differs in several fundamental ways to that of the societas canon. 
Societas constitutionalism represents a legal form of agreement between individuals 
to form a state, with the text designed to protect the liberty of the individuals, via both 
the bill of rights and the separation of power. For Althusius, the constitution 
represents a form of organising differing levels of consociatios, each of which is 
based on its own agreement. Moreover, as Althusius' emphasis is on organisation and 
the extent to which each consociatio fulfils the purpose for which it was formed rather 
than individual liberty, his form of constitutionalism, while containing a more 
elaborate separation of power than the societas variant, does not contain a bill of 
rights in the societas sense. 
We have suggested two reasons for the difference between the Althusian and societas 
constitutions: the lack of the contemporary state in 1603; second, the practical manner 
in which Althusius approached his perceived political problems. With the absence of 
the sovereign 'state', Althusius does not have to contend with the centralised nature of 
power in the way that Societas authors were forced to. In addition, Althusius' strong 
Calvinism influenced the lack of centralisation in Politica, and so A1thusius would 
naturally seek to leave as much power as possible at the lowest, and most appropriate, 
level. 
Having compared the Societas variant of constitutionalism and that of Althusius, how 
is this discussion affected by the addition of the word 'treaty'? While it is clear that 
for the Societas canon, Treaty Law would govern any agreement between states, what 
alternative does Althusius offer, bearing in mind the absence of the state, in a societas 
recognisable term, within Politica? 
What is a Treaty? Generic v. Specific definitions 
Since the time of Grotius, the science of the Law of Nations has not ceased attempting 
to formulate a satisfactory classification of the different kinds of treaties (Brandon 
1953: 56) and, despite the fact that there are International Conventions on the Law of 
Treaties, a definite term is still elusive. Indeed, Hugh Thirlway notes that 'if we 
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decline to essay any general answer to the question, What is a treaty?, we do so in 
good company" (1991: 4). The one dissenting voice in the literature is that of Arno1d 
McNair who, in 1961, states that 'the user of a book entitled The Law a/Treaties has 
a right to know the what the author means by the word 'treaty' (1961: 3. Emphasis 
mine), before using a definition given by Hersch Lauterpacht in his first report to the 
ILC in 1953: " ... a written agreement by which two or more States or international 
organisations create or intend to create a relation between themselves operating within 
the sphere of international law" (Ibid.).38 
In support of this, McNair declares that this definition: " .. .is submitted as an attempt 
to indicate what most persons, whether judges, counsel or authors, usually have in 
mind as a definition or description of a treaty" (Ibid: 4). 
Yet these definitions of the term Treaty are still problematic, which is itself a 
problem, bearing in mind that 'for the foreseeable future, the 'treaty' will remain the 
cement that holds the world community together' (Keamey & Dalton 1970: 495). 
Authors have consequently, in a similar manner to the constitutional exercise in the 
previous chapter, attempted to identify common characteristics that 'treaties' share. 
In this way, Kelvin Widdows argues that a treaty in its narrowest sense is a formal 
instrument recording and constituting an international agreement, but the term is 
elastic and employed just as often to describe any binding international agreement 
(1979: 117). Denys Myers, largely supported by Michael Brandon (1953: 56), argues 
that; " ... all agree that Treaties generically have the characteristic oflegally recording 
what the parties have agreed to, and, beyond that, all hedge on completing a 
definition" (1957: 574). 
This difference, noted by Widdows, is echoed in the United Nation Treaty Collection 
where 'treaty' as a generic term and 'treaty' as a specific term are differentiated. 
Whilst the specific term denotes the characteristics of each individual treaty, the 
generic term embraces 'all instruments binding in international law concluded 
between international associations, regardless of the their formal designation' . 
(http://untreaty.un.org/english/guide.asp) T.O. Elias observes that nearly all jurists 
" See Lauterpacht, (First) Report on the Law of Treaties, 1950 I.L.C. Yearbook (I1) 92, U.N. Doc 
AlCNAI63 " ... a written agreement by which two or more States or international organisations create or 
intend to create a relation between themselves operating within the sphere of international law." 
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now accept "Treaty" as the generic term embracing all kinds of international 
agreements in written form, whatever their particular designation. (1974: 14) The 
problem with the specific term remains, however. Despite the existence of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna), 'there are no consistent rules when state 
practice employs the term ''treaty'' as a title for an international instrument' 
(http://untreaty.un.org!englishlguide.asp). 
This aim of the following discussion is to identify a general definition of a treaty from 
the existing legal literature. The reason why the generic, rather than the specific 
definition is sought can be found in the difference between the two. The specific 
example will talk about the treaty, while a generic will talk about a treaty. To find a 
specific definition of a treaty is relatively simple; an analytical investigation of any 
treaty, whether a peace treaty, friendship treaty or arms limitation treaty, will reveal a 
definition and structure for that treaty, however this definition will then have its 
limitations to its applicability to other treaties. Clearly, as the aim of this discussion is 
to find a working definition for a treaty, this specific definition does not serve our 
purpose. 
The Vienna Convention (1969) 
Ifwe use the definition given by the first attempt at the codification of treaty law - the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties39 we find a definition as follows: 
An international agreement concluded between States in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in 
two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation (article 
2(1». 
However, the problem for Anthony Aust is not 'with the definition itself, but with 
whether a particular instrument or transaction falls within the definition' (2000: 14). 
D.P. O'Connell also finds the definition of a treaty unproblematic: For him a Treaty is 
39 The majority of books written on treaty law after 1969 use the articles of the Vienna Convention as a 
base, and a good concise description of the Treaty and the process of its writing can be found in 
Richard Kearney and Robert Dalton's "The Treaty on Treaties" in the American Journal of 
International Law vol,64 1970 pp.495-561. All references to the Vienna Convention will be taken 
from the United Nations Treaty Collection at http://www.un.orgllaw/ilc/texts/treaties.htm 
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an agreement between States, governed by international law as distinct from 
municipal law: 
The name given to the instrument is immaterial provided the parties have 
contractual capacity in international law, and provided their agreement is 
intended to create rights and obligations, or to establish relationships governed 
by intemationallaw (1970: 195). 
In support ofO'Connell's point, Elias notes that formal agreements strictly described 
as Treaties have been called conventions, protocols, pacts, acts, statutes, charters, 
covenants, concordats, declarations, agreements and modi vevendi (1974: 14) and to 
this list, Aust adds compact, solemn declaration, administrative Agreement, Platform, 
Agreed Minute and Terms of Agreement40 (2000: 22). 
Despite the fact that there is a definition of a Treaty contained in the Vienna 
Convention, this is still problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, although the 
article refers to a 'written text', this does not mean that oral agreements are excluded 
from the law of treaties (Elias 1974: 14). Jan Klabbers argues that verbal agreements 
were not included in the Convention; " ... for the simple reason that it would have been 
difficult, if not downright impossible, to deal with both oral and written agreements in 
a single agreement" (1996: 8). 
The lack of inclusion does not affect the validity of verbal agreements; (art. 3) indeed, 
the findings of the Ihlen Declaration in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case 
(1933)41 were that a Foreign Minister may commit his State to a treaty merely by 
words, and unilaterally at that (O'Connell 1970: 203).42 The Court found that when 
acting in an official capacity: " ... the Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of his 
Government in response to a request by the diplomatic representative of a foreign 
power, in regard to a question falling within his competence, is binding upon the 
country to which the Minister belong" (Ibid.). 
40 Denys Myers, in his tabulation of the usage of treaty names from 1864-1952, could add to the list at 
least twenty more titles. 
41 P.C.I.J., ser. AIB, No. 53, p.70 (1933) in O'Connell (1970: 202) 
42 See also Elias 1974: 154-155 & McNair 1961: 9-10 
93 
In support, Arnold McNair argues that; " ... provided that the two persons whose 
spoken words are relied upon as evidence of their agreement, are duly authorised to 
bind their states, there should be no reason in principle why a binding relation should 
not result" (1961: 7). However, as K.!. Igweike notes of the Court's decision: " ... the 
Court did not expressly state that the verbal engagement was a treaty, but Judge 
Anzilotti in his dissenting judgement had no hesitation in concluding that there was 
"an agreement" concluded "by means of purely verbal declarations" and that "there 
does not seem to be any rule of international law requiring that agreements of this 
kind must necessarily be in writing in order to be valid" (1988: 224-225). 
Furthermore, if the text of the Treaty is written, it does not necessarily have to be 
typed or printed. There is no reason why a treaty should not be contained in a 
telegram, telex, fax message or even e-mail (Aust 2000: 16). 
The second problem is that as Treaties are usually written and between states, the 
Vienna Convention deals with these alone (Reuter 1989: 22). However, this does not 
mean that Treaties have to be solely between states. Indeed, a treaty can be concluded 
between a state and another subject of intemationallaw, in particular an international 
organisation, or between international organisations43 (Aust 2000: 15). However, it 
must be made clear that International Organisations, unless given legal personality, do 
not possess the right to sign treaties independently of their members (Reuter 1989: 
59). The most recent example of this situation, and one that is of interest to our 
discussion, is proposed article 1-7 'Legal personality' of the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, which although not yet ratified, states that 'The Union shall 
have legal personality' . 
In addition to the problems of definition, it has also been noted that the Vienna 
Convention has numerous flaws. Firstly, it only applies to treaties that are between 
States and ones that were 'concluded ... after the entry into force of the present 
Convention with regard to such states'. (article 4) Secondly, despite covering the most 
numerous type of agreement (written and between states Reuter 1989: 22), it does not 
cover other significant aspects of treaty law, such as: " ... treaties providing for 
43 Although not covered by the Vienna Convention of 1969, a subsequent Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations 
(1986) has since been convened, although it is not yet in force. 
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obligations or rights to be performed or enjoyed by individuals, the effect of outbreak 
of hostilities upon treaties, succession of states in respect of treaties44, [and] 
international responsibility of States in respect of failure to perform a treaty 
obligation ... " (Elias 1974: 17). 
Definitions & Structures 
There are definitions of Treaties, however, which despite not being consolidated in 
international law are useful for the present debate, probably the best definition being 
that given by Sir Gerald FitzMaurice, Legal Advisor at the UK foreign office from 
1945 - 60: 
... a treaty is an international agreement embodied in a single formal 
instrument (whatever its name, title or designation) made between 
associations both or all of which are subjects of international law possessed of 
international personality and treaty-making capacity, and intended to create 
rights and obligations, or to establish relationships, governed by international 
law" (in Thirlway 1991: 5 & Myers 1957: 575). 
As this definition ofa treaty is one of the most 'all-embracing', it would be useful to 
examine it in more detail to find the workings of a treaty. From the definition, six 
main points can be established; 
I. A Treaty is an international agreement. As Anthony Aust notes, to be a treaty 
an agreement has to have an international character (2000: 14). 
2. The text can be embodied in a single formal instrument (whatever its name, 
title or designation.) 
3. The Treaty is made between associations both or all of which are subjects of 
international law. 
4. The subjects possess international personality and treaty-making capacity. 
5. The treaty is intended to create rights and obligations, or to establish 
relationships. 
44 This has since been covered by the Vienna Convention on Succession States in Respect of Treaties 
1978, which only entered force in 1996 and by 1998 still only had fifteen parties (Aust 2000: 305). 
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6. These relationships are governed by international law. 
From this definition, it is possible to ascertain a working definition of a treaty. 
Having identified this definition, and similarly the discussion on the constitution 
above, it is now possible to compare the societas treaty with a comparable idea in 
Politica. 
AIthusius' Relationship to Treaties 
Althusius' connection to international treaty law cannot easily be made, largely 
because modern treaty law has significantly evolved since the 19th Century, but this is 
not to say that Althusius was not interested in 'international' relations. Politica is a 
political theory proposing an internal political structure for a political association, like 
the Empire. Despite this emphasis on the internal governance, we can discern 
attention to treaty-like matter in PolWea. More specifically, not only does Althusius 
appear to equate 'treaty' with 'agreement', but also in certain parts of the text, he 
offers practical advice on how the Supreme Magistrate should conduct affairs of this 
nature (Politica: 150, 180, 181). In Althusius' practical approach to political 
organisation, each association was to meet the desired end for which it was 
established. Those tasks that could not be achieved at the level of the family were 
mandated to the guild or to the village. Likewise, the tasks that could not be realised 
at this simple level of association were further mandated to the subsequent level. In 
this way, Althusius does foresee a situation in which the universal association may 
need to associate with other like-minded associations for the purpose of 'the 
augmentation and extension of the goods of the associated body' .45 In this category 
Althusius differentiates between two positions; 'confederation or association with 
others' and 'a confederation with foreign people' (Politica: 89). Despite the fact that 
the two may appear to be arguing the same point, there is a subtle difference between 
the two. To highlight the former, Althusius argues that: 
" In addition to the agreement between bodies, Althusius also notes that: "The universal association is 
also augmented by legitimate occasions and titles other than by confederation, as by testamentary 
succession ... by donations and gifts of others, by legitimate war, by purchase, and by the marriage of 
the administrators of the commonwealth ... " (Politica: 90) 
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In such a confederation other realms, provinces, cities, villages, or towns are 
received into and associated with the communion and society of the one body. 
By their admission, the body of the universal association is extended, and 
made stronger and more secure (Politica: 89. Emphasis mine). 
Clearly, this is a situation that affects the evolution of the internal agreements of the 
universal association and so can be deemed to be constitutional. The latter example, 
however, can be deemed to be discussing treaties, as Althusius refers to an agreement 
with 'foreign' bodies. In furthering this point, he offers two distinct examples of such 
an agreement: 'partial' and 'complete' confederation. 
The latter occurs when a: 
... foreign realm, province, or any other universal association, together with its 
inhabitants, are fully and integrally coopted and admitted into the right and 
communion of the realm by a communicating of its fundamental laws and 
right of sovereignty (Politica: 89-90). 
The subtle difference between this and the previous example of a 'confederation or 
association with others', is that in the former, the third party association becomes part 
of the existing fundamental law by integrating its own fundamental law with that of 
the universal association; in this way it is 'absorbed' into the universal association. In 
the case of the 'confederation or association with others', the two parties both agree to 
expand the universal association by creating a new joint fundamental law, thus both 
becoming equal partners in the venture. 
The final type of confederation discussed by Althusius is the partial, in which: 
... various realms or provinces, while reserving their rights of sovereignty, 
solemnly obligate themselves one to the other by a treaty or covenant made 
preferably for a fixed period of time (Ibid: 89-90). 
From this analysis it is clear that the 'partial' confederation is where Althusianism is 
comparable to the international relations of the societas canon. In this example, two 
or more universal associations agree to enact one of their roles on a collective arena, 
but retain the right of sovereignty. The agreement that forms this relationship is a 
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treaty, similar to the Washington Treaty and NATO. Although there is an agreement 
in a complete confederation, this is not a treaty, as one association has agreed to join 
another by adopting the fundamental laws of the latter - this remains a matter of the 
fundamental law or constitution of each association. It is clear that it is the partial 
confederation that can be seen as dealing specifically with international relations and 
the creation of a supranational, treaty-based organisation. How, then does this relate 
to our understanding of the constitutionalisation of Sui Generis associations from an 
Althusian perspective? 
Usefulness of Politica in Explaining Sui Generis Associations? 
Can the EU be described as a 'complete' confederation? During a period of 
accession, when applicant countries are engaged in the negotiations of the inclusion of 
the acquis Communitaire to their legal systems, the EU can also be seen as being a 
complete 'confederation'. During this period, 'a foreign realm, province, or any other 
universal association' is integrated within the existing legal framework of the EU and 
becomes an associated part of the whole. 
Can the EU be more fully described using the 'partial confederation' found in 
Politica? Like the previous example, this example offers greater potential than the 
vocabulary of the societas canon. The EU was founded in order for various states to 
'solemnly obligate themselves one to the other by a treaty or covenant made 
preferably for a fixed period of time' (Politica: 89-90), with the aim of enacting their 
sovereignty on a higher, collectivised level but they retained their right of 
sovereignty.46 In this instance, during the accession process, a new member would 
accede to the existing framework established by the treaty. 
What can be discerned from the application of the ideas of partial and complete 
confederation of Althusius to the EU is that simultaneously they both offer a limited 
46 That is in theory it is possible to leave and this right to leave was enshrined in the Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe under article I 59. At the time of writing, however, both the 
French and Dutch peoples had rejected the Constitution in a referendum, and so its future remained 
unclear. Even if the Constitution does not enter into force, it is possible to foresee some institutional 
changes to facilitate the 2004 enlargement, but whether the inclusion of the right of to leave the Union 
will be included is impossible to speculate upon. 
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understanding of the EU. For Althusius, the purpose of Politica appears to be the 
understanding of the internal relationships of the universal association, as opposed to 
the external relations that the universal association may enter into. In this manner, 
this limited discussion on the 'treaty' in Politica merely replicates the confusion 
found in the societas discussion. Whilst this represents a limit to Althusius as a 
medium of study for sui generic associations, it does not represent a barrier or a 
reason to dismiss Politica, as it should be remembered that Althusius' main 
discussion is of the constitutional structure within the universal association, not 
attempting to define the relationship between two or more universal associations on 
an 'international' stage. 
Althusius' Relationship to the Treaty The Right of Secession? 
In addition to the possibility of the province or universal association being able to 
enter into partial confederations with others, there is also the possibility for any 
association to leave its current position and join another, ifthe " ... public and manifest 
welfare of this entire part altogether requires it, or when the fundamental laws of the 
country are not observed by the magistrate but are obstinately and outrageously 
violated ... " (Politica: 197) 
In current vocabulary, this is the right to secession, which presents a fundamental 
alternative to contemporary practice, because in contemporary legal terms "there is no 
right, under .. .international law to ... secession" (Crawford 1998: 99). Indeed, if 
secession did exist, this would mean that there would need to be an international law 
that allows a state to disintegrate without its consent. To confuse the matter further, 
international law also promotes the idea of 'self-determination' and this poses a 
problem to the territorial integrity of the state. On the one hand, the centralised state 
is favoured by the international system; while on the other, self-determination could 
lead to the disintegration of the centralised state. As Miller argues, secession is 
simply a matter of: " ... whether national minorities who come to want to be politically 
self-determining should be allowed to separate from the parent state and form one of 
their own" (1998: 63). 
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Within the current system of international relations, for the reasons described above, 
this confusion is problematic. As Althusius' theory is not concerned with preserving 
the sanctity of the centralised state, he is in a better position to offer logical solutions 
to the problems of secession. In fact the logical conclusion, in Althusian terms, of an 
irreparable disagreement between levels of association is for the lower one to secede 
and join another association. 
Despite identifying the possibility of secession within the Althusian variant, this does 
not mean that this can be seen as a 'digest for anarchy', as this must be reconciled 
with the rest of the Politica. This right to leave an association would be the last resort 
for an association to take, as one of the roles of the Ephors is to stop a situation in 
which the Supreme Magistrate violates the laws; in addition it is the fundamental role 
of the Supreme Magistrate to preserve the universal association. Secondly, although 
Althusius claims this right, arguably it is not meant to be enacted, due to the serious 
economic, political, geographical and military problems that would occur if one 
association ceded, but no other association did. Although theoretically possible, how 
is it practically possible for a city such as Emden to secede from the Empire and join 
the Swiss Confederation? The geographical implications for this alone were a 
significant barrier. In addition to this, the communications of the 1600s were 
primitive, and so everyday political life would be seriously hampered by a significant 
time delay. 
Although secession appears to be an integral part of Politica, how realistically this 
right could be enacted this is thus a different matter. It could be perceived, however, 
that the right of secession was made known to the Supreme Magistrate in order to act 
as a constraint. That is, in addition to the complex separation of powers and mutual 
restraints between the Supreme Magistrate and the Ephors, the right of secession was 
used to further reinforce the notion that the job of the Supreme Magistrate was to 
govern for the welfare of the association, rather than for personal gain. 
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Conclusion 
To sum up, the aim of the chapter was to address the issue of the constitution and 
treaty, as it is these two terms that dominate intra- and inter-state political relations in 
current legal discourse; but this duopoly has also been replicated in the EU 
constitutional discussion, and has led to confusion due to the sui generic nature of the 
EU. What has been shown is that although Politica addresses aspects of both the 
constitution and the treaty, it does so in a manner not dominated by the centralised 
state. What is also evident is that Althusius' version of the constitution shows more 
potential for the process of constitutionalising a sui generic association, than does his 
take on the treaty. The reason for this is simple. The aim of Politica was to offer a 
structure that would ensure that not only was the aim of government the promotion 
and furthering of the welfare of the specific association, but also that all those roles 
and responsibilities that could be undertaken by the primary associations were done 
so. In contrast, the sole aim of Althusius' brief discussion on the treaty was to either 
to develop a new arena that would enable associations more efficiently to act or 
describe a situation where one association joins another and becomes an association 
of the latter. 
Therefore, despite the fact that the Althusian version of the treaty proposed some 
interesting consequences for the contemporary discussion, it will be the constitutional 
side of Althusius work that will be furthered, with the aim of comparing this to the 
possibility of constitutionalising a sui generic association. In order to do this, the 
following three chapters will explore, respectively, the three main areas of Althusian 
constitutionalism raised above: the social contract, sovereignty and the federalism. 
Similarly to the above discussion on the constitution, the main contention of each 
chapter is that the Althusian understanding of each concept offers a greater degree of 
understanding for that specific aspect of sui generic constitutionalism, than does its 
societas counterpart. 
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Chapter 3: The Societas canon, Politica, the States of Nature 
and the Social Contract 
To early seventeenth -century writers, more or less selectively, over the whole 
expanse of human understanding, it was natural to treat political questions in 
the traditional way. They asked how the state originated; and answered the 
question with little or no regard to historical evidence. 
D.H Pennington 1972: 175. Emphasis mine. 
This and the following two chapters will focus on an exploration of the theoretical 
aspects of Althusian constitutionalism in comparison with that of the societas canon. 
In this way, we will focus on the three key areas of Althusian constitutional theory: 
the social contract, sovereignty and federalism (Hueglin 1999b: 29). Not only are 
these three topics the main discussion pieces in the societas canon, but also these 
topics can be identified in Politica. Consequently, the chapters will explore the 
problems associated with the issues of sovereignty and federalism as they relate to the 
EU through Althusian 'lenses' to ascertain whether Althusianism presents a more 
fruitful theory of constitutionalism. 
This chapter will discuss the issue of the state of nature and the social contract, as it is 
in these ideas that the basic features of the 'modem' state, such as individualism, can 
be located. The importance of this is twofold: firstly, these features will underpin the 
discussion of the next three chapters, and so it is important to discuss them at this 
juncture; secondly Althusius, while recognising a social contract, does not recognise a 
'state of nature' and as a result presents a fundamentally different version of the social 
contract to that of the societas canon. The argument here is that this alternative 
version of the social contract presented by Althusius is better suited to the 
understanding of sui generic constitutionalism, for two reasons: firstly, it is not based 
on the same political principles as those of the sovereign state; secondly, as was seen 
in Chapter Two, rather than a single social contract, each individual consociation is 
founded on an individual contract. 
The chapter will proceed as follows. First, the state of nature will be discussed in its 
Hobbesian, Lockean and Rousseaunian forms. While the type of state of nature 
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differed between the three, there were similarities between them, as the idea of the 
state of nature was methodologically used to serve an identical purpose, that is to 
offer a theoretical justification for the creation of the state. Second, the discussion 
will identify three fundamental differences between Althusius and the societas state of 
nature: for Althusius the man is naturally social and political, the basis of the 
Althusian 'state' is the individual collective, as opposed to the individual and finally, 
the notion of equality is questioned in Politica. An aspect of this discussion will 
clarify an important theoretical aspect of Althusius that has important ramifications 
for the idea of sui generic contractarianism, and that is the status of the 'individual' in 
Politica, the consequences of which will be explored both after the initial discussion 
and also in the conclusion to this chapter. 
Third, following on from the discussion of the state of nature, the chapter will turn its 
attention to the social contract, and will focus on the criticisms made of the notion, 
most notably by King James I of England and VI of Scotland, Robert Filmer and 
David Hume (Lessnoff 1986: 83-86), paying particular attention to Hume's attack on 
Lockean contractarianism. After this, the discussion will focus on the response to 
these criticisms by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as it is in the work of Rousseau that many 
. of the faults of the social contract appear to be addressed. Following this theoretical 
discussion, the chapter will move onto the limited occasions in which the idea of the 
social contract has been used to describe the formation of a sui generic entity, in this 
case the European Economic Community. Fourth, the discussion will focus on 
Politica, as despite being presented as being in opposition to the societas canon, 
AIthusius entire work is based on contractarianism, yet, in theory, AIthusius' version 
represents a more applicable style of contractarianism to the complex nature of sui 
generic associations. 
The State of Nature 
Figure 7 shows the significant characteristics of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau's 
state of nature. These writers used the state of nature to denote a pre-political 
condition or a time before the creation of the state that can be used for the 
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justification for the creation of the state and govenunent. In this manner, the idea 
behind the state of nature is a logical hypothesis and is actually very simple. 
Figure 7: Key features of the Hobbesian, Lockean and Rousseaunian state of 
nature 
Author Features of state of nature 
Behavioural state of nature 
Law of nature induces men to leave 
Thomas Hobbes Individualistic 
Equality 
Selfish 
'Warre' 
Moral state of nature 
Ruled by inherently known law of nature 
John Locke Individualistic 
Equality 
Self-centred 
Competition 
Hypothetica1l Abstract state of nature 
Individualistic 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau Equality 
Passive 
Lack of human contact 
Source: The author 
Whereas political societies vary from place to place and so were hard to predict, 
nature manifests itself in regular unchanging laws. Therefore, in order to add a level 
of certainty to the study of politics, it was essential to understand man and society in 
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abstract form, so that he, analytically speaking, must be moved from a natural 
condition governed by these natural unchanging laws (Hall 1973: 24) As Locke argue 
To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must 
consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect 
freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as 
they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or 
depending upon the will of any other man (Treatise: 8). 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) 
The focal point of the state of nature as a theoretical tool is undoubtedly Thomas 
Hobbes' Leviathan, which with the alternative title of 'The Matter, Forme and Power 
of a Commonwealth Ecc1esiasticall and Civil', represented a watershed in the 
discussion of political association. The most significant feature of Leviathan was the 
rejection of Aristotle as a thinker, and the subsequent scientific approach adopted by 
Hobbes. It will be remembered that for Aristotle, man was Zoon Politikon: a social 
animal, and the symbiotic life for him is so natural that without it he could not realise 
himself (de Benoist 2000a: 31). For Hobbes, using this assumption as a foundation to 
build up a 'Doctrine of Civill Society', is: 
... yet certainly False, and an errour proceeding from our too slight 
contemplation of 'Human Nature' as the exploration into the causes of man 
coming together will reveal that they do so not naturally, but by accident (De 
Cive: 22). 
Indeed, the negativity that Hobbes saw in human nature is elaborated in Leviathan, in 
which he argues: 
Againe, man have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of griefe) in 
keeping company, where there is no power to over-awe them all (Leviathan: 
185). 
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For Hobbes, this negative aspect of human nature was a result of deep-rooted egoism 
that limits the possibilities for human co-operation (Held 1984: 33). Indeed, it is a 
time when all men seek to preserve life and acquire satisfactions and the means to 
satIstacfions, and they seek to aVOId death, dissatisfaction, sorrow, and those things 
that lead to them (Goldsmith 1966: 86). In addition to this egoism, the limited contact 
between individuals in the state of nature meant that the natural condition of mankind 
is inherently unstable (Gauthier 1969: 17) and the life of man is famously 'solitary, 
poore, nasty, brutish, and short' (Leviathan: 186). 
This instability and egoism is not aided by the fact that in the state of nature all 
individuals are equal, although this does not mean that the state of nature is a time of 
perfectly identical clones. Rather, Hobbes argues that man consists of four parts: 
bodily strength, experience, reason and passion; the equality arises from the fact that 
these different parts will always consist of the same equal number. That is, although 
one man may be stronger or cleverer than the next man, he is still equal, as the four 
components of the individual will always be equal. As Hobbes demonstrates: 
For as to the strength of the body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the 
strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are 
in the same danger with himselfe (Leviathan: 183). 
In addition to this "equality", in this natural condition the selfish interests of the 
individual leads not only to both a suspicion of others (McClelland 1996: 193) and an 
equal hope in each man to satisfy his needs47 (Goldsmith 1966: 87), but also to 
competition and aggression (Hood 1964: 75). As for Hobbes, life in the state of nature 
revolved around desires: 'Life it selfe is but Motion, and can never be without 
Desire,48 (Leviathan: 130). It is these desires that lead to aggression and conflict, as 
due to the nature of the individual if two men desire the same thing 'very often they 
can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that that the 
strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the Sword' (Hobbes 
De Cive: 27). 
47 In this sense a man's 'needs' are not a single particular thing, but the generalised capacity to satisfy 
new desires as they emerge (Hampsher-Monk 1992: 23). 
48 Goldsmith clarifies this position with the macabre notion of 'only the dead are without desire' (1966: 
86). 
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The paradoxical point of this selfish aggression, is that the preservation of many men 
is frustrated by the exercise of this right of each to preserve himself, so 'Reason 
suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to 
agreement' (Hobbes Leviathan: 188). In other words, while the individual can exist in 
the state of nature, in order to achieve a greater degree of stability of life by avoiding 
harm and risking an early death, let alone to ensure the conditions of greater comfort, 
the observation of certain laws is required (Held 1996: 41). 
As Hobbes demonstrates, these laws are needed as, in the absence of a supreme 
authority, man's rational individual calculation to preserve his own interest brings 
about an unwished for and disastrous consequence for all concerned (Hampsher-
Monk 1992: 25). For Hobbes, these Articles oflaw of nature, were: 
... a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which man is 
forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life or taketh away the means 
of preserving the same (Leviathan: 189). 
More specifically, this 'generall Rule' should be: 
That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as has hope of obtaining 
it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and 
advantages of War re (Ibid. Emphasis in original.). 
These laws of nature not only impose an obligation on man to leave the state of 
nature, but also to enter into a situation where the laws of nature are fully obligatory; 
that is to say, they oblige in foro interno or they bind a desire that they should take 
place (Leviathan: 215) in civilised society. 
Hobbes' state of nature thus revolves around radical individualism and egoism, which 
in turn leads to instability, a pessimistic view of mankind that was influenced by the 
fear he himself had about the Civil War in England (1641-1649). Due to the 
instability caused by the rebellion to the Crown, Hobbes argued that an individual will 
not naturally enter society unless there is a sovereign power to over-awe him, as man 
is, by nature, a solitary and individualistic creature, who is either at war or who will 
ridicule his fellow men. In this natural state, there is no right or wrong, just or unjust, 
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simply because there is no common power (or Leviathan), thus there is no law 
(Murray 1929: 209). 
The problem with this stance is that it is in conflict with Hobbes' concurrent theme in 
both De Cive and Leviathan; that is, that man's sole aim in life is to maximise his 
individual happiness. How can this be achieved in a state of nature where there is no 
culture, no use of the seas, no account of time, no arts, no letters or no society 
(Hobbes Leviathan: 186) and where private property consists only of that which man 
can defend? (Ibid: 188) So the question becomes how can man form a society when a) 
all he has known is a state of Warre?49 and b) he is fearful and mistrusting of his 
common man? Hobbes argues that as man naturally desires that which is good for 
him, (De Cive: 30), it is 'easily judg'd how disagreeable a thing the preservation 
either of Mankind, or each single Man, a perpetuall Warre is' (Ibid: 30). This state of 
war within the state of nature will be 'perpetuall' as it cannot be ended by victory, 
simply because no man is strong enough to do so. So in order to end the Warre and 
enter into a contract each man has to authorise and give up their right of governing 
himself to this man, or this assembly of men, on the condition that thou give up thy 
right to him, and authorise all actions in a like manner (Murray 1929: 210). Thus, via 
this contract, both the society and the government, or more specifically the Leviathan, 
is formed. 
John Locke (1632-1704) 
The negativity of the state of nature that is a common feature in Hobbes is absent for 
Locke. Although Locke's Second Treatise contains many similar aspects to Hobbes' 
thesis, it can be viewed as an attack on, or at the very least an attempt to repudiate, the 
Leviathan50 (Van Creveld 1999: 180). Locke raised a fundamental objection to the 
49 It must be clarified here that by Warre, Hobbes did not just mean 'Battel onely, or the act of 
fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and 
therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of 
Weather' (Leviathan: 186). 
50 The reason why Treatise attacks Sir Thomas Filmer personally, rather than Hobbes directly is that 
amongst the Royalists, Hobbes was not a fashionable character. Despite being given a job by Charles 
II after the restoration, prominent Royalists believed him to be a turncoat, as Leviathan could be used 
to justity Cromwell's rule; indeed some Royalists believed Leviathan was written to flatter Cromwell 
(Sabine 1941: 456). Although Leviathan could be used tojustity Cromwellian rule, this did not make 
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negative Hobbesian view of mankind according to which individuals could only find 
peaceful life if they were governed by the dictates of an indivisible sovereign. 
Instead, Locke saw mankind in a more positive light in that rather than keeping the 
people in awe, the state should protect the life, liberty and property of the individual 
as laid down by the law (Hall 1984: 37), which would be established and controlled 
by the sovereign people, rather than made by an individual Leviathan. 
This position could be achieved in two ways: firstly, while Hobbes' state of nature is a 
pattern of behaviours carried out by individual man, Locke's version is moral 
(Simmons 1989: 450) and refers to the rules which men are morally obliged to obey 
when they have not contracted or promised to modify their behaviour in any way 
(Hampsher-Monk 1992: 84). Secondly, while the state of nature for Hobbes was a 
time of 'perpetual I Warre', for Locke the state of nature is neither a state of war nor a 
properly political condition (Dunn 1969: Ill). 
In addition to this, not only does Locke deny that the state of nature is not a state of 
war, due to the adherence of the natural law (Hall 1984: 38), but also the state of war, 
which is brought about by a breach of the natural law, is one great reason for men 
putting themselves into society and quitting the state of nature. 
In this Lockean version of the state of nature, the individual lives in a 'civilised' state; 
but rather than being ruled by an elected or hereditary government, he indirectly rules 
himself through the law of nature which is totally operable within the state of nature. 
As Jean-Jacques Rousseau acutely remarked of Locke, 'Primitive man is on his lips, 
but the portrait he paints is that of civil man' (Murray 1929: 223). 
The positive position adopted by Locke allowed for a more elaborate discussion of the 
state of nature to occur. Indeed, there are two main features of the Lockean state of 
nature that highlight its progressive nature: there exists a law of nature to govern it 
(Locke Second Treatise: 9); and the presence of property. For Locke, the natural law 
was a set of fixed and permanent moral rules that are firmly rooted in the soil of 
human nature (Ashcraft 1968: 906), and man will naturally live by the laws of nature 
as they are transcended from God, and to break these laws goes against God's purpose 
Hobbes a 'turncoat', as he remained loyal to his philosophy, which was not loyalty not to a particular 
party, but to peace (Lessnoff 1986: 48). 
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and contradicts our own nature (Hampsher-Monk 1992: 82). If anyone did break these 
natural laws: 
... the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and 
common equity, which is the measure God has set to the actions of men, for 
their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, 
which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken 
by him (Locke Second Treatise: 10). 
This knowledge of the law of nature results in the fact that as there is no government 
or overarching power to keep men in awe in the state of nature, each man has the 
individual right not only to punish an offender who breaches the law of nature, but 
also to compel justice on other wrong doers and be executioner of the law of nature 
for others (Ibid.). 
One major criticism that could be made at this juncture centres on man's inherent 
ability to know the 'laws of nature'. In Politica, Althusius argued that 'natural law is 
not so completely written on the hearts of men that it is sufficiently efficacious in 
retaining from evil and impelling them good' (Politica: 139-140). Locke did foresee 
this criticism to a degree, noting that some people may have been brought up in vice, 
and thus may not know the law of nature; however for Locke, the important feature 
was whether a man, through the social conditions of the state of nature, could gain 
knowledge of the natural laws. This is a distinct possibility, as it must be remembered 
that Locke's state of nature is developmental, not static (Ashcraft 1968: 906). 
The second fundamental aspect of Locke's state of nature is the presence of property. 
Indeed, Locke argued that there were two 'states of nature', one before and one after 
the introduction of money. Unlike Hobbes, who saw no distinction between mine and 
thine (Murray 1929: 209) and private property was that which man could defend, for 
Locke the law of nature allows property and trade to be developed, as long as every 
man has an understanding of the law of nature (McClelland 1996: 234). As Gough 
explains: 
The only guarantee of the immunity of a man's person or possessions in the 
state of nature is the respect of his neighbours for the law of nature, which is 
110 
only another name for moral obligation, and which wicked men will ignore 
(1957: 141). 
As Locke's primary objective was personal fulfilment, then mutual co-operation and 
limited contractual agreements, governed by the natural law, are the logical and 
natural course of action to take. 
This picture of a perfect society governed by man's intrinsic understanding of the 
natural law, where there is hesitation to compel against another's life or property and 
where man can justly execute natural law against wrongdoers appears to be better 
than a political society, so what compelled man to leave this utopia? Indeed, Locke 
himself addresses this question directly: 
If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord 
of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to 
nobody, why will he part with this freedom? Why will he give up the empire, 
and subjugate himself to the dominion and controul of any other power? 
(Second Treatise: 65) 
In answering the question, Locke argues that 'civil government is the proper remedy 
for the inconveniences of the state of nature' (Second Treatise: 12). These 
inconveniences stem from man's potential tendency to commit crimes against his 
fellow man and the danger of the victim to over-compensate in terms of justice. If 
there is no overarching power, or government, to execute the laws (the Hobbesian 
Leviathan), then the state of nature ceases to be a state of peace and reverts to a state 
of war. Secondly, and more importantly for the overall argument of Second Treatise, 
the state of nature is left, as while man lives in it 'the enjoyment of property he has in 
this state is unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, 
however free, is full of fears and continual danger' (Second Treatise: 66). For Locke, 
the 'holy trinity' of life, liberty and property can be more effectively insured under a 
government, than it can in the state of nature. 
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Jean-Jacgues Rousseau <1712-1778) 
While Hobbes' state of nature reflected the most negative aspects of human nature, 
and Locke's reflected the positive outcomes through inherently known natural law, 
Rousseau's state of nature can be as 'historical'. For Rousseau: 
The philosophers who have examined the foundations of society have all felt 
it necessary to go back to the state of nature, but none of them has succeeded 
in getting there ... It has not even entered the heads of most of our philosophers 
to doubt that the state of nature once existed, yet it is evident from reading the 
Scriptures that the first man, having received the light of reason and precepts 
at once from God, was not himself in the state of nature (Inequality: 78). 
Gough argues that: 
The original state of nature, according to Rousseau, was neither a Hobbesian 
war of all against all, nor a Lockian abode of peace and goodwill; it was just a 
condition of brutish isolation, in which men were physically much stronger 
than they are today. Society developed by the family widening into a tribe, a 
nomadic existence giving place to fixed residence, and the consequent 
acquisition of property (1957: 164). 
Despite this claim, the state of nature appears not to play the predominant position it 
does in either Hobbes or Locke; rather Rousseau's contribution to the overall 
discussion is focused on the social contract, rather than the state of nature. While 
Hobbes' Leviathan and Locke's Second Treatise were influenced by practical 
events,S 1 Rousseau's social contract can neither be described as 'practical' in a 
Hobbesian or Lockean sense, nor can it be described as 'academic', a term Lessnoff 
uses to describe the latter social contracts of Pufendorf and Kant (1986: 70). Rather, 
Rousseau's theory needs be understood as a response to the author's own experience 
of contemporary European society (Ibid: 71): that is, the examples of Hobbes and 
Locke were written as a response to an actual political event, while that of Rousseau 
is a culmination of the writer's travels around the continent and is tied to no single 
specific event, but to a continuum of minor events. 
SI For Hobbes the English Civil War, and Locke the Glorious Revolution of 1688. 
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The main criticism Rousseau made of Hobbes highlights the weakness of the abstract 
character of the state of nature; as although Hobbes attempts to describe a situation 
where all known laws are removed, he fails to remove the social consequences of the 
laws.52 To this extent Rousseau implies that Hobbes has attributed 'social 
characteristics' to natural man, even though he was yet to develop the vice for amour 
propore (or Glory) as this would imply a desire for the superiority over others, which 
is a product of society (Lessnoff 1986: 77). 
There are, however, three Hobbesian-like features within Rousseau's state of nature. 
Firstly, Hobbes' individualism and mutual fearing and mistrust are echoed when 
Rousseau notes that: 
.. .it is impossible to imagine why in the primitive society one man should 
have the need of another man ... or if such a need were assumed, to imagine 
what motive could induce the second man to supply it, and if so how the two 
could agree the terms of the transition (Inequality: 97). 
Secondly, Hobbes went to great lengths to emphasise that due to the lack of a 
Leviathan in the state of nature, there could be no right or wrong, good or bad. 
Rousseau almost repeats this verbatim, when he notes man in the state of nature 
having no kind of moral relationships, or any known duties, could be neither good nor 
evil (Ibid: 98). Locke also shares the third Hobbesian characteristic, although for 
Rousseau it is slightly more complicated. Although natural inequality may exist in 
the state of nature, i.e. natural deformities, mental problems, problems associated with 
age or gender etc, there is no social inequality. This is because firstly man can and 
does exist independently of his fellow man and secondly; as no contact occurs social 
inequality cannot exist, as for a notion of social equality or inequality to exist, this has 
by nature preconditions of some form of collective groupings. Rousseau himself 
recognises as much when he states: 
.. .it is impossible to enslave a man without first having to put him in a 
position where he cannot do without another man, and since such a situation 
52 For instance, Hobbes' reliance on passions, appetites and desires for honours such as glory (Hobbes 
Leviathan: 128-(30) within the state of nature. 
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does not exist in the state of nature, each man is therefore free of the yoke, and 
the law of the strongest is rendered vain" (Inequality: 106). 
Although Rousseau does appear to share several similarities with Hobbes, he also 
displays one main similarity with Locke, but for a different reason. The main 
Lockean feature of Inequality is that man is naturaIIy passive towards others. 
Rousseau, in concluding the first part of Inequality, finds savage man: " ... wandering 
in the forests ... without war, without relationships, without any need for his fellow 
man and without any desire to hurt them ... " (Inequality: 104) 
This lack of the will to make war was also found in Locke's primitive society; 
however for Locke this was due to man's inherent understanding of natural law, 
whereas, for Rousseau it is due mainly to lack of familiarity between men and the fact 
that man does not have to make war. 
To sum up the societas state of nature in its Hobbesian, Lockean and Rousseaunian 
guises, it is clear that while the three writers viewed the state of nature in quite 
fundamentally different ways, there are common characteristics such as the emphasis 
on the individual, on individual equality and on the need to leave the state of nature 
and form a more secure agreement in the state. The other common feature they share 
is the use of the state of nature as a descriptive tool: as was touched upon above, the 
state of nature was not an actual time that existed prior to the state, but rather was a 
philosophical tool intended to explain the purpose, reason and need for the state. 
AIthusius and the "State of Nature" 
As we have seen in Chapter One, Althusius was influenced by Aristotle, but also by 
Paul Ramet and so adopted a fundamentally different position to the 'state of nature' 
debate. Indeed, from an exploration of Politica, it is possible to highlight three 
fundamental differences between Althusius and the societas canon on the nature of 
the founding of the state, for which the state of nature served the societas canon: first, 
for AIthusius, man is naturaIIy social and political; second, the foundation of the 
Althusian "state" is the aggregate of individual consociations, rather than individual 
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persons; third, for Althusius, man is naturally unequal and this forces him to be social 
and political: 'necessity therefore induces association' (earney 1995: xvi). 
Man is Naturally Social and Political 
The first argument why Althusius' theory could not start from a 'state of nature' is 
based on the author's interpretation of the Paul Rarnet's (1515-1572) law of justice 
and law of truth. Ramus' interpretation of "invention", which is a strand ofthe theory 
of logic, made use of three laws he adapted from Aristotle's Posterior Analytics 
(earney 1995: xiii): The law of justice (lex justitiae), the law of truth (lex veritatis) 
and the law of wisdom (lex sapientiae). the law of justice (lex justitiae) indicates that 
each art or science has its own purpose, that this purpose serves as a principle for 
determining what is proper to a given art (suum cuique), and that everything not 
proper to it is to be rigorously excluded (earney 1995: xiv). Althusius utilises Ramus' 
law of justice in relation to "the purpose of political science", which according to 
Althusius, "is the maintenance of social life among human beings. He therefore 
proposes to remove certain legal, theological, and ethical material from it by which 
others in his judgment had confused and compromised its proper operation" (earney 
1995: xiv). From this theoretical position it is possible to draw the conclusion that 
Althusius would not have adopted the scientific approach of subsequent societas 
authors, as this would introduce external material, namely science, which may 
confuse and compromise the proper operation, not only of science itself, but also the 
maintenance of social life arnong human beings. 
In addition to the use of the law of justice, Althusius used the law of wisdom, in 
which a proposition should be placed with the nearest class of things to which it 
belongs rather than with matters on a higher or lower level of generality (earney 
1995: xv), giving Politica a very ordered and structured appearance. This methodical 
structure appears to be in conflict with the scientific approach of the societas canon: 
logically, how could the state of nature affect all men, and if it did not, why did it only 
affect certain groups? These questions, coupled with the Althusian assumption of 
man being a public and political animal, results in the conclusion that theoretically 
Althusius could not start from the 'state of nature'. 
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Natural Inequality v. Natural Equality 
A second key difference between the societas canon and Althusius, is that for Hobbes, 
Locke and to an extent Rousseau53, man was an individual creature attempting to 
serve his own individual needs. Also, man in the state of nature for Hobbes, Locke 
and Rousseau is equal. Hobbes starts chapter XIII of Leviathan by stating that: 
Nature hath made men so equall, in faculties of body, and mind; as that 
though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of 
quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference 
between man, and man is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon 
claim to himse1fe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he 
(Leviathan: 183). 
Similarly, Locke opens Chapter II of Two Treatise by noting that: 
A state of equality also, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, 
no one having more than another. .. (Treatise: 4) 
Conversely, Althusius, free from the abstraction of the state of nature argues that man, 
due to God giving uneven talents to each, is naturally unequal and so: 
... while some persons provided for others, and some received from others 
what they themselves lacked, all came together into a certain public body that 
we call the commonwealth, and by mutual aid devoted themselves to the 
general good and the wealth of this body (Politica: 23). 
Not only did this inequality make man seek an association with others, it also makes 
man helpless on his own, and therefore requires social communication in order to 
overcome this state of indigence (Hueglin 1979: 25): 
For this reason it is evident that the commonwealth, or civil society, exists by 
nature, and that by nature man is a civil animal who strives eagerly for 
association. If, however, anyone wishes not to live in society, or needs 
" For Rousseau, when man bound himself by the Social Contract he became 'collectivised', but 
Rousseau's initial theoretical basis was on man as an individual in the state of nature. 
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nothing because of his own abundance, he is not considered a part of the 
commonwealth. He is therefore either a beast or a god, as Aristotle asserts 
(Althusius Politica: 20). 
The Foundation of the "State": aggregate total of the individual collectives v. the 
Individual 
A third key difference between the two canons, and one that is central to this thesis is 
the foundation of society and government, which for Althusius is the aggregate total 
of individual collectives, whereas for the societas canon it is the individual himself. 
For Althusius, ail human activity is seen as contributing to, and, in the end, 
constituting an integrated social whole (Hueglin 1999: 92). Conversely, for Hobbes 
the natural selfishness and self-interestedness of man meant that all his springs of 
actions aim either at self, its preservation or enlargement, or greater gratification 
(Murray 1929: 207). A further consequence of this starting point of man in different 
collectives, starting with the familys4, rather than on the fictitious state of nature, 
enabled Althusius to base his political theory in a more 'realistic' natural 
environment, than the abstract and much criticised state of nature. 
Althusius and the Individual 
Despite the fact Althusius was influenced by Aristotle's Zoon Politikon, so 
consequently there is no great emphasis on the 'individual' in Althusius, this does not 
meant that the individual does not exist. Rather the individual exists, but not in a 
manner in which current political vocabulary could describe him. This point needs to 
be emphasised as it has ramifications not only for our study of sui generic 
constitutionalism, but also for the issue of the social contract. 
For Althusius, after the creation of man, necessity forced men to build separate 
houses, villages, counties 'since we cannot assume that all men lived together for any 
length of time at one place or in one family' (Friedrich 1932: lxix). As a result of this, 
54 Locke himself recognised that the family was the basic unit of the first society (Dunn 1969: 114). 
but the emphasis was still on the individual in relation to the state, rather than the Althusian collective. 
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whenever Althusius discusses the "state", the 'consociatio symbiotica' or the body 
politic (Politica: 17-26): 
... he thinks of it as a vital phenomenon, as a natural phenomenon which 
leaves no choice to the individual. The notion that the people could choose in 
this matter is simply inconceivable from Althusius' point of view (Friedrich 
1932: Ixx). 
This view results in Althusius' assertion that the man who lives outside of society is 
either a God or a beast (Politica: 25). In this way, the individual exists for Althusius, 
but only insofar as he is a member of a consociatio that is that he is engaged in 
symbiotic life, as a symbiote (Politica: 17). It is the family as a consociational group 
that is the basis and the key to understanding of any universal association; yet" ... the 
head of the family goes out of his house, in which he exercises domestic imperium, 
and joins the heads of other families to pursue business matters, he then loses the 
name of head and master of the family, and becomes an ally and citizen" (Politica: 
33). 
Despite the fact that the head of the family is initially a symbiote in simple and private 
association (the family) once he leaves, he remains an individual, so long as he joins 
another simple and private consociation (the guild). The emphasis here is on 
practicality, both of representation and of political life. In support of this, Hueglin 
notes that 'the argument that there is no individual to be found in the Althusian state 
evidently does not hold' (1979: 21). Rather: 
... the individual participates in the state through the plurality of federally 
organised associations, which are all essentially political, and which all act as 
the natural mediators between the universal association and the individual, 
who is essentially defined as a private, social and political being (Ibid.). 
In this way the discussion of the individual in Althusius thus becomes not one of 
'does the individual exist?', but one of 'how is the individual represented in the 
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individual associations and commonwealth?' or 'how can the link between the 
individual and these associations be realistically connected?'ss 
In the 'traditional' social contract theory of Hobbes and Locke, the contract was an 
agreement between individuals to leave the state of nature and form a state, and in this 
respect P.J. Winters argues that a social contract is impossible in Althusius: 
... because the universal association is not composed of individual or private 
association, but of cities, provinces and regions, which agreed on the 
constitution of the one political body, there is no individual to be found in the 
sphere of the state .. .it is therefore impossible to speak of social contract, 
which would necessarily have to originate in the free declaratory acts of 
autonomous individuals (in Hueglin 1979: 19-20). 
In addition to the methodological differences between Althusius and the societas 
canon, the problem with regards to Althusius is the presence of these 'intermediary' 
levels between the individual and the "state" and their effect on the contract between 
the individual and the "state". Of these 'intermediary' contracts, Georg Jellinek 
argued that they would obscure the relationship between the individual and the state 
(quoted in Hueglin 1979: 21). In response to this, and in defence of Althusius, Gierke 
argued that there was no reason why the socialisation by successive steps as found in 
Althusius could not be explained in terms of a social contract, even if this contract is 
not yet based on the extreme individualism of later times (Hueglin 1979: 21). Again 
here the emphasis is on practicality, and in this runs counter to the established 
'scientific approach' to politics that originated in the work of Hobbes and Locke, and 
can be seen in scientific notions such as 'the state of nature'. 
" There is a further debate related to Althusius and the individual that will be briefly touched upon 
here. For Friedrich, the true individual in Althusius' thought, is the religious individual. As earl 
Friedrich notes: " ... he [Althusius] is emphatic in rejecting majority decision in matters of religion 
because religion concems individuals" (I932: lxxxii). Althusius, states that: " ... faith is said to be a gift 
of God, not of Caesar. It is not subject to the will, nor can it be coerced. If in religion the soul has once 
been destroyed, nothing henceforth remains, as Lactantius says. We are not able to command religion 
because no one is required to believe against his will. Faith must be persuaded, not commanded, and 
taught, not ordered" (Politica: 172). This aspect of the discussion will not be pursued as this 
increasingly opens a theological debate, which does not serve the interests of the present discussion. 
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Hume and the Criticism of the Social Contract 
Having discussed the theoretical origins of the societas state, the discussion will now 
shift to the logical conclusion of the state of nature: the social contract; focusing on 
criticisms made by David Hume and the Rousseaunian 'revival' of the term in the 
societas canon, and how the social contracts of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau have 
been used as a tool of understanding for the original EEC, before moving onto the 
Althusian variant of the term, focusing particularly on the integral nature of the 
contract for all aspects of the Althusian structure, and certain structural constitutional 
characteristics that are to be found in Politica. 
The notion of a social contract in whichever form, had by the time of Rousseau 
received such a volume of criticism as to kill off the theory more or less (Lessnoff 
1986: 83). The first of the main critics of the idea was King James VI of Scotland and 
I of England. He argued that Kings ruled by divine right, and that if the King was 
established as a result of a contract, this would mean that there was a independent 
judge to decide on conflict that arose from the ruler and the ruled. According to 
James, the absence of such a judiciary highlighted the absurd nature of the social 
contract (Lessnoff 1986: 84-85). Richard Filmer's Patriarcha or the Natural Power of 
Kings (1680), the book that was famously refuted by John Locke in the First Treatise 
of Government, adopted a second line of attack. For Filmer, the idea of the social 
contract was nonsensical for two main reasons. Firstly, and as the title of his book 
showed, Filmer believed that Kings inherited their powers from Adam (comparable to 
the divine right of kings). Indeed, Filmer argues that: 
It follows that civil power not only in general is by divine institution, but even 
the assignment of it specifically to the eldest parent, which quite takes away 
that new and common distinction which refers only power universal as 
absolute to God, but power respective in regard of the special form of 
government to the choice of the people. Nor leaves it any place for such 
imaginary pacts between kings and their people and many dream of 
(Patriarcha: 7). 
Secondly, Filmer used what Lessnoffhas called the 'argument of the plain man of the 
common sense against the philosopher' (1986: 85): "Quite simply, the notion that 
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government originated in a contract - of whatever kind - is hopelessly unrealistic." 
(Ibid.) 
The third main line of attack, and arguably the most damning, was that of David 
Hurne's Of The Original Contract (1748). Although Hurne recognises the initial 
social contract, he also argues that man will only bind himself through his own 
consent: 
If this, then, be meant by the original contract, it cannot be denied, that all 
government is, at first, founded on a contract, and that most ancient rude 
combinations of mankind were formed chiefly by that principle (Ibid: 211-
213. Italics in original). 
Hurne's criticism of the social contract theory stems from an observation of the world 
in which the social contract theorists would meet with nothing that, in the least, 
corresponds to their ideas, or can warrant so refined and philosophical a system (Ibid: 
213-214). For Hume the problem arises after the original contractors have died: 
... the contract, on which government is founded, is said to be the original 
contract: and consequently may be supposed too old to fall under the 
knowledge of the present generation. If the agreement, by which savage men 
first associated and conjoined their force, be here meant, this is acknowledged 
to be real; but being so ancient, and being obliterated by a thousand changes 
of government and princes, it cannot now be supposed to retain any authority. 
If we would say anything to the purpose, we must assert that every particular 
government which is lawful, and which imposes any duty of allegiance on its 
subjects, was, at first, founded on consent and voluntary compact (Ibid: 215. 
Emphasis mine). 
Hume, however, rejects the notion of present governments being based on an original 
contract: "Almost all the governments which exist at present, or of which there 
remains any record in history, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or 
conquest, or both, without any pretence of a fair consent or voluntary subjection of the 
people" (Ibid: 215-216). 
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Hume demonstrated that the state in its modem form was not directly based on a 
social contract, but through usurpation of power or occupation by foreign power, so 
that clearly the issue of consent to be bound by a contract was no longer was 
applicable to the discussion. In response to this, and this is one of the main pieces for 
the idea that Hume was directly attacking the issue of consent in The Second Treatise, 
Locke argued that the 'tacit consent' of the individual is sufficient to bind him to the 
contract, but this notion has been highly problematic, as for many critics, 'tacit 
consent is no consent'. On this issue, Hume famously quipped: 
Can we seriously say that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave 
his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives by day 
to day, by small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert that a man, 
by remaining in a vessel, freely consent to the dominion of the master, though 
he was carried on board asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the 
moment he leaves her (Original Contract: 221-222). 
The issue Hume appears to forget is that during this period, several people did leave 
the United Kingdom to find 'a better life' in the United States.56 Regardless of this, 
Hume's criticism does appear to be focused on the Lockean variant of the social 
contract. 
Hume's Attack on Lockean Contractarianism 
The prominence of Locke in the debate on the social contract is interesting. Martyn 
Thompson argues that David Hume's criticisms of the social contract were 
(mis)directed at Locke (in Buckle & Castiglione 1991: 470), while Buckle and 
Castiglione note that in Locke's time, there were three variants of the 'fashionable 
theory': that of John Locke, or philosophical contractualism; the constitutional 
contractualism of William Atwood, Robert Ferguson and Samuel Johnson; and the 
'integrated' contractualism of James Tyrrell and Algemon Sidney. Whilst Locke can 
so The actual number of immigrants to the USA prior to 1821 can only be speculated at, as before this 
time the Federal Government did not keep immigration records. However, Mark Nowak suggests that 
the number of immigrants from 1776 to 1819 was 300,000, but this includes all immigrants, rather than 
just those from England. One of the most famous of the English immigrants to the United States was 
Thomas Paine, who emigrated in 1774. 
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be seen as a social contract theorist alongside Hobbes and Rousseau, he appears to 
place less stress on the contract than either Hobbes or Rousseau, and this largely 
results from the positive view Locke has of the state of nature. Indeed, the presence 
of natural law in the state of nature makes it both possible and advantageous to enter 
into limited contracts with others. 
In criticising Locke, Hume differentiated between the origin of government and the 
reasons why governments should be obeyed (Lessnoff 1986: 87). The protection 
offered by a government was essential for the human race to subsist in any sort of 
comfortable or secure state (Original Contract: 210), and so the government must be 
obeyed, not because of a contract, but for the 'sake of peaceful and orderly society 
(Lessnoff 1986: 87). This very stability of government was threatened by Locke's 
social contract as this contained the right to resistance against tyrannical government 
(Buckle & Castiglione 1991: 472); yet Hume saw government as both essential and 
serving a specific God-given, rather than socially constructed, role: 
As it is impossible for the human race to subsist, at least in any comfortable or 
secure state, without the protection of government, this institution must 
certainly have been intended by the Beneficent being, who means the good of 
all his creatures ... (Original Contract: 210) 
Whether or not Hume's criticisms were directly levelled at Locke or not is irrelevant 
in this context. What is of importance to our discussion is the response made to these 
criticisms by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In many ways, the argument in both Inequality 
and Social Contract appear to heed the criticisms of Hume and respond to them in a 
manner in which the social contract is restored. Despite its abstract, or even utopian 
nature, Rousseau's The Social Contract (1762) arguably marked the first (and final) 
attempt to salvage the notion of the social contract. 
The Response by Rousseau 
The key point in Rousseau's theory is that society is formed via a social contract after 
the state of nature has been left, but that this society is unjust. In order to combat this, 
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Rousseau's invents two social contracts, one to fonn the state, and the second to 
equate to a governmental contract, or constitution. This notion of the dual contract 
represents a progression from the contractarianism of Hobbes and Locke; but it does 
so in such a way as to discredit Hume's criticism about the validity of the original 
contract. Rousseau would agree that the original contract cannot be seen to be the 
legitimate agreement of the state not because it is superseded by political practice, but 
due to the unequal nature of the original contract: in the state of nature the individual 
is equal, yet once in civil society, contact and relationships between different 
individuals ultimately led to inequalities emerging: 
.. .inequality of influence and authority becomes inevitable among individuals 
as soon as, being united in the same society they are forced to compare 
themselves to one another and to take into account the differences they 
discover in the continual dealings they have with one another" (Inequality: 
132). 
From these relationships expressions such as 'large', 'small', 'weak', 'strong' and 
'fearful' began to emerge (Ibid: 110). For Rousseau, in order to protect the weak from 
oppression, to retain the ambitious, and to ensure for each the possession of what 
belongs to him, (lbid: 121) all must agree to unite their forces for the good of whole, 
and this finds face in the General Will. 
Social Contract Theory and the EU 
Despite the fact that authors such as Hume largely discredited the theory of the social 
contract, there has been a recent revival of the idea. Indeed, the idea has even been 
applied as a descriptive tool to understand the original institutional structure of the 
EU, or to be precise the EEC. One of the aims of Michael Newman's Democracy, 
Sovereignty and the European Union (1996), is to apply the social contract theories of 
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau to an analysis of the original institutional structure 
established by the Treaties of Rome as a descriptive tool. Newman rejects the social 
contract of Hobbes and Rousseau as they involve the transfer of power by the 
individuals to the state, which then has full power over the constituent parts. Of 
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Hobbes' contract, Newman argues that: "The Hobbesian contract is not applicable to 
the EU, since it would suggest that the MS [member states 1 had agreed to abandon 
their right to self-government and to hand over all their power to a new supra-national 
state which could rule over them. This new Leviathan would then also possess full 
law-making powers throughout the Union, and the MS would be reduced to being 
passive recipients of its decisions" (1996: 26). Newman also dismisses Rousseau's 
contract as not only being a 'highly idealistic version of reality', but also suffering 
from the same fundamental flaw as Hobbes identified above. 
Rather, Newman's argument presents Locke's theory as offering the best model of 
understanding the original Treaties of Rome, for three main reasons: 
Firstly, 'for Locke, the new state was really an instrument to facilitate the attaining of 
existing interests' (1996: 27. Emphasis in original). In comparison, as each of the 
original member states had economic interests, the creation of the EEC merely offered 
an instrument to facilitate the attainment of these interests. 
Secondly for Locke, while individuals were able to define their own goals, it was 
necessary to establish new' legal and political institutions so that these goals could be 
attained more effectively', or in the case of the EEC; Community Law, with the ECl 
to preside over it, and the Commission to suggest policies towards these aims (1996: 
27). 
Thirdly, in Locke's theory, the individual (through a legislature) retained the ultimate 
right to determine the law and the extent of power wielded to the executive and this is 
akin to the relationship between the governments of the member states and Brussels. 
As Newman argues, there was a tension in Locke's work between the creating: 
... institutions with sufficient independence to achieve the aims which had 
been defined, and the need to ensure that they were ultimately in a relation of 
dependence on the governments that had created them (1996: 27). 
This does not mean that Locke's theory is a perfect representation of the original 
European Economic Community (EEC); Newman highlights, for example, the fact 
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that Locke's political system was concerned primarily with the interests of those who 
already had power in pre-political society: 
Locke's system contained no mechanism for securing the consent of those 
without power in society, but the founding treaties of the EU were designed to 
accommodate the individual interests of all the MS (1996: 28). 
The interest ofNewman's exercise for the argument of this chapter is twofold. Firstly 
it represents an original attempt to apply the political thought of Hobbes, Locke and 
Rousseau to the EU, albeit in its original incarnation as the EEC. Secondly, it reveals 
that the idea of applying Locke's original contract is now no longer relevant, and so a 
new version of the contract is needed; but this does not mean that the idea of the 
contract cannot be used as a descriptive tool in the EU setting. 
The contract proposed by Locke was a legislative contract in which the members, 
while retaining legislative power, agreed to form a govemment effectively to 'enforce 
the law of nature' (Lessnoff 1986: 62). While this analogy could be applied to the 
original EEC, as the purpose of the European institutions was to more efficiently 
enforce the trade interests of the original signatories; this analogy is no longer 
applicable. If the social contract to be of relevance for the current EU, it would need 
to be able to accommodate the European institutions, sub-state actors and other 
interested groups, as it was these actors who were evident in the European 
Constitutional Convention (2002-2004): thus, the application of Locke's social 
contract to the EEC has been superseded by progress. If the social contract is to again 
become relevant as a theoretical tool for understanding the EU, the contract in 
question must be able to accommodate the numerous non-state actors that are evident 
in the EU, as well as the Member States and the European institutions themselves. 
Althusius and the Social Contract 
Although this dissertation presents Althusius in opposition to the societas canon, this 
does not mean that the notion of the social contract is absent from his work. In the 
same manner as the discussion on the individual above, the social contract is an 
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integral part of Politica; yet its mistaken absence arises from Althusius' use of the 
term. Rather than Althusius advocating the social contract as representing an 
agreement between individuals to form a state, the contract represents the agreements 
reached by each individual level of consociatio: 
... no realm or commonwealth has ever been founded or instituted except by 
contract entered into one with the other, by covenants agreed upon between 
subjects and their future prince, and by an established mutual obligation that 
both should religiously observe. When this obligation is dishonoured, the 
power of the prince loses its strength and is ended. Whence it follows that the 
people can exist without a magistrate, but a magistrate cannot exist without a 
people, and that the people creates the magistrate rather than the contrary 
(Politica: 122. Emphasis mine). 
In addition to this, recent interpretations of Althusius also support the important role 
played by the social contract for Althusius. Michael Lessnoff, quoting Otto von 
Gierke, argues that it was Althusius who 'raised the idea of the contract to the level of 
theory' (Lessnoff 1986: 35). George Sabine contends that the contract figured in 
Althusius in two ways: firstly, it had a specifically political role in explaining the 
relations between a ruler and a people, but it also had a general sociological role in 
explaining the existence of any group whatever (1941: 417). Thomas Hueglin, 
moreover, argued that Althusius was one of the first great social contract theorists 
before Hobbes (Hueglin 1999: 86). 
In relation to Althusius' use of the contract, an important qualification nevertheless 
needs to be made. The contract of the "state" is not an agreement between the 
individual members, but the individual consociations, which in turn are founded on 
contracts. A second important fact to remember at this juncture is that unlike the 
Societas canon, all the consociatio are political - even the family. In this manner, 
each of the individual consociatio has its own compact (or constitution) on which it is 
agreed: 
The simple and private association is a society and symbiosis initiated by a 
special covenant (pactum) among the members for the purpose of bringing 
together and holding in common a particular interest (quid peculiare). This is 
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done according to their agreement and way of life, that is, according to what is 
necessary and useful for organised symbiotic life. Such an association can 
rightly be called primary, and all others derivative from it (Ibid: 27). 
A further concurrent theme of the Althusian social contract involves the idea of the 
oath of allegiance, which appears in relation to the superior (Politica: 40-41) and the 
senatorial committee (Politica: 42-43), to the Ephors (Politica: 58), the Supreme 
Magistrate (Politica: 93 & 106) and finally between the supreme magistrate and the 
people (Politica: 133). In this way, Althusius recognises that in some instances there 
is already a landed gentry within a consociation, and so the concern is how to limit 
them to serving the good of the collective, rather than using the collective to further 
their own personal gain. 
So, what does this mean for our discussion on developing an understanding of sui 
generic constitutionalism? In general terms, Politica offers a system of social 
contractarianism, which, rather than relying on a fictitious contract between a group 
of abstract individuals to create a state, relies on social contractarianism as a logical 
progression from the smallest consociation to the Universal Association. In this way, 
the idea of the contract is an integral part of the Althusian system, and reflecting the 
nature of Politica, reflects a practical use of the term. With specific relation to the 
EU, relating the discussion back to Newman's application of the social contract to the 
EU setting, Althusius' model of constitutionalism offers a more realistic theory to that 
of the societas canon, as rather than starting from an abstract point, that is the state of 
nature, it reflects and takes into account the existing political structure of the body it 
attempts to constitutionalise. In this way, the Treaties of Rome founded the 
governmental structure and system of the EU, while the Constitutional Treaty 
attempts to define the roles of both the ruler (the European institutions) and the ruled 
(the member states). 
Constitution Related Issues: The Removal of the Parliamentary System 
There remain a number of characteristics of the Althusian political system that require 
exploration, as although they are not part of the constitution, there are principles that 
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emanate from the constitution: the first of these is that the conflictual nature of the 
current mode of parliamentary party politics would be largely removed from an 
Althusian inspired sui generic association. In the Althusian system, the main 
decisions and framework of the individual consociations have already been achieved 
through the establishment of the consociation, and so subsequent decisions need to 
reflect the fluidity of everyday decisions, for which the entrenchment of political 
views in parties is not effective. Rather, the lack of political parties within the 
decision-making process was offset by the guiding presence of strong Calvinist ethics 
in Politica. Indeed, Althusius notes that: "For a sound worship and fear of God in the 
commonwealth is the cause, origin, and fountain of private and public happiness. On 
the other hand, the contempt of God, and the neglect of divine worship, are the causes 
of all evil and misfortune" (Politica: 161). 
One of the qualities of this approach is that it avoids the 'abstract' nature of 
parliamentary democracy and, as was seen in Chapter One, this is a point reiterated in 
Titoism. In representative democracy, it is impossible for each individual's views to 
be represented in a centralised parliament. Instead, the views of the constituents are 
reduced to 'abstract' collective wills, which the elected 'representative' then 
represents within the parliament. In this way, the political system is in many respects 
unrepresentative as the centralised nature of power does not allow the process to focus 
on individuals 'real' needs, so 'abstract' as opposed to 'real' views are represented. 
In Politica 'nowhere do the contracting parties appear alienated from any of their 
rights or wills' (Hueglin 1999: 86). As was seen in the Chapter One, the nature of the 
Yugoslav system consciously attempted to avoid the notion of the western 
parliamentary 'abstract citizen' who is divorced from the fundamental social 
relationships in which he develops: "Such an abstract and isolated individual can be 
represented only by an alienated, general deputy who pursues some sort of fictive 
general interest" (Todorovic 1974: 3). 
It must be made clear that this lack of political parties can also be found in Hobbes' 
and Rousseau's writings, indeed the latter vehemently attacked the idea of 
representation. In a chapter on the social contract entitled 'Deputies or 
Representatives' , Rousseau argues that: 
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Sovereignty, for the same reason as makes it inalienable, cannot be 
represented; it lies essentially in the general will, and will does not admit of 
representation: it is either the same, or other; there is no intermediate 
possibility. The deputies of the people, therefore, are not and cannot be its 
representatives: they are merely its stewards ... The idea of representation is 
modern; it comes to us from feudal government, from that iniquitous and 
absurd system which degrades humanity and dishonours the name of man .. .In 
any case, the moment a people allows itself to be represented, it is no longer 
free: it no longer exists (Rousseau Social Contract: 96-97). 
Rousseau's solution to this problem was the notion of the General Will, which by its 
very nature could only work in small communities in which the individuals had a 
chance to participate directly in the running of the affairs, so individuals could act as 
'stewards' of the general will. The problem here, and one that plagues much of 
Rousseau's work, is its abstract nature. The idea of the general will and each giving 
their all, but remaining as free as before is very much a utopian view; in stark 
contrast, Althusius' lack of political parties is based on methodical and practical 
solutions to the idea of multi-level constitutionalism, in which the 'general will' is the 
practice of prior consociations acting for a common purpose. 
Politica and Decision-Making 
The decision-making procedure outlined by Althusius also provides some interesting 
outcomes, not least that each consociation appears to have its own unique procedure. 
In the simple consociations, namely the collegium or guild, Althusius offers a subtle 
distinction between two forms of decision-making. For those issues 'common to all 
colleagues, or pertaining jointly and wholly to the colleagues as a united group, but 
not in matters separately affecting individual colleagues outside the corporate 
fellowship' (Politica: 37) a majority vote will bind the minority. The subtlety is that a 
majority decision cannot bind in matters 'common to all one by one, or pertaining to 
colleagues as individuals' (Ibid.), in which case decisions have to be made by 
unanimous decision, as 'what touches all ought to be approved by all'. (Ibid.) 
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Within the city, Althusius argues that there should be both 'a prefect or superior of the 
city' and a 'senatorial collegium' (Politica: 42), with the latter consisting of 'wise and 
select men to whom is entrusted the care and administration of the affairs of the city' 
(Ibid: 43). With respect to the decision-making process, a majority of the senators, 
either of all senatorial colleagues without exception, or with at least two-thirds of the 
colleagues of the entire collegium have to be present. Although this differs little from 
modem contemporary procedure, Althusius does add a condition. If, after the 
senators have voted, the 'gravity of the matter so demands' and 'the majority is 
thought to have decided incorrectly' the president of the senate may order the 
majority to consider the view of 'the dissenting minority' and 'discuss the matter 
anew' . After this process has occurred, the president 'decides on the basis of 
considered votes of the majority' and so a position is adopted. In addition, the 
minority is required to consent itself to the decision of the majority so that 'the 
decision of the majority is declared and held as the judgement of the whole senate or 
consistory, and binds the entire community' (Politica: 44). 
The point of finding a consensus decision refers back to the idea of what is touched by 
all, ought to be approved by all. Only a consensus decision 'is sufficient in those 
matters that pertain to persons as a group, or that are done by the many as by everyone 
and the groups' (Ibid: 45). 
The problem here is that Althusius does not give exarnples of situations where the 
'gravity of the matter' so requires a 'rethink', and so this procedure may appear 
surprising. However, it must be remembered that Althusius saw that the senate and 
president were not only 'wise and learned' men, but also that as a group they were 
inferior to the consociation as a whole and, as servants of the collective body, their 
task would be to adopt decisions that would benefit the overall consociation, not the 
senators as individual members. 
The reason behind highlighting this procedure is that it is clear that Althusius not only 
places the good of the whole at the forefront of the decision-making procedure, but 
also that the decision making-procedure is as a result of continual negotiations 
between 'learned' men who are not tied down to any particular party rule and 
ideology and so can be expected to be much more arnenable to finding common 
ground, as opposed to party politicians that increasingly either focus on the negatives 
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of the opposition or on presenting an 'alternative' way. The result of this is that one 
group (potentially a majority of the population) will always 'lose', as their views will 
not be represented at all. 
The Issue of Equality 
One final (contentious) point of Politica will be discussed here, and that is the 
interesting perspective of Althusian constitutionalism on the notion of equality. 
Althusius spends little time on this specific point; there is one paragraph towards the 
end of his discussion on 'the city' that has potentially significant ramifications. 
Althusius argues that: 
Concord is fostered and protected by fairness (aequabilitas) when right, 
liberty, and honour are extended to each citizen according to the order and 
distinction of his worth and status. For it behoves the citizen to live by fair and 
suitable right with his neighbour, displaying neither arrogance nor servility, 
and thus to will whatever is tranquil and honest in the city. Contrary to this 
fairness is equality (aequalitas), by which individual citizens are levelled 
among ... From this arises the most certain disorder and disturbance of matters 
(Politica: 49-50). 
The problem stems from the translation of the terms aequabilitas and aequalitas. For 
Hueglin, the terms translate respectively as 'absolute equality' and 'adequate and fair 
degree of equality' (1999: 164), and refer to the process of communication of that 
which is necessary for consociational life within the city. In this regards, Hueglin 
argues that the distinction focuses on the relationship between the guilds and colleges 
that constitute the city. Absolute equality would lead to social disorder, while relative 
equality would foster concord between the different consociations (Ibid). 
The fact that Althusius notes that people should be treated fairly, rather than equally, 
represents an interesting alternative to the current liberal notion of equality. To what 
extent this distinction can be transferred onto the current social order is questionable. 
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However, if it is remembered that not only did Althusius see a strong social order57, 
but also that 'God distributed his gifts unevenly among men' (Politica: 23), then it is 
feasible that this distinction between fairness and equality could be applied to the 
Althusian social order,58 but the applicability of this to the present day secular order 
remains an issue for debate. 
The problem here stems both from the original translation of Camey, and also from 
the subsequent normative interpretation of Althusius' work by subsequent scholars. 
Not only do both Camey and Hueglin interpret the terms used by Althusius in a 
significantly different manner, but also there has been no subsequent work on 
Althusius in relation to this particular point, as it is merely a minor passage with 
Politica.59 
Conclusion 
To swn up, the three fundamental differences (lack of parliamentary representation, 
decision-making and equality) between Althusius and the societas canon mirror the 
argument of Chapter One, namely that the political and constitutional system 
described in Politica differs in such fundamental ways from the societas canon, that it 
is counter-productive to take aspects of it out of context. This idea is further 
supported by means of a single example. The fact that there are no political parties 
within the Althusian system may lead to criticisms of 'unrepresentativeness': how can 
the 'people' be represented if not through an elected representative? What Politica 
shows is that there are alternative representative methods to parliamentary democracy, 
'7 Althusius argues: "The secular order of the province is assigned, with the consent of the provincial 
members, the responsibility for the body, food, clothing, and other things that pertain to this life. It 
observes whether there is any need for remedy, aid, or amendment in political matters relating to the 
second table of the Decalogue. It does this in order that advaotages to the province may be provided, 
and disadvantages to the provincial members avoided. 
This secular and political order is twofold. It includes the nobility (ordo nobilitatis) and the commons 
(ordo plebeius), the latter of which embraces the inhabitaots both of cities and of country villages. 
Whence there are three secular estates: the nobility (status nobilitatis), the burghers (status civitatum), 
and the agrariaos (status agrariorum)" (Politica: 60). 
ss It must also be remembered that Althusius promoted equality among consociations, such as guilds 
(Hueglin 1999: 64). 
59 There is however, ao interesting connection in this regard to the work of Immanuel Kaot. Reiss 
argues in relation to the work of Kant that: "A ruler should give everyone his due, but human beings 
are not equal. Therefore, the principle of merit, and not of equality, must be applied" (1999: 245). 
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which do not rely on direct elections or the representation of the 'general will' of 
constituencies. In addition to this, Politica offers a system in which interests can be 
addressed due to the nature of power being held within the simple consociations. In 
many ways, this point is repeated in Titoist constitutionalism, as discussed in the 
Chapter One. In 1953, Yugoslav officials Milovan £>ilas and Ales Bebler attended the 
conference of Asian Socialists and noted of the speech of British Labour Leader 
Clement Atlee: 
Atlee, too, gave a short speech on matters of principle; the point of it - that 
only the parliamentary system was worthy of humanity - left Bebler and me 
resentful. Though we no longer denied the value of the parliamentary system, 
especially its historic value, I thought Atlee's assumption old-fashioned and 
dogmatic. The majority of humanity is not ''parliamentary'' and seeks 
different, nonparliamentary. paths (£>ilas 1985: 311. Emphasis mine). 
In final conclusion, we have argued in this chapter that the Althusian constitutional 
system offers a fundamental alternative to the constitutional model of the societas 
canon in relation to the foundation and organisation of the political association. The 
difference between the two constitutional models is so important however that, in 
order to avoid the 'problems of translation' highlighted by Neil Walker in the 
introduction, it is essential to address Politica as a holistic theory of constitutionalism. 
Thus in the following chapter we explore a second key aspect of constitutionalism, 
sovereignty, which is treated by Althusius in a manner similarly distinct from the 
societas canon. The argument of the chapter is that Althusius' version of sovereignty 
represents a remarkably 'modem' understanding of the term. What is meant by this 
claim, is that the basic features of the present day understanding of sovereignty can be 
found in Politica, but with a subtle distinction that has the potential to further our 
understanding of sui generic constitutionalism. Thus, a secondary claim of the 
chapter is that the initial societas discussion on sovereignty by Jean Bodin and 
Thomas Hobbes represents a regression in lineage of political thought, as it was not 
until 1762 and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's the Social Contract that the societas canon 
laid the foundation for the present day understanding of sovereignty, advocating a 
theory of sovereignty that mirrored much, but not all, of Althusius' argument, some 
160 years prior. 
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Chapter 4: The Societas canon, Politica and Sovereignty 
Viewed from a wider angle, it is the applicability of statist concepts like 
sovereignty to the post-national reality which is thrown into doubt and it [this 
applicability 1 reveals the necessity to translate those concepts into conceptions 
that do not constrain the new reality ... 
Samantha Besson 2004: 3 
If states were not sovereign political life would have to rest on a different 
nonnative foundation, such as suverainty or empire or theocracy as was the 
case prior to the revolution of sovereignty. 
Robert Jackson 1999: 432 
Famously, Voltaire argued that if God did not exist, it would be necessary for man to 
invent him; much the same can be said for the concept of sovereignty. Authors such 
as Jean Bodin initially devised sovereignty as a justification for the centralisation of 
the state under the authority of the Monarch, and so became a 'by-product' of the 
creation of the modem state. Indeed, the early societas authors, who greatly 
influenced modem state incarnation as we saw in the previous Chapter, saw the state 
as a prerequisite for the existence of sovereignty. The relationship between the state 
and sovereignty has become so interdependent that F .H. Hinsley argued that 
'sovereignty will not be found in societies in which there is no state' (1966: 22). 
Furthennore: "Sovereignty is quintessentially an expression of a political relationship 
and, from a juristic perspective, sovereignty constitutes the essence of the modem 
state" (Loughlin 2003: 69). 
Given these definitions the study of sovereignty in a sui generic setting, thus appears 
problematic. It must be remembered, however, that sovereignty existed prior to the 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which marked the beginning of the sovereign state. 
Indeed, an initial discussion of sovereignty that occurred from 1576 to 1614 between 
Bodin and AIthusius, which will be discussed below, occurred some 30 years before 
the Treaty was signed. 
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Despite Hinsley's assertion, the issue of sovereignty in the Westphalian societas 
system is problematic. This results from the fact that in the work of writers such as 
Bodin and Hobbes, sovereignty had a definite meaning; due to the continual evolution 
of the societas canon, however, sovereignty came to lose its original meaning in 
Bodinian-Hobbesian sense of the work. In this respect, a problem surrounding 
sovereignty is that there no concrete definition of the term. Subsequently, sovereignty 
has increasingly become a 'catch-all' phrase encompassing notions such as consent, 
self-governance, legitimacy and even the very notion of nationhood itself. Indeed, 
reflecting this, N ewman lists the different variants of the word 'sovereignty': state 
sovereignty; legal sovereignty; popular sovereignty; popular state sovereignty; 
popular state sovereignty in combination with various forms of 'totalitarian' claims; 
national sovereignty; divided sovereignty and shared sovereignty (1996: 8-9. 
Emphasis in original). Furthermore, Newman adds the proviso that 'if someone refers 
to 'sovereignty', without further clarification, we cannot be sure what slbe is talking 
about' (Ibid: 9. Emphasis mine). 
In many respects, sovereignty no longer exists, which is fitting, given it symbiotic 
relationship to the state. Indeed, some have concluded that: 
As a political concept, sovereignty has long been since emptied of substance. 
The character of the state and relations between states have changed so much 
that the conceptual coherence of sovereignty has be shattered. Sovereignty is 
neither final nor absolute; it is simply irrelevant. Bodin has effectively been 
superseded ... today it much more acute to refer to the 'autonomy' of the 
modem state - its capacity to determine itself - than it is to speak of what is 
now outmoded sovereignty (Burgess 2000: 15). 
This progression beyond sovereignty in its current form characterised much of the 
early EU constitutional debate on the subject. However, in the later debates, much of 
this debate focused on attempts to 'recondition' or 'reconceptualise' (Walker 2003: 
10) sovereignty in order for it to be of relevance to sui generic associations. 
In order to be able to explore these issues, this chapter will firstly explore a 
'forgotten' initial dialogue on sovereignty that occurred in the Reformation era: 
between the years 1576 and 1614, the theoretical debate on sovereignty produced 
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definitions of sovereignty, which included many current characteristics. Second, after 
the analysis of this "initial discussion", the chapter will move onto the 'other' 
discussion on sovereignty; that is the evolution of the term in the societas canon, since 
it is important to understand the distinct changes to the idea of sovereignty and how 
they affect the concept in its present form. Third, the influence of Rousseau on 
sovereignty will also be explored in relation to the French Revolution, as this 
represents a 'watershed' for sovereignty, in which much of the political theory 
became political practice. Fourth, after this discussion, the chapter will discuss the 
theoretical problems of sovereignty, which result largely from the natural evolution of 
the societas canon. Fifth, the discussion will then place the problems identified thus 
far in the context of the sui generic EU. Here we will note two broadly different 
approaches to the subject in relation to the EU; one theoretical approach that focuses 
on "reconditioning" sovereignty in order for it to be of relevance to the EU 
constitutional discussion; and a political discussion, which explores the EU as an 
alternative model for Member States to exercise their state sovereignty. Sixth, the 
discussion will then explore the Althusian variant of sovereignty, focusing both on a 
critical comparison between sovereignty as found in Politica and The Social Contract; 
and finally, on the possible theoretical relevance of Althusian Sovereignty to the two 
EU 'camps'. 
The 'initial discussion' of sovereignty 1576-1614: Bodin v. AIthusius 
Most discussions of sovereignty take as their theoretical starting point the work of 
Jean Bodin (1529/30-1596), immediately followed by that of Thomas Hobbes (1588-
1679). While this lineage is almost forced on any discussion due, in particular, to 
Hobbes' relationship to the modem state, it does reject a key dialogue on sovereignty 
that occurred in the late 1500s and early 1600s. The importance of this discussion for 
our argument is that it occurred in the brief period immediately before the dominance 
of the modem state, in which both Bodinian and Althusian theories of sovereignty 
coexisted (Elazar 2001: 35); and subsequently allows us to explore a time when 
popular sovereignty existed prior to the state in its Westphalian form. 
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The origin of this dialogue was Jean Bodin's Six Books of the Commonwealth, 
(Commonwealth) (1576), in which Bodin advocated that sovereignty should be vested 
in a Prince who would restore and maintain order. For Bodin, peace was to be 
ensured through the 'absolutism of the Prince', but the Prince was not created via a 
social contract between individuals, as was to become the case in the Leviathan. 
Rather than adopting the 'scientific approach' of the later societas authors, Bodin's 
argument was shaped by the Reformation era in which he wrote, his belief (or not60) 
in Aristotelianism and, to many extents, his religious beliefs. In this way, while it is 
essential to recognise that Bodin 'gave form to the state as an intimate union of ruler 
and ruled' this remained a 'half-way concept' between two ages (Shennan 1974:76), 
and so remained 'a theory waiting for an equivalent view of man and equivalent 
sociology' (McClelland 1998: 284) in order for it to be fully realised. 
For Bodin, the aim of Commonwealth was to demonstrate how the sovereign, who 
was established by God to be one of His lieutenants to rule over men, could restore 
peace in an already existing state. In this manner Bodin recognised a quasi-medieval 
commonwealth based on the Aristotelian notion of the family, and that the individual 
becomes a citizen upon leaving the family as long as they recognised the sovereignty 
of the Prince (McClelland 1996: 282). Furthermore, Bodin recognised that 
sovereignty was absolute, indivisible, that is located in one central position, and 
interconnected, that is all aspects of sovereignty are connected. This idea did not 
mean that Bodin is simply an earlier version of Hobbes. In addition to the difference 
on the nature and creation of the state, Bodin also recognised three types of laws, 
which each affected the ruler in a different manner. First, the Prince had to recognise 
the law of God (or natural law), but could not be forced by any human office to obey 
it; second, he had to recognise fundamental law (which could be equated with a 
modern constitution (de Benoist 2000b: 104); and, third, he had only to be tolerant of 
customary laws, and could amend or abolish these without consent. 
Taking these features into account, we can see that Bodin's sovereignty is an early 
form of 'ruler' sovereignty, but one that is not formulated in the same scientific 
manner as that one adopted by Thomas Hobbes: indeed, Bodin's understanding of the 
60 Of Bodin's Aristotelian beliefs McClelland notes: "Bodin thinks he is a follower of Aristotle, but if 
he is, he is the follower of the wrong Aristotle ... " (1996: 281). 
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commonwealth is closer to Althusius than Hobbes; but, the key feature with Bodin is 
that he is the first political theorist to offer a 'modem' version of sovereignty vested 
in a single ruler, and his relationship to the state. 
While our argument presents Bodin and Althusius as engaged in a theoretical 
discussion, this argument has been achieved retrospectively, as Bodin in fact died 
seven years before Althusius' wrote Politica. The 'discussion' between the two 
authors is thus focused on Althusius' constant reference to Bodin's work in Politica. 
Often Althusius was critical of Bodin, but, in many respects, the two authors share 
more similarities than they do differences. Not only were both these writers 
rationalists, in the sense that they regarded political science as a discipline distinct 
from theology, but they also believed that the hallmark of the state or commonwealth 
was sovereignty (Forsyth 1981: 74). In any case, as Hueglin rightly argues, Althusius 
'could not ignore Bodin's epochal definition of sovereignty ... since it had already 
begun to reorganise the modem world of territorial centralisation' (1999: 114). 
While Althusius was in disagreement with Bodin's contention of the location of 
sovereignty in the Prince, he concurs with Bodin on the issue of sovereignty being 
'indivisible, incommunicable, and interconnected, so that whoever holds one holds 
them all.' (Politica: 71). In addition, not only is Althusius in agreement with Bodin 
that the sovereignty is the "bond, soul and vital spirit of the commonwealth, without 
which it is degenerated and disintegrated", (Politica: 65) but Althusius continually re-
iterates Bodin's distinction that 'a superior entity can have no equal or greater 
superior' (Politica: 71). 
The important distinction between Althusius and Bodin, however, is the nature and 
location of sovereignty and the nature of the "state". For Althusius, the "state" was 
not a specific form of rule over human beings that created unity through the 
possession of sovereign power; rather, it was a specific form of association, namely 
one that was all embracing: 
It was, more specifically, an association of associations, marked off from the 
lesser associations ... by its comprehensiveness, its self-sufficiency, its 
universality, its capacity to fulfil, not this or that particular end, but all the 
various needs of man both spiritual and material (Forsyth 1981: 77). 
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Bodin did differentiate between the form of the state and its government: however, the 
nature of the state was radically from that of Althusius. While the precedence of the 
sovereign power in one, a few or many defined the form of state as monarchy, 
aristocracy or democracy, any of these forms may have characteristics of the others 
because of the sovereign's decision regarding the type of government (Salmon 1996: 
502). Resulting from this potential mixture, this led to the conclusion that sovereign 
authority could delegate offices and the mere exercise of some of its powers in more 
complex communities, but Bodin always favoured monarchical due to its 
concentrated source of sovereignty (Hinsley 1966: 123). Indeed, Bodin did emphasis 
the importance of corporations within a community, but he did not confer on them 
fictitious legal personalities in the same way as Althusius did61 (Salmon 1996: 502. 
Emphasis mine). Instead, local autonomy is allowed as long as it does not constrain 
the sovereign (de Benoist 2000b: 102). For Althusius, this is where Bodin 'greatly 
errs'. By attributing 'absolute and all-encompassing' power to the King of France 
(i.e. the Prince) and hardly recognising the 'optimates' (Politica: 105) or the political 
restraints that naturally exist on the Prince, Bodin places both the Prince and the 
optimates in an unworkable position.62 
In response, Althusius argued that sovereignty is located in the collective members as 
a whole (whom Althusius refers to as 'the people'); he also differentiates between the 
jus regni or the jus majestatis and the posestas regni - namely, the right of the realm 
or the right of sovereignty, and the power of the realm.63 While the former is located 
61 Any position in the commonwealth would have to have created or authorised by the sovereign. A 
key part of Bodin's discussion is that he argued sovereignty consisted of five 'marques' or 
'prerogatives', the third of which states that it is the prerogative of the sovereign to 'establish the 
principle offers of the state' (Commonwealth: 64). After which Bodin discussed the manner in which 
the individual offers are constituted, one of which is election by the people. The key point to this 
prerogative is that right of sovereignty is not in the election of the officers, by either the sovereign or 
by election - rather the right of sovereignty is in the creation, confirmation and conferment of the 
office (Commonwealth: 66). 
62 Although Bodin did emphasise the importance of corporations within a community, he did not confer 
on them fictitious legal personalities in the same way as Althusius did (Salmon 1996: 502). Instead, 
local autonomy is allowed as long as it does not constrain the sovereign (de Benoist 2000b: 102). 
Althusius also is critical of Bodin's position that the sovereign was above the law, for 'to liberate civil 
law is to release it to a certain degree from the bonds of natural and civil law' (Politica: 72). 
63 As noted by Thomas Hueglin, there is an inconsistency in Althusius' work with regard to the terms 
used in translation. While in Frederick Camey's abridged version the terms jus regni,jus majestatis 
and poses/as regni appear, in Hueglin's book he translates the potestas regni as potestas imperandi 
universalis. Despite this, as Hueglin himself comments, 'the central point, the separation of the 
ownership of sovereignty from its delegated exercise, remains clear throughout' (1999: fu 43). The 
negation, by the societas canon, of the differentiation between sovereignty and the right of sovereignty 
is a criticism that is also made by Daniel Deudney in his study on Philadelphian sovereignty. "Statists 
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within the consent and concord of the 'people', the latter is located in the 
'administrators of power' who recognise that they are not in control of the supreme 
power (Politica: 71). Consequently, although the rights of sovereignty and of the 
realm (jus majestatis et regni) are indivisible, incommunicable and interconnected: 
"These rights can, however, be lawfully delegated, so that in their administration 
someone other than the owner may perform the duties of the supreme magistrate" 
(Politica: 71. Emphasis mine). 
Thus in this view, ruling institutions could not 'possess ' (or even be the source of) 
sovereignty but could only 'administer the rights' of sovereignty on behalf of the 
sovereign people (Forsyth 1981: 78), and this represents a form of 'popular' 
sovereignty, as opposed to Bodin's 'ruler' sovereignty. 
This 'disagreement' between Bodin and Althusius that can be identified in Politica 
represents the beginning and the end of this "initial discussion". The majority of 
writers who subsequently became involved in this debate were strongly influenced by 
the Bodinian variant of sovereignty. Indeed, Politica itself can be seen as a direct 
response to William Barclay's Bodinian The Kingdom and Regal Power64 (1600); in 
turn, Henning Amisaeus's De Jure Majestatis Libri Tres (1610), which supported the 
idea of sovereignty being located within a single ruler, can be seen as a major attack 
on Althusius. Only Bartholomaeus Keckerman (1607) attempted to find any kind of 
middle ground between the Althusian and the Bodinian sides. 
What this Bodinian prominence reflects is the nature of political Europe during this 
period. The process of state building that was largely consolidated in the Treaty of 
Westphalia was growing in both emphasis and influence so much so that the 
Althusian version of 'popular' sovereignty was overwhelmed by 'ruler' sovereignty. 
More importantly for the ongoing discussion, the former was not really discussed 
again until the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in 1762. This claim that Althusius 
do not distinguish sufficiently between authority and sovereignty, and tend to leap from the definitional 
impossibility of divided sovereignty to the mistake of thinking a system of multiple authorities that are 
not hierarchically arranged is impossible or inconsistent with sovereignty" (1996: 196). 
64 In discussing Barclay's views on the subject ofEphors, Althusius writes 'I will repeat his IBarclay's] 
arguments, and refute them in a few words ... ' (Politica: 109). The connection between Althusius and 
Arnisaeus is less compelling. In the 1995 edition of Politica, Arnisaeus is mentioned once in relation 
to the topic oftyranoy, but Althusius merely states that Arnisaeus 'has a different viewpoint from mine 
concerning the marks of tyranny' (Politica: 198). In a translation footnote to this, Carney adds 
'Althusius neither elaborates nor responds to Arnisaeus' viewpoint' (Ibid: fn25). 
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represents the first attempt to popular sovereignty is supported by Thomas Hueglin 
who argued that: "by grafting the principle of sovereignty upon the organised body of 
the people rather than a state somehow representing individual citizens, he [Althusius 1 
may indeed deserve to be regarded as one of the first early modem theorists of 
popular sovereignty (Hueglin 1999: 115). 
The 'other' discussion on sovereignty: The societas canon 1651-1762 
Despite its predominance, the Bodinian variant of ruler sovereignty presents a 
paradox, as it no longer complies with a modem understanding of the concept. 
Present day sovereignty in a democratic sovereign state is not based in a single ruler, 
but in the people as a whole who enable their sovereign rights to be exercised through 
elected representatives. This does not mean that Bodin has no relevance to the 
discussion of sovereignty, as the basic features of Bodin's theory; namely, its 
absolute, indivisible and interconnected still serve as the basis of the current 
understanding of the term. This leads us to ask the question, why did Bodin's theory 
of sovereignty gain importance over the Althusian model, and how did the Bodinian 
model evolve into the model we know today? 
The answer to the first part of the question asked above revolves around two key 
historical events in the 16th and 17th Century. In 1572, the French King Charles IX, 
under the influence of his mother Catherine De Medici, ordered the murder of the 
French Calvinists, or Huguenots, who had visited Paris to attend the wedding of 
Charles' sister, Princess Marguerite to the Calvinist Henri, Prince ofNavarre. The St. 
Bartholomew's Day Massacre, as the event became known, inaugurated a period of 
religious unrest in France. 
This unrest formed the background to the argument in Bodin's Six Books, and while 
Bodin agreed with the Huguenot claims of Innocent Gentille's Anti-Machiavel (1576) 
that the massacre had been caused by Tyrannical acts of the Crown caused by the 
influence of Machiavellianism (Bonney 1991: 308), a right to resist the Prince meant 
that the people were superior and this appeared to Bodin to a 'recipe of anarchy' 
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(Franklin 1992: xxiii). Thus, Bodin has been cited as leading the strong reaction 
against both Protestant and Catholic resistance theory (Bonney 1991: 312). 
Similarly, the political unrest that preceded the Civil War in England, led Thomas 
Hobbes to call for the strong leadership of the King. Even during the Civil War, 
Hobbes' basic argument remained that strong leadership, either in the form of the 
King or Cromwell, was needed to end the fear of being afraid, as Hobbes, like Bodin, 
saw the need for strong leadership to restore and/or maintain peace. In this sense, 
Bodin's theory of sovereignty 'won out' against that of Althusius because its basic 
principle, the location of sovereignty in the Prince promised, theoretically at least, to 
restore order to the largest states at that time: France and England. In retrospect, 
Althusius' location of sovereignty in the 'people' and exercised through 
representatives could be perceived by 16th and 17th Century French and English 
political theorists as either being utopian or unworkable, but more importantly, unable 
to restore peace, and therefore prosperity. 
The answer to this second part of the question, 'how did Bodin's theory of 
sovereignty evolve into the model we know today?' represents what is called here 'the 
other discussion on sovereignty'; that of the societas canon. The premise behind this 
argument is that the Althusian version of sovereignty was ahead of its time by several 
decades, if not centuries. For example, one hundred and sixty years before Rousseau, 
Althusius had differentiated between the jus regni and the posestas regni, and allotted 
each its own specific role within the political system. Subsequently, the people in 
Althusius' system, while remaining the source of sovereignty, were able 'to delegate 
the exercise of sovereign power to different bodies as they please (according to their 
sovereign will)' (Elazar 1995a: xli). Even though Althusius had presented a coherent 
discussion concerning this division, his argument lost out to the societas-influenced 
state, largely due to the historical situation outlined above. Indeed, it was not until 
Rousseau's The Social Contract that the idea of the people as the sovereign, or 
'popular' sovereignty began to re-emerge; but by this time Rousseau's work was 
largely seen as abstract utopianism and it took the actual revolutions of the United 
States and France for the notion of the people as sovereign to become practically 
accepted. 
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Theoretically, in this respect, the whole of the societas canon (including Rousseau) 
can be seen as representing a regression of political thought; and, in addition to the 
political context, the main reason why the idea of ruler sovereignty became 
theoretically dominant was the influence of Thomas Hobbes on political thought. 
Sovereignty and Hobbes 
Hobbes attempted to use a scientifically methodological approach to explore the 
problem of the state; as a result, the issues of religion that bound Bodin did not 
concern him. Indeed, while Bodin wished to endow the sovereign with God's qualities 
(van Creveld 1999: 177), Hobbes' conception of the sovereign is naturalistic and 
utterly remote from Christian ideas (de 10uvene11957: 233). However, Hobbes did 
not deny the existence of God. Instead he stoutly maintained the existence of God, 
but he denied that the church had any rights against the state (Bernstein 1930 189-
190); for Hobbes, the church and the Commonwealth are two aspects of the same 
institution. Therefore, unless there was one governor (the Leviathan) over both state 
and church there would be civil war between the church and the state, between 'the 
sword of justice and the shield offaith' (Murray 1929: 213). 
With regards to absolutism, Hobbes proved as ruthless as Niccolo Machiavelli and far 
more centralist than Bodin (King 1974: 54). For Hobbes, the issue of what law, if 
any, binds the sovereign was irrelevant. In this fashion, Hobbes was able to avoid the 
problems of Bodin, that is what laws, if any, can bind the Prince, by virtue of the fact 
that there is no 'fundamental law' that can bind the sovereign, and so the subsequent 
problem of who decides whether the sovereign has breached a law is non-existent. 
Indeed, the right of the people not to be bound by a sovereign's law, was for Hobbes, 
'logically absurd'. In this respect, the decision was not between differing degrees of 
'Soveraignty' but between civil government and the state of war (Fukuda 1997: 53). 
For Hobbes, absolute state-power, absolute sovereignty, was the necessary condition 
for stable politics and indeed for hwnan safety (MacCorrnick 1999: 123). 
Despite its absolutism, Leviathan does contain a typically modern concept, namely, 
the emphasis on consent and contract with words such as 'justly' or 'authority' 
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appearing in the relationship between sovereign and subjects. While the fact that the 
Leviathan was formed via a 'consensual' and secular social contract is a progression 
from Bodin's 'God on earth', the Leviathan fuses Althusius' distinction. In this 
respect, both sovereignty and the right of sovereignty are vested in the same place -
the Leviathan. For, Althusius this represents a negative position for the entire state 
since: 'the less the power of those who rule, the more secure and stable the imperium 
remains' (Politica: 121). Indeed, for Althusius the whole scientific approach of 
Hobbes was false: " ... there is no instance in which a people has conferred upon a 
prince the unrestrained license to bring about its own ruin. For a people when 
questioned could have doubtlessly responded that it had granted no power to 
accomplish its own ruin .... " (Politica: 124) 
Subsequently, Althusius offers four reasons why 'absolute power, or what is called 
the plenitude of power, cannot be given to the supreme magistrate' (Politica: 121). 
For first, he who employs a plenitude of power breaks through the restraints 
by which human society has been contained; Secondly, by absolute power 
justice is destroyed, and when justice is taken away realms become bands of 
robbers, as Augustine says; 
Thirdly such absolute power regards not the utility and welfare of subjects, 
but private pleasure. Power, however, is established for the utility of those 
who are ruled, not of those who rule, and the utility of the people or subjects 
does not in the least require unlimited power. Adequate provision has been 
made for them by laws; 
Finally, absolute power is wicked and prohibited. For we cannot do what can 
only be done injuriously. Thus even almighty God is said not to be able to do 
what is evil and contrary to his nature. The precepts of natural law (jus 
naturale) are to "live honorably, injure no one, and render to each his due 
(Politica: 121-122). 
Despite this, the influence and importance of Leviathan cannot be understated. The 
Leviathan offered the basic premises of the liberal debate, such as the centralised 
nature of the state, the indivisibility of sovereignty and the social contract between 
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individuals that generated further discussion, most notably in Locke, and this 
influence is evident in the whole of the societas canon. 
Spinoza. Harrington. Locke and Rousseau 
Writing at the same time as Hobbes, Benedict de Spinoza echoed many Hobbesian 
characteristics, so much so that Spinoza has been described as 'a more consistent 
Hobbist than Hobbes,65 (McShea 1968: 138). This should come as no surprise as not 
only were both Spinoza and Hobbes scientists, 'they [also] believed in the science of 
politics, and both men seek to construct it by means of psychology, seeking out the 
facts of human nature that concern them' (Murray 1929: 217). Although the influence 
Hobbes had on Spinoza is recognised, scholars have emphasised that Spinoza also 
differs fundamentally in certain aspects. For example, Spinoza's insistance on 
keeping natural right intact, that is evident within the state of nature, actually 
demolished the basic concept ofHobbes' political theory (Wernham 1958: 35). 
Despite this, Spinoza shares the fundamental Hobbesian position that the state is 'an 
artificial arrangement for the betterment of the lot of individual men and they agree it 
cannot be too powerful ifit is to achieve this end' (McShea 1968: 149). Consequently, 
and more importantly in relation to sovereignty, both Hobbes and Spinoza agree in 
favouring absolute sovereignty (Ibid). 
Similarly, while agreeing with Hobbes, James Harrington, after asking fundamental 
questions of Leviathan, believed that absolute sovereignty was achieved via a system 
of stable and mixed government. While Hobbes saw the need for individuals to 
accept the will of the sovereign as essential to avoid anarchy, Harrington believed that 
this was not essential; instead what was required was the need to eradicate resistance 
(Fukuda 1997: 93). Harrington considered that to achieve a stable government it must 
consist of a bicameral chamber consisting of an equal 'senate' and a 'popular 
assembly' (Fukuda 1997: 96). In this way, although "both Harrington and Hobbes 
consider a government has absolute sovereignty when there is no resistance to it, 
" McShea clarifies this point; "In what may be considered its preliminary passages, it is more than 
similar, it is identical, but identical not so much with what Hobbes actually said as witb what he should 
have said had he been consistent" (1968: 137-138). 
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Harrington's man will not resist because his interests are satisfied by the government. 
Hobbes' man cannot resist because the government has the common power to 
suppress him" (Fukuda 1997: 125). 
The fundamental difference between the two authors is, to summarise, that Hobbes 
believed power could prevent anarchy. Yet, this could not explain the military coup 
against the English RumpParliament in 1653. In order to prevent the possibility of 
anarchy despite the presence of power, and by attempting to reconcile the differing 
forces within a commonwealth, Harrington was able to transform the notion of 
'power' found within Leviathan to one of 'authority'. In this way, Hobbes prevented 
anarchy by not allowing the individuals to rebel against the Leviathan, while 
Harrington attempted to prevent anarchy by not giving the individuals a reason to 
rebel. 
Regarding sovereignty, Harrington represents the beginning of a shift in emphasis, 
from the Leviathan (in either its singular or group form), to a more recognisable 
bicameral political structure; but the indivisible and absolute nature of sovereignty 
remains unchanged. In this manner, Harrington offers the first significant signs of the 
evolution of the status of sovereignty in the societas canon, a shift emphasised by 
John Locke. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, much of Locke's Treatise can be seen as a rebuttal of 
Hobbes' Leviathan, and this is certainly true of Locke's discussion of sovereignty. 
Unlike the other authors of the societas canon, Locke has no theory on sovereignty: 
his true sovereign is the sovereign individual (Murray 1929: 225). Unlike Hobbes, 
where the state and government are needed to further man's individual aspirations in 
an arena of security, in the Lockean state of nature, man instinctively knew the laws 
of nature; thus the creation of the state, via the social contract, merely represented a 
more efficient manner in which to exercise these laws. To this end, the purpose of the 
state and of government is the protection of property of the individual, and in order 
for this to be achieved, a legislature is needed to which the sovereign individuals can 
delegate power in order for their common interests to be protected. Very much as a 
result of Locke's discussion with Robert Filmer on the patriarchal nature of 
government, the legislative once formed cannot transfer power, as the power they 
hold is delegated from the sovereign individuals, and thus they do not own it (Murray 
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1929: 226). So, rather than an all-powerful Leviathan, Locke argues that the 
government should be both minimal and separated: "Locke [can] be seen as one of the 
originators of the separation of powers, which was a device deliberately designed to 
prevent the accumulation of absolute power in the hands of anyone branch of 
Government" (Gough 1958: 36). 
Despite having no strict theory on sovereignty per se, but being individualist to the 
core (Murray 1929: 225), Locke's 'sovereignty' displays a deliberate shift from the 
uncontrolled 'tyranny,66 of the state sovereignty of the Leviathan to a more popular 
sovereignty with a separated and minimalist government, which is dependent on the 
sovereign individual. 67 
Just as Locke was influenced by, but was critical of Hobbes, Locke was a potent 
influence on Rousseau, but the 'disciple is never as good as the master' (Murray 
1929: 224). Rousseau, in many respects, completes the circle of sovereignty that 
originated with Hobbes. For Rousseau, as for Hobbes, sovereignty was indivisible, 
but the cyclical nature of the discussion meant that rather than the indivisible 
sovereignty being vested in the singular Leviathan, in Rousseau it is vested in the 
people's 'general will'. This similarity, yet fundamental difference between the two 
authors, has led commentators to note that: 
In fact, it is only necessary to substitute "absolute sovereignty of the people" 
for absolute sovereign or absolute assembly" and Leviathan becomes a 
"revolutionist's handbook" (Bemstein 1980: 192) 
The Influence of the French Revolution on Sovereignty 
Unlike Leviathan and Treatise, which were post-event works68, Social Contract 
played a significant role in the ideology that inspired the French Revolution. The 
direct link that Rousseau's theory had on French revolution practice is palpable. 
66 The word 'tyranny' is used in this context in opposition to the sovereignty found within Locke's 
thought. Although Hobbes makes it perfectly clear that Leviathan is formed by consent, and so any 
subsequent actions are legitimate, if this is superimposed onto a Lockean premise, these actions could 
be justly called tyrannical. 
67 The reason why Rousseau, rather than Locke, is taken as representing the first theory of societas 
p,0pular sovereignty, is the elitist and inclusive nature of Locke's version of the 'people'. 
8 Both Hobbes' Leviathan and Locke's Treatise were published after the English Civil War and the 
Glorious Revolution respectively. 
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Wokler, supported by Russell (1979: 674), has even gone as far as to describe 
Rousseau as the 'French Revolution's Moses whose Contrat Social comprised its Ten 
Commandments (1998: 306-307). 
The French Revolution also highlighted negative aspects of the notion of 'popular' 
sovereignty, and these criticisms can also be seen as a weakness of the societas 
version of popular sovereignty in general. If the people, as a collective of individuals, 
are construed as the 'nation', then the outcome of this scenario is that sovereignty is a 
representation of the Rousseaunian 'general will' - that is, the state is nothing more 
than the general will of the people. In the example of the French Revolution, this lead 
to the argument that due to Rousseau's claim that that the General Will was 
indivisible (Contract: 27-28), popular sovereignty required centralisation and 
uniformity to be realised; the Jacobin principle of unity' (Keating 2001: 14), which 
allowed for no variation of interest. This uniformity was continued in the institutions 
of the Republic: 
... on account of the Jacobin framework ... the primary emphasis remained on 
the principle of unity. The sovereign people were one and indivisible. The 
institutions of the republic were framed in such a manner as to underline this 
unity (KitromiIides: 2003: 472). 
Bertrand Russell argues that Rousseau' s work suffered the fate of most bibles in that, 
'it was not carefully read and was still less understood by many of its disciples' 
(1979: 674). The Rousseaunian General Will existed as a theoretical foundation for 
the French Revolution, but the event manipulated Rousseau's abstract discussion to 
suit a particular need: Jacobin centralisation. 
A second negative aspect of societas popular sovereignty concerns the relationship 
between sovereignty and representation. Indeed, as the basic principles of liberalism 
inherent in the societas canon were now dominant, the state was the result of an 
agreement between individuals and the natural groupings, such as the family or 
geographical groupings, although stilI in existence, did not figure in this relationship. 
Instead, the people as an abstract entity became sovereign without 'any 
presupposition of them being composed of particular communities and distinct 
entities' (de Benoist 2000b: 107-108. Emphasis mine). The result of this was that 
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sovereignty was 'given' to the people, but due to the individualism of liberalism, there 
was not the sufficient framework for the sovereign people actively to become 
involved, other than through voting for parliamentary representation, and this 
negativity was discussed in the 'abstract nature' of parliamentary representation in 
Chapter Three. 
Despite this criticism, other authors argue that the French Revolution represented a 
watershed in both political theory and practice. Indeed, for CoIIignon, individualism 
is the very 'normative foundation of modernity': 
Autonomous individuals are kept together by contracts, which are based on 
the norms of freedom and equality and also on rights; individuals recognise 
their collective interests in the social contract, rather than in a hierarchically 
structure whole (2003: 64). 
CoIIignon elaborates when he argues that: "the French Revolution of 1789 
emancipated the individual from its communitarian subjection by proclaiming free 
and equal citizens as sovereign" (CoIIignon 2003: 64. Emphasis mine). 
Thus while Hobbes initiated individualism in political theory, it was the Rousseaunian 
inspired French Revolution in which individualism found its practical realisation. In 
this respect the French Revolution can be seen as a 'watershed' in the practical 
existence of the modern state.69 Despite its subsequent disturbances, the French 
Republic not only commenced the start of the modern European experiment with 
popular sovereignty, but its thinkers also went to great lengths to end the societas v. 
universitas debate in favour of the former, which represented an opportunity to apply 
the societas-liberal theories of Locke and Rousseau. 
Whilst Althusius' popular sovereignty shares characteristics with the contemporary 
theory, due to the historical conditions of France and England outlined above, it was 
the ideology of the societas canon that became dominant and it was not until 1762 and 
Rousseau's Social Contract that the societas canon readopted many of the most basic 
69 Although the French Revolution started the 'modern' European experiment with sovereignty, it must 
be remembered that the United Kingdom's model of sovereignty pre-dated that of the French, but 
represented a different interpretation. As a result of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, when William of 
Orange was invited to take the throne from James n, British sovereignty passed from the Monarch to 
Parliament. 
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characteristics of Althusian sovereignty, namely located on the 'people' and exercised 
in representatives. However, this was done so within the confines of the societas 
state. 
Reflecting this evolutionary nature of sovereignty within the societas canon, coupled 
with the attempt to practically apply popular sovereignty in both the French and 
American Revolutions has meant that sovereignty has emerged as a quintessentially 
'statal' concept and as such represents a barrier to the study of sovereignty within sui 
generic constitutionalism. 
Firstly, as we saw above, there is the issue of misinterpretation and misunderstandings 
of classic texts on the subject.7o As demonstrated above, both Bodin and Hobbes 
explored 'absolute' sovereignty, but they adopted very different approaches and 
placed the 'absolutism' in very different scenarios; yet, Bodin and Hobbes are both 
labelled as occupying the same 'absolutist' camp. In addition, there is generally an 
insufficient distinction made between the different ideas on sovereignty within the 
societas canon. It must be remembered, that while Bodin influenced Hobbes, Locke, 
Spinoza and Rousseau, the latter three of these addressed many of the weaknesses of 
the Leviathan, and subsequently the notion of sovereignty evolved. 
The second source of the misunderstanding of sovereignty arises from the failure to 
make a distinction between sovereignty and power or authority, or using Michael 
Keating's terminology, the legal conception of sovereignty (de jure) and the 
substantive power to act (de facto) (Keating 2001: 120). For Hobbes and Bodin, 
power and sovereignty were indistinguishable; however starting with Locke71 and 
further elaborated by Rousseau, 'sovereignty' was vested in the people, but power or 
the capacity to act was mandated to elected representatives. In this way, sovereignty, 
while staying indivisible (a point Rousseau famously makes) was separated from, but 
legitimated by the power or the capacity to act.72 Both de Benoist and Collignon echo 
70 In this I am not attempting to discredit the arguments of many established academics, but the 
distinction between sovereignty and the right of sovereignty appears, as yet, not to have thoroughly 
discussed. 
71 I argue the process started with Locke, but was fully realised within Rousseau, due to Locke's 
selective notion of who constituted the 'people'. 
72 The point about the legitimation of power is essential. 'Sovereignty, even at its most monarchical or 
dictatorial, is never a matter of mere power. Even Hobbes' Leviathan only has total power because the 
people have completely relinquished to him their natural but vulnerable rights, legitimising his 
legislative capacity' (Keohane 1995: 167). 
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this differentiation in the work. de Benoist, after defining sovereignty as 'one of the 
most complex [concepts] in political science, with many definitions, some totally 
contradictory' (2000b: 99), distinguishes between the definition of sovereignty as the 
supreme public power and the second definition as the holder a/this legitimate power. 
(Ibid. Emphasis mine.) 
Sovereignty, in many respects, has been elevated to a 'biblical pedestal' and 
consequently, for a significant period of time, it was not questioned, nor a concrete 
definition sought - it simply existed. This situation was challenged not only by the 
collapse of the bipolarity of the Cold War under which states were relatively secure, 
but also by the increasing politicisation of sui generic associations, such as the 
European Union. Largely as a result of these events, the issue of sovereignty and its 
relationship to the state has been increasingly scrutinised and compared to other 
aspects of the state such as democracy. 
In many respects, sovereignty as a concept has either been unable to evolve to meet 
these new challenges, or has been found to be in conflict with other 'staple' features 
of the state, such as democracy (Hoffman 1997, 1998 & Camilerri & Falk 1992). 
Sovereignty and the European Union 
Taking the specific case of the EU, there appear to be two distinct conceptual 
approaches to the issue of sovereignty. The theoretical argument appears to deem 
sovereignty as an outdated concept; for it to be of relevance to sui generic structures, 
it needs to be 're-conditioned'. Conversely, the political camp appears to accept the 
relationship between Member State sovereignty and the EU as being unproblematic; 
not only this, they see the EU acts as a magnifier for the sovereignty of the member 
states. This is because EU membership offers all Member States, especially the 
smaller ones, a better and grander platform on which to exercise their sovereignty, not 
only in European, but also in world affairs. This view regards the EU as an 
'association of states' with each retaining full external sovereignty, but willing to pool 
it in order to co-ordinate their actions, and potentially increase their influence 
(Bellamy & Castiglione 1997: 438-9). In many ways this latter argument is typified 
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by the presence of the veto in the Council of Ministers. When unanimity is required 
both Germany and Malta, despite their massive demographic, geographical and 
economic differences are equal, as both are sovereign states. 
Theories ofEU Sovereignty 
For Lynch, the indivisibility of traditional sovereignty leads to a 'zero-sum' approach, 
and as such represents a barrier to understanding (1997: 57) the concept of 
sovereignty relating to the EU. The symbiotic relationship between sovereignty and 
the state needs to be unpicked, as this relationship is problematic within a sui generic 
setting. For de Benoist it is a grave error, indeed even an barrier to study, to assume 
that sovereignty is only possible within the framework of the classic type of state 
(2000b: 100). As a result, the traditional unitary and indivisible nature of sovereignty 
as held by the societas influenced authors, has led authors to attempt to find an 
alternative definition of sovereignty that specifically holds for the EU. In this way, 
certain parts of the discussion are attempting to develop a theory of sovereignty that is 
'EU-specific', very much in the same way that modern sovereignty originated as a 
result of the state. 
Post-Sovereignty 
The first conceptual model to be discussed here is that sovereignty in its present form, 
and due to evolving political practice, is out-dated; this is the issue of 'post-
sovereignty'. Although, authors such as Keating (2001) and Hoffman (1997,1998) 
recognise the limited relevance of sovereignty to the modem discussion, they take two 
distinct courses of action. For Keating, in many ways echoing Hoffman, this new 
understanding of sovereignty within the European context attempts to recognise the 
'end of state monopoly of ultimate authority' (Keating 2001: 27), and equate the 
notion of' sovereignty' with self-determination: 
In this way it might be possible to delink sovereignty from the state in an 
altogether more radical manner, by formulating it as a right of self-
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determination. Here an entity, whether it be a people or a territorial unit, may 
be sovereign where it has right to determine its own future. The practicalities 
of the World, together with their own aspirations, may mean that this does not 
take the form of a state ... but this would not affect sovereignty itself (Keating 
2001: 15). 
The second path of action also argues that sovereignty has become outdated, and thus 
is incompatible with the modem world; MacCormick argues that as there 'are no 
remaining sovereign states in the [European) Community', we are 'beyond the 
sovereign state' (1993: 16, 18). Furthermore, the very notion of post-sovereignty itself 
appears to be a 'very welcome development in diminishing the probability of 
recurrence to the barbarisms oftime recently passed'. (1999: 142) 
Stepping out of the neat state/sovereignty dichotomy, MacCormick proposes a lateral 
approach to understanding sovereignty within a post-sovereign setting: 
Do politics or law always have to resolve distributions of power in favour 
ultimately of some absolute and final centralised authority on everything, 
subject to doubt only on the number of power centres there are to be? (lbid: 
17) 
The argument here is that why should the result of politics or law be a neat 
distribution of power to a single centralised political source? Why must A 'losing' 
sovereignty, result in B gaining it? Why must politics and law always be binary? The 
essence of the concept of post-sovereignty, in both forms, is that sovereignty, in our 
present understanding is an outdated concept, and thus has limited use in either statal 
or sui generic situations. The need therefore is to "recondition" or "rethink" 
sovereignty, by removing it from theoretical discussions of the constitutionalism. 
Post-sovereignty is not without its critics, however; Besson, for example, argues that 
post-sovereignty fails to manage or substitute the 'epistemic and normative role of 
sovereignty' (2004: 17), such as the flag, an army or the head of the Queen on a 
banknote, etc. (Collignon 2003:63). 
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Late Sovereignty 
The second conceptual model of sovereignty recognises two stages in the evolution of 
the concept itself. According to Walker, the first, or Westphalian, refers to an 
international order of sovereign states, which was complemented by two frameworks 
of law; internally by constitutional law and externally by international law (2003: 9). 
This initial stage has, for Walker, been superseded by a post-Westphalian stage, 
which was 'ushered in by the pressures of globalisation on the one hand and the 
multi-dimensionality of constitutional pluralism on the other' (Ibid: 10). The question 
for Walker is 'how to retreat from the (flawed) assumptions of post-sovereignty 
without returning to the oxymorons of disaggregations or the myopia of the unitary 
approach'? (Ibid: 18) The answer for Walker is a concept of 'late-sovereignty'. The 
prefix 'late' does not mean sovereignty should be removed from political discussions, 
rather it equates to an idea of sovereignty has the potential for continuity and 
adaptability; secondly, it suggests a distinctive phase in the discursive career of the 
sovereignty; thirdly, it suggests irreversibility, that is that there is no longer a 
possibility to return to a traditional definition of the term; finally, it represents 
'transformative potential', in that sovereignty in its capacity to represent the world of 
political authority is being tested to the limit (Ibid.). For Walker, and this is a relevant 
point to the ongoing discussion about representation: 
The key difference in the claim made in the multi-dimensional post-
Westphalian order is that the boundaries are no longer merely territorial, but, 
if in an increasingly permissive sense, also functional (Ibid. Emphasis in 
original). 
The point on the 'irreversibility' of late sovereignty means that there cannot be a 
return to an 'early' or pre-Westphalian sovereignty for two main reasons. Firstly, the 
macro-political conditions of globalisation, the rise of non-state polities, global 
communications and the free movement of peoples has fundamentally altered the 
structure of politics and society; secondly, the 'the logic of sovereignty itself 
guarantees irreversibility' as the increasing formation of new sovereign entities 
involves severing the initial legal order in favour of a newer fragmented one (Ibid: 
25). 
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Pre-Sovereignty and Co-operative Sovereignty 
The third model rejects the above distinction between 'sovereignty' and 'post-
sovereignty' as being 'two sides of the same coin'; rather, this model focuses on the 
communicative nature of political association. Bellamy proposes the idea of 'pre-
sovereignty' in which the basics of the state system, such as democracy and the rule 
of law, are brought together in a position in which there is neither legal nor political -
including popular - sovereignty: 
Instead, citizens have to engage with each other as political equals and 
negotiate collective agreements that embody reciprocity and a willingness to 
'hear the other side', neither ignoring nor overriding other people's concerns 
as long as they too embody mutual respect" (2003: 181). 
With a similar emphasis on negotiation and communication, Besson argues for a 'co-
operative sovereignty', in which the emphasis is not on static definitions or zero-sum 
solutions to constitutional conflicts and other clashes of sovereignty; rather 'the co-
existence, competition and mutual adjustment of conflicting claims of sovereignty 
should be regarded as a normal and desirable political and legal condition' (Besson 
2004: 4). The emphasis in the model is an emphasis on fluidity. Besson argues that: 
"Only when understood in this cooperative way, can sovereignty be the reflexive and 
dynamic concept it is, stimulating constant challenging of the allocation of power, 
thus putting into question other's sovereignty as well as one's own" (Ibid: 13). 
Both pre-sovereignty and cooperative sovereignty contain characteristics of a pre-
Westphalian model, in which different groups, but not necessarily states, were in a 
position, through continual negotiations, to decide common outcomes. This emphasis 
on pre-Westphalia is also evident in the fact that, as with Walker's 'late-sovereignty', 
the important aspect of co-operative sovereignty is that it is neither a retreat back to a 
quintessential Hobbesian definition, nor is it a rejection of sovereignty, nor a sign of 
sovereignty being surpassed as in Neil MacCormick's 'post-sovereignty'. 
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The Politics of Sovereignty in the European Union 
Much of the discussion here is focused around the notion of 'pooling' of sovereignty, 
which is a common concept and practice of the EU, commencing with the Treaties of 
Rome. Here, the member state remains the 'owner' of sovereignty, but, in order to be 
able to exercise sovereignty in a more efficient manner, certain parts of sovereignty 
are 'pooled'. Under this scenario, the member states 'loan' their sovereignty to the 
EU73 (Keating 2001: 13) and, through a 'reduction of a state's policymaking authority 
may simultaneously extend policy-making capacity' (Lynch 1997: 49). In this way, 
the EU may act as a 'magnifier of sovereignty' for member states. To Euro-Sceptic 
authors, this pooling of sovereignty nonetheless represents an erosion of Member 
State sovereignty in favour of a European Sovereign "superstate". In response to this 
accusation, those in favour of pooled sovereignty, such as member state governments, 
highlight the fact that this pooling does not limit or erode national sovereignty, but 
offers an alternative platform on which to exercise it. Even when national law is in 
conflict with the EU law and the former is forsaken, this for certain authors, still does 
not represent an erosion of sovereignty. Referring to the Factorame Case (1991) in 
which the European Court of Justice ruled a UK law to be in conflict with Community 
Law, Neil MacCormick argues that rulings such as this do not limit sovereignty, since 
the UK Parliament has consented to this legal arrangement. It is much in the same 
way that: " ... the possible derogation from or invalidation of Acts of Parliament 
subsequent to 1972 does not weaken the view that Parliament remains a sovereign 
whose commands are the ultimate source of law, since this is what Parliament has 
commanded" (1993: 3). 
A further example can be cited of those Member States that have adopted the Euro; 
they have merely decided to exercise their sovereignty in that way. This is a matter of 
policy and not of sovereignty (Jackson 1999: 453. Emphasis mine.). 
Two conclusions can be drawn from these debates. Either, adopting the binary zero-
sum approach, the EU represents a significant threat to the sovereignty of the Member 
State as the latter either "owns" sovereignty or the EU does and there can no middle-
ground. Or, more constructively, the European Union can be seen as a tool to 
73 Keating fmishes the sentence by stating' ... but they can always take it back' (2001: 13). 
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promote and serve state interests (Newman 1996: 17), by acting as an alternative 
method in which to exercise sovereignty. As was mentioned above, if there is a 
strong political desire to leave the EU, then there is the possibility to enact the exit 
clause enshrined under article I-59 of the Constitutional Treaty.74 This must then 
equate both to the idea that the state remains sovereign and that it consents to being 
subject to EU law, as it is in its interests to do so. MacCormick here attempts to offer 
a new definition of the EU proposing the notion of the 'democratic Commonwealth' 
of the EU, whose member states have a 'common weal' or a common good7S (1997: 
339) and who increasingly co-operate in sustaining it. The problem with this 
approach is that while it can be used to explain the political and legal relationship of 
the sovereignty of the Member State to the EU, it is unable to account for the 
'epistemic and normative role of sovereignty' (Besson 2004: 17), that is, this 
approach is unable to explain or account for the normative feeling that have been 
attached to sovereignty as a result of a member state's 'independent' or pre-
membership history. 
Althusius, Sovereignty the European Union 
Having explored the theoretical problems of sovereignty and how EU scholars have 
attempted to surmount them, let us refer back to our "initial" discussion. 
Simultaneously, Althusius offers something and nothing to the debate. In one way, 
Althusian sovereignty can be viewed in the same way as the societas version of 
sovereignty; 'vested in the people or jus regni, the fundamental law of the realm, 
namely the constitution' (Elazar 1995a: xlii), and exercised through elected 
representatives. But we recall that the Althusian 'state' is not the product of unrelated 
individuals, but of the interaction between multi-layered consociations. This means 
that sovereignty, for Althusius, is a representation of the relationship between the 
different associations that comprise the universal association, rather than a collective 
of individuals. Before being able to explore fully the consequences of Althusian 
74 The right for a Member State to leave the EU was written into EU law in the Constitutional Treaty 
and this was the first time such a course of action had been inscribed in Community law. 
" MacCormick, however, does offer a word of caution to this defmition: "the idea of a democratic 
commonwealth, especially one exhibiting the characteristics of the European Union, being a polyglot, 
multi-national and trans or supra-national commonwealth committed both to democracy and to 
subsidiarity, is a complex, not a simple one" (1997: 354-355). 
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sovereignty for sui generic constitutionaIisation it is necessary to clarify the 
difference between Althusian sovereignty and Rousseaunian sovereignty, as the 
relation of Althusian to Rousseaunian concepts of sovereignty is crucial here. 
Althusius' Relationship to Rousseau and 'Modern' Sovereignty 
The similarity between Althusius and Rousseau has led academics to speculate about 
the relationship between the two authors. While there is direct evidence that 
Rousseau referred to Althusius by name76 (Gierke 1958: 332 in HuegIin 1994b: 81), 
the context in which this occurs merely demonstrates that Rousseau was aware of 
Althusius; it does not prove that Rousseau read Politiea. Furthermore, subsequent 
investigations into the relationship appear to argue against any Althusian influence on 
Rousseau. Searching for the main influences on Rousseau, C.E. Vaughan argues that 
while there is little doubt that 'the methodical treatise' of Althusius was 'well known 
to Rousseau' (1915: 9), this where the influence ends: 
What is the likelihood that the Contrat Social owed anything to a book so 
little known - and it must be added, so uninspiring - as Politica? (Ibid: 10). 
While Vaughan notes that the doctrine of sovereignty and of contract are central 
themes of both Politica and the Social Contract, he also argues that it is highly 
probable that Rousseau's notion of sovereignty was inspired by the 'fine genius' of 
both De Cive and Leviathan, both of which Rousseau studied and knew well. It is 
'more likely that the idea of sovereignty, if borrowed at all, was borrowed from De 
Cive, which is a work of genius, than from Politica, which is not' (1915: 10). 
Additionally, Friedrich observes that 'Althusius does not know a free will. This 
separates him from Rousseau that all verbal similarities seem insignificant in 
76 Rousseau referred to Althusius in the sixth letter in the "Lettres ecrites des Montagne", which were a 
series of letters written between December, 1763 and June, 1764, in response to J. R. Tronchin's 
Lettres de la Campagne. 'Althusius, en AIlemagne, s'attira des ennemis ; mais on ne s'avisa pas de le 
poursuivre crimineIlement'. The context in which this was written was Rousseau complaining of his 
legal persecution as a result of the publication of the Social Contract. He argues that Sidney was 
imprisoned for his political actions rather than his political writings and Althusius was not punished at 
all. While this does not prove (or disprove) that Rousseau had read Politica, Vaughan argues that 'it is 
hardly conceivable that the name [of Althusius] should have been known to him [Rousseau] unless 
through the treatise [Politica], by which alone the author's name is kept alive (1915: 87 fnI2). 
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comparison to it' (Friedrich 1932: Ixix. Emphasis in original). There are three more 
likely differences between the Althusian notion of popuJar sovereignty and its 
Rousseaunian counterpart. 
Three Key Differences Between Althusius and Rousseau 
Firstly, sovereignty in Althusius' universal association refers to those issues that 
affect the universal association as a whole. As the universal association consists of 
smaller associations, this sovereignty does not affect the ability of each constituent 
association to act in its own internal affairs. Rather, the common will establishes 
authority over matters of joint interest among all members, which can be equated with 
the initial reasons for fonning the universal association. Sovereignty in this sense 
carmot be understood as the "transubstantiation" of the will of all (volonte de tous) 
into a unitary common will (volonte generale) (Hueglin 1999: 182) as Rousseau 
understood it. Rather, for Althusius, popular sovereignty carmot be understood as the 
people speaking with one voice, but only as a multiple, well-organised system of co-
operation between the consociatios and their ability to access power. 
The second difference revolves around the predominance of the individual and the 
social contract discussed in Chapter Three. We have seen that the contemporary 
expression of popular sovereignty can be seen as the expression of a collective of 
individuals, which is then vested in directly elected representatives. In the Althusian 
equivalent, the social pact represents the progressive organisation of organic 
communities into larger associations, and so individuals have no direct part (de 
Benoist 2000a: 52), but they do participate as members of a community. Clearly, in 
the Althusian version, the societas theory of the individual and the social contract 
carmot apply, due to the fact that this relationship between individual and the 
sovereign state does not exist. Instead, Althusius' concept of sovereignty needs to be 
interpreted as the collective actions of consociations within the universal association, 
rather than the societas-inspired collective actions of its organised individual citizens. 
The third difference refers to individual's need for the state. For Rousseau, the state, 
in opposition to the state of nature, is essential for the individual to realise his 
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faculties (Murray 1929: 254). This is in stark contrast to Zoon Politikon of Althusius, 
in which the differences between the pre-political state of nature and the political state 
of nature is not recognised, as we saw in Chapter Three. 
Thus, although we have claimed that Rousseau read and possibly used Politica as a 
basis for the Social Contract (Hueglin 1994a: 81 & de Benoist 2000a: 50-51) it is 
clear that Rousseau, like Althusius, was a product of his time. Although both 
Rousseau and Althusius presented similar versions of popular sovereignty, the latter's 
definition of sovereignty is nevertheless fundamentally different, reflecting the 
medieval period in which he wrote (Hueglin 1994a: 81), and this is key for the 
understanding of Althusius in relation to in sui generic constitutionalism. 
Specifically, Althusian popular sovereignty was based on the sui generic rather than 
the modem societas state. 
Subsidiarity and Althusius 
As we saw in the above discussion on Althusian and Rousseaunian sovereignty, one 
of the key differences was Althusius' notion of the delegation of sovereignty from the 
'people' to the respective level of consociation. Althusius was able to achieve this 
system of mandated delegation due to the idea of subsidiarity expounded in Politica. 
This presence is however, a retrospective interpretation of Politica, as Althusius 
himself, does not explicitly refer to the term (Hueglin 1999: 152): rather, recent 
analyses of Althusius have revealed a structural process similar to subsidiarity, as 
understood in its present day meaning. 
In its most basic form, subsidiarity can be seen as an efficient allocation of roles and 
responsibilities within a polycentric political structure. As a result, the govermnents 
of the EU member states have embraced subsidiarity as a working principle of the 
EU; albeit for different reasons. For instance, the former German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl, understood subsidiarity to mean: 
... the Community only undertaking actions which can be better achieved or 
attained at supranational level, [whereas the British govermnent of John 
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Major saw] that Community action should only be undertaken when it is 
necessary or essential to secure the objectives in question (Teasdale 1993: 
190). 
Despite this confusion, the increasing use of the term has resulted in it becoming a 
'watchword' in the theoretical discussions on the constitutional processes of the 
European Union. For MacCormick, the increasing dispersal of powers within the 
community context 'opens the door to a conception of subsidiarity that could 
gradually acquire real teeth' (1997: 338). Besson argues that it implies a test of 
efficiency in power allocation (2004: 12. Emphasis in original). What also must be 
understood is that subsidiarity can be viewed either in a positive or negative marmer: 
Negatively, the higher political order shall not assume or absorb responsibility 
for actions that can be achieved by the lower order. Positively, it has an 
obligation to take action when common objectives carmot be achieved 
individually (Hueglin 1999: 156). 
Despite being in a position to offer a theory in which decision-making is kept as close 
to the base of the political structure as is efficiently needed, subsidiarity does not 
appear able to function effectively within the context of the European Union; indeed, 
Thomas Hueglin has noted that the principle of subsidiarity anchored in the 
Maastricht Treaty on the European Union is practically meaningless (1999: 158). One 
possible explanation for the apparent impotence of subsidiarity is the predominant 
position of the 'state' within the EU. 
Here we should clearly distinguish between' subsidiarity' and 'decentralisation', the 
key difference being the location of power within the political structure. In 
decentralisation a certain, usually limited, amount of power is transferred from a 
central authority to local authorities. Subsidiarity, on the other hand, revolves around 
lower levels delegating functional responsibilities, rather than power, to a higher 
level, and only those responsibilities that carmot be undertaken at the lower level. 
Relating this to the EU, it appears that to a considerable extent, subsidiarity has been 
taken to equate to a panacea that will counter 'the tendency to over-centralise at the 
level of member-states, in the same way that it counters 'any over-centralisation 
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towards Brussels' (MacCormick 1999: 135). In actual fact, this distinction confuses 
the notion of 'subsidiarity' with that of 'decentralisation'. Within the different 
political relationships of the EU, subsidiarity can only occur between the Member 
State and the European institutions, and not between a region and the EU. The reason 
for this is that as the member states retain sovereignty within the EU, then subsidiarity 
can only occur between the Member States and the EU, through the process of the 
pooling of sovereignty. Clearly, domestic discussions on subsidiarity could occur in 
each Member State, but due to the centralised nature of power, this discussion would 
focus on the issue of 'decentralisation', as opposed to subsidiarity. As the 
constitution of the state establishes the central institutions of the state, which can then 
allocate power to any newly created institutions, for subsidiarity to occur, the people 
would have to be able to continually allocate functional responsibilities to whichever 
level of government deemed to be able to efficiently carry out the specific task. 
Conclusion 
The aim of the chapter was twofold; firstly, to bring to light a discussion on 
sovereignty that occurred between 1576 and 1614, that not only predated the now 
best-known discussions of the subject, but also one in which a variant of popular 
sovereignty, very close to the current understanding of the word, was developed. As a 
result of the predominance of the centralised state, however, this initial Althusian 
version of popular sovereignty was forgotten and not until 1762 did the societas 
canon produce their own coherent and thorough version of popular sovereignty. 
The second aim of the chapter was to highlight the confusion that arises from the term 
"sovereignty" partially due to the misinterpretation of the classic texts of the societas 
canon. As a result of this, we saw a failure to distinguish between 'sovereignty' and 
the 'right of sovereignty', which for many of the initial societas authors were 
synonymous. Partially due to subsequent acknowledgement of this conceptual 
ambiguity, and partially as a result of a fragmenting political world, sovereignty as a 
political concept has come under increased scrutiny as to its relevance, not only in 
relation to the state, but also in the context of sui generic entities, such as the EU. 
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This confusion has led authors either to attempt to "recondition" or "reconceptualise" 
sovereignty in order for it to be of relevance in current discussions, or to locate 
alternative sources of sovereignty than the Westphalian state. One of the most 
interesting examples of the latter is Robert Jackson's Sovereignty in World Politics: a 
Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape (1999). Jackson explores the 
struggle between the differing medieval models of sovereignty that existed before the 
Westphalian sovereign model, encapsulating the Hobbesian variant, became 
dominant. He concludes that the notion of the Respublica Christiana holds the key to 
the understanding of the polycentric and territorially overlapping medieval era (1999: 
435), and that it offers a viable alternative to the understanding of the EU. Jackson 
argues that the EU represents an organisation in which: 
... the member states have come together to form a European legal and 
political authority which is constitutionally distinct from those states and with 
regard to which the states have limited their sovereign rights and prerogatives 
in certain important aspects. That is afundamental change that moves Europe 
some distance beyond a societas of states and toward an emergent universitas 
(1999: 450. Emphasis mine). 
Despite Althusius representing the most holistic and thorough of these universitas 
authors, there is open hostility to Politica amongst certain authors. At the forefront of 
this group, Preston King's animosity is the most contemptuous. Speaking of the 
divide between 'individualists' and 'pluralists' corresponding to study of sovereignty, 
King notes: 
... there are no individual 'pluralists' who will bear comparison with 
'absolutists' like Hobbes (especially), Bodin, Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, 
and, indeed John Austin. Such men as these display analytical powers of the 
very first order. Men like Johannes Althusius and the Baron de Montesquieu 
are quite out of their depth in such company (although they might bear 
comparison with Bodin) (1974: 20. Emphasis mine). 
The fact that Althusius offers an apparently simplistic model of sovereignty that is 
applicable to Sui Generic constitutionalism is ironic. Using a quasi-Bodinian, quasi-
medieval notion, Althusius offers a 'traditional' societas notion of sovereignty, but by 
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differentiating between the sovereignty or the jus symbotiucm and the mandated 
power or capability to act of the magistrates (or the right of sovereignty) of the 
differing strata, Althusius is not only able to stop a division of sovereignty by keeping 
it located with the 'people', but also ensures that each level only receives as much 
power to act as is necessary for the role they were established to fulfil, thus ensuring 
subsidiarity. 
The purpose of the discussion was to highlight the fact that Althusius had presented a 
'popular' version of sovereignty in 1603, which retains significance 400 years later. 
The problem with this, and likewise for the other aspects of Politica, is that it was 
proposed in an era in which the modem Westphalian state was beginning to become 
the dominant mode of political association. As a result, it was the ruler sovereignty of 
Bodin and Hobbes that became dominant, and popular sovereignty was forgotten until 
it eventually re-emerged in a liberal fonn in the societas canon in 1762. Despite this, 
and while operating under similar principles, the popular sovereignty of Rousseau and 
Althusius are not the same and this reflects the mode of association in which both 
authors wrote: Rousseau within a liberal model, Althusius within the Empire. 
Arguably, it is this difference that increases the relevance of the Althusian concept of 
popular sovereignty to Sui Generic constitutionalism. While Rousseau's version is 
dependent on the staple ideas of the state, the individual, the social contract, etc., 
Althusius offers a theory in which the sovereignty of the Sui Generic entity is found 
in the common agreement and action of the constituent members. More importantly, 
this can then be located in a written agreement or the "constitution". The right of 
sovereignty can then be exercised through the mandating of sovereignty to the 
different levels of the association. In this way, Althusius is able to offer a model of 
sovereignty to Sui Generic constitutionalism. 
The following chapter will explore the third, and final, aspect; federalism. The 
argument of the chapter is that due to the presence of subsidiarity, Althusius' version 
of federalism represents a fundamentally different variant to the current understanding 
of federalism. The chapter argues that federal theory has undergone two distinct 
evolutionary changes, starting with the pre-modem federalism of Politica, to the 
intemational federalism of Pufendorf and Kant and finally to the modem statal 
federalism of the Publius authors, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay. 
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Moreover, the chapter contends that while it is the pre-modem federalism of 
Althusius that offers greatest potential for understanding sui generic 
constitutionalism, it is the societas inspired modem statal federal model that is 
routinely applied to attempt to understand, with limited theoretical results, the 
structural processes of the EU. 
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Chapter 5: The Societas canon, Politica and Federalism 
Pre-modem federalism had a strong tribal or corporatist foundation, one in 
which individuals were inevitably defined as members of permanent, multi-
generational groups and whose rights and obligations derived entirely or 
principally from group membership. Modem federalism broke away from this 
model to emphasise polities built strictly or principally on the basis of 
individuals and their rights, allowing little or no space for recognition or 
legitimation of intergenerational groups. 
Daniel Elazar 1991b: 19 
Contemporary developments in ... the European Union strongly suggest that 
political science itself should contemplate new models of federal union. 
Michael Burgess 1993: 11 
Traditionally, federalism as a political theory has found fertile ground in forms of 
political organisations in which there are several distinct centres of power, of which 
the EU is a prime example. However, the use of the term in the context of the EU is 
problematic, since under the influence of the societas canon, federalism as a 
constitutional theory refers to an internal system by which to organise a state. As the 
EU is a sui generic association and not a state, this comparison produces limited 
understanding. In order to overcome these theoretical weaknesses, the aim of this 
chapter is to explore federalism as a means of political association in relation to sui 
generic associations. The chapter will argue that the federal model of the United 
States, often used as a reference point in federal theory, merely represents the most 
recent evolutionary stage of federalism as political practice, and that there are other 
prior federal models that offer greater potential to the understanding of sui generic 
associations. Federalism, we will demonstrate, has undergone three distinct stages; 
pre-modem or polyvalent, international and modem statal, the latter two of these 
models influenced by the societas canon. 
In the case of the secondary evolutionary stage or international federalism, authors 
such as Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf attempted to define 'irregular' entities 
such as the Holy Roman Empire. They were influenced by the societas nature of the 
state and were forced to view sui generic associations as a league of sovereign states. 
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Similarly, in the late 1770s, when this international model of federalism evolved into 
modem statal federalism, the influence of the societas authors such as James 
Harrington, Baron de Montesquieu and John Locke on the Publius authors are 
evident. Indeed, it will be argued later that the adherence of the Publius authors to 
Lockean liberalism actually enabled the landed gentry of America to gain power at 
the expense of the 'sovereign' people. 
The central argument of this chapter is that the pre-modern model of federalism 
allows us to describe sui generic constitutionalism since it is not afflicted by the 
'touch of stateness' that is evident in all subsequent constitutional models. 
In order to be able to explore these issues, this chapter will proceed as follows. First, 
the vocabulary of federalism will be explored, as it is apparent that the term 'federal' 
has many variants, each relating to a different aspect of the political theory. The need 
for this discussion is to clarify the terms used by political theorists. Second, the 
evolution offederalism from its pre-modem to international form will be discussed, as 
this evolution coincides with the shift in Europe away from the Reformation era in 
which sui generic associations and states co-existed, to a Europe based in the societas 
state; here three differences will be put forward that differentiate the pre-modern from 
international federalism. Third, the chapter will proceed to explore the second 
evolution of international to modem statal federalism, a process that occurred in the 
late 1770s, with the emergence of the United States of America. 
Fourth, and influenced by the work of authors such as Daniel Elazar (1998), the 
chapter will explore the possibility of European constitutional theory returning to 
itself, in the re-emergence of the concept of the confederation in current academic 
debate (Wind 2003). Related to this issue of the confederation, the chapter will 
explore the Swiss variant of federal constitutionalism, before elaborating on the pre-
modem federal model and, more specifically, the structure of Althusian federalism 
and its consequences for our understanding of Sui generic associations. 
Before this discussion can begin, a point on the term 'modem' used in the chapter 
needs to be clarified. In this context, the term 'modem' is being used to represent a 
late Reformation period beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). In this 
manner, 'pre-modern' federalism represents a theory of political organisation that 
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existed before the European state system was consolidated by the Treaty of 
Westphalia, and modem statal federalism is used to represent the federal theory 
enacted by the Publius authors in the United States, under the theoretical influence of 
the societas canon. 
The Vocabulary of Federalism 
One of the most comprehensive discussions of federal theory was Preston King's 
(1982) Federalism and Federation, in which he not only separately defined 
federalism and federation, but also further differentiated between different types of 
federalism. For King: 
.. .'federalism' is often promoted as a political philosophy of diversity-in-
unity ... [a]ccordingly, 'federalism' is employed where the interest is primarily 
ideological, while 'federation' is applied to designate a more descriptive, 
institutional arrangement of fact, without particular regard to whether it is 
being supported or opposed (1982: 19-20). 
Therefore, it is possible to identify federalism as an ideologically charged framework 
or process that is capable of accommodating political diversity, possibly within a 
unitary system; whereas federation can be seen as the practical realisation of the 
theory of federalism. King goes on to note that: 
Ideologically federalism (as distinct from institutional federation) reflects at 
least three different mobilisational orientations [or power relationships] - the 
first being centralist, the second decentralist, while the third involves an 
appeal to balance (1982: 21. Emphasis in original). 
King identifies examples of federalism to support this differentiation: for centralist, 
the USA77 (Ibid: 29); for decentralist, the Federal Republic of Germany in the 
77 In discussing the centralist nature of US federalism, King notes: "basically, the argument of The 
Federalist is a centralist argument. It is no way as dramatically centralist as the earlier arguments 
advanced by figures like Bodin, Hobbes, Grotius, Spinoza and Pufendorf in support of the doctrine of 
sovereignty ... 1t does accord some importance to decentralism,faute de mieux, perhaps as a necessary 
evil, but not particularly in the form of an ideal to be achieved" (1982: 29). 
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immediate post-War period (Ibid: 39-55); for the federalist balance, King does not 
give an example per se, but it is possible from his definition to offer the EU as an 
example: 
Here federalism is regarded as afoedus, a pact (deriving fromjides or trust) 
implying an agreement that is freely and mutually consented to, whereby each 
party surrenders a degree of autonomy in exchange for some compensating 
advantage (1982: 56). 
Federalism Without Federation? A Description of the EU? 
In this sense, it is clear that the EU best exemplifies King's "federal balance". 
However, if a second of King's definitions is explored, this also has significant 
potential for our understanding of the EU as a sui generic association. For King, 
'although there may be federalism without federation, there can be no federation 
without some matching variety of federalism' (1982: 76); we shall see that this 
distinction goes to great lengths in de-mystifying federalism as a form of political 
association. For those Euro-Sceptic academics and practitioners, there is still an 
underlying assumption that federalism within the EU would mean a degradation of the 
state in favour of a European federation or federal state. What King's distinction 
shows, is that while there can be a federal arrangement between the EU and its 
member states, this does not automatically mean that the EU is a federation or federal 
state. The supremacy and direct effect of EU law on member states, the fact that any 
constitutional conflicts regarding membership are resolved in favour of EU law and 
the exclusive competences of the commission are all applicable to federalism, but this 
does not mean that the EU is afederation. 
Indeed, many of the basic characters of EU federalism have been in place since the 
mid-1960s and so, when the most anti-federal member states, such as the UK and 
Denmark joined the EU, its federalism, that is the basic organisational structure 
enshrined in the Treaties of Rome, coupled with the 1963 "Van Gend en Loos" and 
the 1964 "Costa v. Enel" ECJ rulings discussed in the introduction, were already in 
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place. In this manner 'Britain has therefore been part of a 'federal' arrangement (in 
the looser sense) since 1973' (Fischer & Neff 1995: 906). 
This should come as no surprise, given that the dominant ideology of the post-War 
politicians who were the driving force behind the ECSC and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) was federalism. Of the discussions over the structure of the 
ECSC, Monnet, in his Memoirs notes: 
Turning to Spierenburg78, I reminded him that intergovernmental cooperation 
had never led anywhere ... Remember we are here to build a European 
Community. The supranational Authority is not merely the best means for 
solving economic problems: it is also the first move towards a federation 
(Monnet 1978: 328). 
It is increasingly becoming less contentious to discuss the EU using federal 
vocabulary, but this still does not disguise the fact that modem statal federalism as a 
political model is too simplistic or contentious for the EU. For Daniel Elazar, any 
successful political solution for Europe needs to be built on a more complex model 
than that of the United States, which has its limits in addressing the European 
experience (1995b: 442). 
Federalism as a political theory is concerned with the allotting of powers between 
more than one level of government; traditionally, this has been realised in the 
separation between 'federal' or 'national', and 'state' government. While this simple 
dichotomy serves the federal 'state', in the case of the EU, this understanding has 
become obsolete. For Elazar, any model of federalism that is constructive for the EU 
must be able to accommodate the European reality of 'four or five arenas of territorial 
governance instead of the two or three, the accepted number in modem federations' 
(1995b: 444). In addition to this territorial distinction, a federal model for the EU 
must also be able to contend with non-territorial forms of representation, such as 
occupational or political groupings that have increasingly become involved in the 
constitutional discussion, such as the Regions, business groups and the Catholic 
Church. Elazar concludes that: 
78 Dirk Spierenburg, a Dutch delegate to the ECSC negotiations and future member of the ECSC High 
Authority. 
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Such a model may indeed be available in the federal theory of Johannes 
Althusius, the first great European theorist of federalism who was one of those 
on the eve of the modem epoch who tried to foster federal as distinct from 
statist solutions on the Continent (1995b: 444). 
What must be also recognised is that while this discussion has focused on one 
example of sui generic constitutionalism, namely the EU, the problems identified and 
the criteria proposed by Elazar for a more appropriate model could also be envisaged 
in other sui generic entities. 
The Evolutionary Stages of Federalism: The Initial Evolution - Pre-Modern to 
International Federalism 
Federalism as a theoretical concept, underwent a process of evolution from pre-
modem to international federalism between 1614 and 1648: the start of the evolution, 
given here as 1614, represents the publication of the third edition of Politica, while 
1648 represents the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia. As with the question of 
sovereignty, this is due to the growing influence and predominance of the societas 
canon's notion of the sovereign state, which resulted in the rejection of Althusius' 
pre-modern federal theory. This centralised notion of both state and sovereignty, 
coupled with the Treaty of Westphalia, helped cement the position of the state in its 
modem fonn and, as Althusianism had been rejected, a new description was sought to 
describe the 'irregular systems' within Europe. 
The dominance of BodinianlHobbesian 'sovereignty-thinking' (Riley 1976: 9) meant 
that by definition a "federal state" could not exist, as this would entail two sovereign 
entities within the same grouping; but there were irregular systems that appeared to 
have some fonn of federal government, such as the Holy Roman Empire and the 
Swiss Confederation. Subsequently, authors such as Hugo Grotius and Samuel von 
Pufendorf explored federalism as the means of understanding the relationship between 
sovereign states within a league. 
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While Bodin directly influenced both Grotius and Hobbes, the latter two approached 
sovereignty in a different manner from Bodin: while Hobbes discussed sovereignty 
within the state; Grotius turned to an international setting, and in this way, Murray 
argues that it was Grotius who 'securely laid the foundations of international 
sovereignty' (Murray 1929: 186). Despite being a seminal tract in the seventeenth 
century (and predating Hobbes), only one passage from Grotius' The Rights of War 
and Peace is relevant here, as the focus of Grotius' book was to discover when, how, 
and by whom war may be justly. conducted. Grotius, after observing that 'the 
common subject of sovereign power is the state' discusses the idea of states entering 
into a system or league, while at the same time retaining their characteristics of state: 
So it may happen, that many states may be connected together by the closest 
federal union, which Strabo, in more places than one calls a system, and yet 
each retain the condition of a perfect, individual state, which has been 
observed by Aristotle and others in different parts of their writings (Rights of 
War: 49). 
The one condition Grotius attaches to this is that this league can only be entered into 
by states: 
... who are not 'in a state of subjugation to another power ... for those nations 
are not sovereign states of themselves, in the present acceptation of the word 
but are subordinate members of a great state, as slaves are members of a 
household (Ibid). 
This idea of the state as the sovereign actor within a 'federal league' is pursued in the 
work of Pufendorf who, like many authors of his time, was greatly influenced by 
Thomas Hobbes, as is clear from his definition of sovereignty: 
If sovereignty be lodg'd indivisibly in the Hands of the many together, then 
each of those many must necessarily hold some Part of it, out of the Collection 
of which Parts the whole Sovereignty must at length be constituted. But at the 
same time 'twill be likewise necessary that each of these Parts be Supreme: 
and thus in one State there will be more than one Supreme; which is absurd 
(Law of Nature: 176. Emphasis in original). 
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The influence of Hobbes also extends to the terminology used by Pufendorf. Not only 
did Pufendorf use the terms of' regular' and irregular' , which originated in Hobbes, to 
define the state system, he emphasised 'state systems' or 'a system of states' as 
opposed to the Aristotelian theory used by Bodin (Schroder 1999: 968). Indeed, one 
of Pufendorfs greatest debts to Hobbes is the latter's methodological approach to 
understanding the state: 
In his book Dissertation de Statu Hominum Naturali (1675) he [pufendorf] 
described the analytical method of modem political theory in terms drawn 
directly from Hobbes' account of his own method in the preface to De Cive: 
just as scientists took apart physical bodies to analyse them into their 
component parts, so too political theorists had analysed the state (Malcolm 
2002: 524-525). 
Despite the significant influence Hobbes had on Pufendorf, in many ways the latter 
used Hobbes as a convenient basis on which to further the understanding of the Holy 
Roman Empire; indeed, in this way there was a fundamental difference between the 
two. Pufendorf himself argued that his entire theory of natural law was fundamentally 
different from Hobbes', whose theory, as we have seen in Chapter Two, was founded 
on self-preservation; while Pufendorfs was founded on 'socialitas' (sociality of 
sociability) (Malcolm 2002: 523); and this difference is evident in Pufendorfs 
discussion of the 'state of nature'. Both he and Hobbes recognised the theoretical 
existence ofa 'state of nature', but Pufendorf, due to the presence of natural law, did 
not recognise the hostility and brutal nature of the Hobbesian state of nature, per se. 
Pufendorf did recognise 'negative' duties, but he also recognised positive duties to 
God, oneself or 'self preservation' and others or the 'preservation of society' (Tully 
2003: xxvi & Boucher 2001: 564). This in turn led to an obligation to God to form 
political society in order to be able to 'fulfil our natures as social beings'; so placing 
Pufendorf closer to Locke (Boucher 2001: 565) than to Hobbes. Despite these 
differences between Hobbes and Pufendorf, the latter attempted to describe the 
Empire in a non-traditional manner; as for Pufendorf to employ the Aristotelian 
methodology of Bodin could not encapsulate the 'irregular' nature of the Empire 
(Schroder 1999: 967). 
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In his earlier work, De Statu Imperii Germanici (1667), Pufendorf argued against 
those authors who deemed the Empire to be a state. Instead, Pufendorf contended that 
the Empire was a gradual disintegration of a monarchical form of state into a body 
which came closest to a confederation of states. (Forsyth 1981: 80) In addition, the 
Imperial Diet was not the senate of an aristocratic state (Ibid.) as Bodin had claimed, 
as the sovereignty did not reside with the Diet, (Boucher 2001: 572); nor was the 
Imperial Diet reminiscent of Althusius' 'Ephors', as they did not act as a limitation on 
a monarchical form of state (Boucher 2001: 572). Instead, 'the only feature that 
prevented the Empire from being completely assimilated to a confederation was the 
lingering authority of the Emperor (Forsyth 1981: 80).79 
While Pufendorf himself was never happy with his constitutional description of the 
Empire (SchrOder 1999: 968) as an 'irregular form of simple state' (Ibid: 969), he 
could never fully describe the relationship between the Emperor and the Reichsstande. 
He did admit, however, that 'Germany would most naturally develop into a federation 
of states,80 (Schroder 1999: 968), largely due to the fact that the Empire itself could 
not hold rights of supreme sovereignty on its own behalf, as the whole empire itself 
consisted of heterogeneous parts (Schroder 1999: 965).81 
After De Statu Imperii Germanici, Pufendorf developed his theoretical exploration of 
a 'states system' or 'a system of states', which could be either 'close' or 'loose'; by 
the time of his The Law of Nature and Nations, however, the emphasis had become 
concentrated on the close relationship.82 Bearing in mind Pufendorf s adherence to 
Hobbes, whether the federation was 'loose' or 'close' it could be: 
79 Of the lingering nature of the presence of the Emperor, Peter SchrMer notes: "It was in the interest 
of the foreign royal houses to establish the Reichsstande as independent and sovereign powers, given 
that at this time they were only associated in a somewhat loose congregation called the Empire. But 
the foreign perception of the Empire apparently underestimated the political necessity of, and loyalty of 
the Reichsstande to, the idea of the Empire itself' (1999: 977). 
80 The main issue was the sovereignty of the Reichsstande in relation to the Emperor. Indeed, in 
attempting to locate sovereignty, Pufendorf disagreed with both Bodin who defmed it as a residing in 
the imperial Diet and Althusius who argued that the Diet acted as a limitation to monarchical state 
(Boucher 200 I: 572). 
81 Many of the heterogeneous parts, or the Reichsstande, were monarchies within themselves and so 
attributing sovereignty to them was straightforward 'as long as they were considered in their own rights 
and not in connection with the Empire' (SchrMer 1999: 965). 
82 The former type of association occurs when separate states are united, most commonly under 
marriage or inheritance, by sharing the same Monarch. An example of the former is this is the Union of 
England and Scotland, when James VI of Scotland, became James I of England after the death of 
Elizabeth I (Boucher 200 I: 570-571). 
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... no more than a permanent league of states united through a perpetual 
covenant, binding as international law, in which the constituent states 
delegated limited enumerated powers to a common governing council while 
retaining full rights of international sovereignty (Elazar 1991a: 140). 
Although the fact that the exercising of certain parts of supreme sovereignty were 
exercised in the common council made the federation more than a normal alliance, it 
did not make it a state in its own right, due to the limited nature of the power that was 
pooled (Forsyth 1981: 82). 
For Pufendorf, and despite the presence of leagues, the source of these leagues 
remained the state. Indeed, after identifying the 'chief Occasion' of the need for a 
league as 'each particular People loved to be their own Masters, and yet each was not 
strong enough to make Head against a Common Enemy' (Law of Nature: 186), 
Pufendorf went on to distinguish between state and league or confederation: 
For the Leagues to which there Systems owe their rise, seem distinguish'd 
from other (so frequent amongst different States,) chiefly by this 
Consideration; that in the latter each corifederate people determine themselves 
by their own judgment to certain mutual Performances, yet so as that, in all 
other respects, they design not in the least to make the Exercise of that part of 
Sovereignty, whence those Performance proceed, dependent on the Consent of 
their Allies, or to retrench any thing from their full and unlimited Power of 
governing their own States (Law of Nature: 186. Emphasis mine). 
That is to say, the sole aim of the league is to realise within the confederation those 
selected parts of sovereignty that were imperfect in the state. However, only that part 
of sovereignty that was identified as lying within the purpose of the league was to be 
placed in the common consent of their allies, and nothing was to be done that would 
restrain the 'unlimited power' of the league. 
Although this 'pooling' of sovereignty appears to be against its indivisible nature, 
Pufendorf, building upon the distinctions made by Bodin, offers an explanation of 
both the indivisibility and the pooling. Just as Bodin argued that there were 'five 
marks of sovereignty', which although separate did not divide sovereignty, Pufendorf 
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made a sharper distinction between sovereignty and its 'various outer characteristics 
of sovereignty,:83 
The latter for Pufendorf were 'parts' of the whole, but not in the additive 
sense that the whole was nothing more than the parts, but in a sense that the 
parts represented the relationship between the underlying unity and different 
facets of the world. The judicial power, the legislative power, the power of 
war and peace were all 'parts' of sovereignty in this sense. In a federal system 
- the power of war and peace - was clearly made dependent on the consent of 
all, but sovereignty in the ultimate simple and indivisible sense was not 
renounced (Forsyth 1981: 84). 
Writing in the 1780s and 1790s, ImmanueI Kant continued the discussion started by 
Pufendorf by discussing federalism as a manner in which to achieve international 
order and stability between sovereign states, as he most famously advanced in 
Perpetual Peace (1795). In the 'second definitive article for perpetual peace', Kant 
argues that 'the law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states' (Peace: 
16); and it is here that the influence of Hobbes becomes apparent. For just as Hobbes 
viewed man as either enduring of others in a state of nature or living under a social 
contract within a state, Kant superimposes this basic idea onto the state of nature: 
Peoples, as states, like individuals, may be judged to injure one another 
merely by their co-existence in the state of nature [i.e., while independent of 
extemallawsJ. Each of them may and should for the sake of its own security 
demand that the others enter into a constitution similar to the civil 
constitution, for under such a constitution each can be secure in his own right 
(Peace: 16). 
83 Pufendorfs understanding of sovereignty was more evolved and advanced than either that of Bodin 
or Hobbes. Although he still argued for the indivisibility of sovereignty, he also argued that the 
Supreme Authority 'tho' in its own Nature it be one individual thing, yet because it exerts itself in 
different Acts, according as it is employ'd about different Means. Necessary to the Preservation of the 
State, is general conceiv'd as consisting of many parts'. Pufendorf makes the analogy between 
sovereignty and the soul, although there is only one soul it 'exerciseth different Operations, in 
Proportion to the Difference of the Objects presented to it', but this does not entail that the soul itself is 
divided (The Law 0/ Nature: 165-166). (For the full discussion on Pufendorfs 'Of the Parts of 
Sovereignty, and their natural Connection, see The Law o/Nature book VII, chapter IV.) 
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The key difference here between Kant and Hobbes, is that the basic unit that Kant is 
discussing (that is the state), is the end product ofHobbes. As a result, within Kant's 
international 'state of nature' (as opposed to Hobbes') the 'constitution' between the 
states does not create a Leviathan: 
This league does not tend to any dominion over the power of the state but only 
to the maintenance and security of the freedom of the state itself and of other 
states in league with it, without there being any need to submit to civil laws 
and their compulsion, as men in a state of nature must submit (Peace: 18. 
Emphasis mine). 
The cornmon trend that is apparent in this particular discussion is the influence of 
Hobbes. The indivisibility of sovereignty within the state leads to a position in which 
any federal model must be an international agreement between sovereign states, with 
limited attributes being given to the superstate level. Subsequently, all continental 
federal theorists treated federalism as a means to achieve limited unification of 
sovereign states (Elazar 1991 a: 141) within either a league or an agreement, as 
opposed to federalism as a type of internal government, which we will discuss in the 
modern statal federal theory. 
Three Differences Between International and Pre-Modern Federalism 
It follows from above that we can identify three characteristics of international 
federalism that theoretically differentiate it from pre-rnodern federalism, as typified 
by Althusius. First, certain aspects of sovereignty can be located in the supra-state 
level. It must be remembered here that Althusius, rather than viewing sovereignty as 
exercising itself in different acts, as for Pufendorf, recognised the difference between 
sovereignty and the right of sovereignty. This enabled him to be in a better position 
to explain the irregular systems of Europe: there, sovereignty was vested at the bottom 
with the people as a whole, rather than in a centralised state and so the mandating of 
the right of sovereignty did not detract from the power of a centralised state, as one 
did not exist. 
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The second assumption that can be drawn from international federalism is that the aim 
of any league is peace between states. This, we saw, was famously exemplified by 
Kant, but can also be found in Pufendorf s work, which 'realised the importance of 
the Imperial constitution to provide peace and security for its members' 84 (Schroder 
1999: 972). Although Althusius would agree with this, this statement would offer only 
a narrow and simplistic interpretation of Politica. This assumption appears to reduce 
political life to a dichotomy - there is either mistrust or trust, and the difference is the 
presence of a league. For Althusius, who rejects this individualism, any league or 
association entered into is done so as a natural progression in order for consociations 
to further fulfil the aspects of life that they alone could not fill, rather than as a result 
of mistrust. 
The final assumption is that the state is the predominant actor within international 
federalism; hardly surprising since international federalism was developed after the 
state became the predominant form of political association. It is interesting again to 
note the influence of Hobbes in this assumption. Part of Kant's argument appears to 
recite Hobbes' idea of a state of nature, but in an international setting - that is, states 
enter into a league in order to secure peace. Althusius' disagreement with Hobbes' 
individualism has been explored in Chapter Four from which we remember that in 
contrast, in Politica it is possible for different associations through knowledge of each 
other, to live side by side, without there being friction. 
The Second Evolution: International to Modern Statal Federalism 
The exact point at which federalism evolved from international federalism into 
modem statal federalism, depends very much on normative interpretation. While the 
Treaty of Westphalia represented a reasonably clear line of demarcation between pre-
modem and international federalism, no such event occurred to highlight the 
evolution of international into modem statal federalism. In geographical terms, this 
most recent version of federalism evolved and developed in the American continent, 
while the international federal model remained in Europe. Furthermore, despite 
gradually adopting state-like features, the Holy Roman and Hapsburg Empires existed 
84 In a similar manner to the aim of the EU. 
179 
for some time after the Treaty of Westphalia; thus, international federalism did not 
simply vanish after the Treaty was signed, but the Treaty did signal its death knoll in 
its traditional fonn. In this respect there was an overlap between international and 
modem statal federalism in that both co-existed in different parts of the World, but it 
was evident that the entities that were described by international federalism were 
increasingly become' Westphalianised'. 
Modem Statal Federalism, Sovereignty and the Modem State 
What will be discussed here is the process the 'etatisation,85 that occurred in the 
American variant of federal theory; that is, under the writings of the Publius authors, 
federal theory increasingly adopted 'state-like' features. The significance of this is 
that by definition, federalism is in opposition to a centralised notion of power, at the 
expense of territorial autonomy. In this way, federalism can be seen as a doctrine of 
anti-sovereignty, as discussed by Grotius, Pufendorf and Kant. Yet, in the US version 
of federalism: 
... at the same time that they oppose sovereignty, they [the Publius authors] 
ascribe it to themselves and that is source of the oddity of federal theory 
(Riley 1976: 18). 
It is here that an important differentiation needs to be made. Sovereignty, in this 
particular guise, refers to external sovereignty, that is the sovereign'S ability to act in 
relation to third parties, as opposed to internal sovereignty, that is the sovereign'S 
ability to act internally within the boundaries of the state. As long as external 
sovereignty remained indivisible - that is in relation to third parties - internal 
sovereignty could be located in the people and exercised in different locations and this 
was evident in the process of etatisation. 
Under the strong influence of Locke, and partially in fear of individual human actions, 
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton aimed to create a federal government based 
"This term is adapted from John Lampe's term 'de-etatisation' (1996: 280), which he uses to describe 
the political process that occurred in Yugoslavia in the mid 1960s, in which the central state 
increasingly 'lost' competencies to Republic and Communal level associations. In this context, it is 
used to mean the reverse: the state like fearures attributed to federal theory by the Publius authors. 
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on democratic republicanism (Miller 1998: 104): namely, a system in which the 
landed gentry are recognised as enjoying a predominant role in both the political 
system; translated to the political system, this entails government striving to achieve 
goals agreeable to this class of citizen, of which they are a part. Coupled with this, 
and again influenced by the liberalism of Locke, Madison and Hamilton saw 
sovereignty as residing in the people as a collection of abstract citizens, rather than in 
a collection of naturally occurring groups, such as villages, towns or other collectives. 
Indeed, as Miller argues, by locating popular sovereignty within the people as an 
abstract body, rather than in practical bodies such as local communities or within the 
states, Madison and Hamilton were able to render the notion of sovereignty harmless 
'by invoking a fictitious people who could not possibly act together' (1988: 104). Due 
to these two factors, American popular sovereignty became a fiction that merely 
described a relationship between the people conceived as one body and the national 
govermnent (Miller 1988: 107), rather than an actual working relationship, and as a 
result left the American government in a position of power applicable to that of any 
centralised European state govermnent. 
The (Re)Emergence of the Confederation 
As a result of the shortcomings of the modem statal modem of federalism in the 
discussion of the EU, there is an increasing 'historical' confederal discussion (Elazar 
1998, Friedrichs 2001, Wind 2003), which emphasises the weaker federations or 
leagues or city-states, that were dismissed by the theorists of both international and 
modem statal federalism. The predominance of the state within political theory has 
actually caused the need for such premodem political vocabulary to be revived: 
Today, however, confederation and confederal arrangements are being revived 
as the postmodem form of federalism that seems to be particularly useful in 
connecting politically sovereign states that must accommodate themselves to 
the realities of new times (Elazar 1998: 40). 
Elazar summarises the main conclusion of this anti-statal stance. Not only is it 
insufficient simply to analyse the EU in relation to existing federal models, but also it 
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is increasingly necessary to revive traditional federal or confederal models that were 
in existence before the state became the predominant model of association in order to 
understand the EU better. 
Is European Constitutional Theory Returning to Itself? 
Speaking of the relevance ofpre-modern federal theory, Heinz Eulau notes that: 
A fact little appreciated by American political scientists is the relatively early 
emergence of federalism as a working concept of political theory in the Holy 
Roman Empire in the seventeenth century (1941: 643). 
This did not mean that the early federalism in Europe could be unifonnly applied to 
all sui generic associations. Eulau himself notes how the 'confederalism' of the Holy 
Roman Empire differed: 
... not only from unitary states, but also from such pennanent unions as the 
Achaean League, the United Provinces, or Helvetic Confederation. By thus 
showing that the territories were subject to the whole in spite of their 
statehood, while the members of these other federalistic systems were not 
really subject to any higher authority at all (Ibid: 652. Emphasis mine). 
The importance of this claim to our argument is, first, the relationship between inter-
statal units (that is the constituent parts) and, second, the relationship between the 
state level, and the federal. The confederal nature of the Empire has been echoed both 
in Elazar's definition of the Empire 'as a truly medieval confederal arrangementbased 
on a medieval society whereby different groups were organised on a nonterritorial 
basis as pennanent bodies, each with a different legal status accordingly'. (1998: 45); 
and Montesquieu's discussion of the United Provinces and the Empire: 
In the Republic of Holland one province cannot conclude an alliance without 
the consent of the others. This law, which is an excellent one, and even 
necessary in a confederate Republic, is wanting in the Gennan constitution, 
where it would prevent the misfortunes that may happen to the whole of the 
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confederacy, through the imprudence, ambition, or avarice of a single member 
(The Spirit o/Laws: 128). 
In relation to Althusius, this has interesting ramifications. In his role as Syndic of 
Emden, Althusius would come into close contact with the Dutch (Baker 1993: 34), 
and Althusius much admired the Provinces' resistance against the Spanish monarchy. 
As a result of its position, Emden can be taken as the divide between the medieval 
confederation and federation, or the Empire and the United Provinces, and as a result, 
Politica reflects aspects of both. While Eulau sees Althusius as attempting to explain 
the constitutional nature of the Empire, Politica can also be seen as an archetypal 
Calvinist tract on the right of resistance. 
Indeed, there is confusion over the nature of Althusius' political theory. Writers have 
contested the position of Althusius' work in relation to other thinkers or canons, and 
they have attempted to classify Althusian thought. As we saw in Chapter One, 
Althusius has been accredited with being the originator of the Continental federal 
model (Burgess 2000); yet, Friedrich questions the use of the term 'federalism' in 
relation to Althusius' work as being misleading since 'Althusius never wearies of 
emphasising the unitary, collectivist nature of any symbiotic group' (1932: lxxxvii). 
Possibly because of this, Eulau describes Althusius as 'decentralist' (1941: 648). 
In a similar manner, if the geographical location of Emden is considered then further 
confusion ensues - the 'federalism' of the United Provinces versus the 
'confederalism' of the Empire. Further discussion has also arisen among scholars 
regarding Althusius' concept of federalism. Otto von Gierke, (1841-1921) the first 
scholar to try to 'revive' Althusius' work, saw him as essentially a medievalist 
seeking to reconstruct medieval corporatism for a postrnedieval and changing time. 
On the other hand, as we saw in Chapter One, Carl Friedrich, the first important figure 
in the twentieth-century Althusian revival, viewed Althusius as being somewhere 
between medievalist, and a precursor of modem federalism (Elazar 1995a: xl). In 
addition to this discussion, there is also the question of Althusius' perspective on 
sovereignty. In agreement with Carl Friedrich's introduction to the 1932 edition of 
Politica, Murray Forsyth argues that: 
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Althusius' constitutionalism ... had a genuinely federal element in it. Checks 
and balances existed not only at the centre of the state, but [also] between the 
centre and the regions. Nevertheless, as we have already stressed, his political 
theory was basically the theory of a single sovereign entity or state, and hence 
cannot be properly be termed a theory of federal union ... (1981: 78) 
Here, in relation to this aspect of Althusius' thought, and to further the idea of 
'Europe returning to itself we can explore the 'states' that existed in Althusius' era. 
To an extent, this has already been undertaken in relation to the United Provinces, 
with Arendt Lijphart's notion of 'confederal consociationalism' and the idea of the 
EU being 'a resurrection of the Holy Roman Empire' (Wind 2003: 118). The only 
political association that existed in both Althusian and the modem period is 
Switzerland; in the late 1980s, there was indeed increased interest in the applicability 
of the Swiss model for the EU. The initial question asked was, could the confederatio 
Helvetica be imitated? 
Can the confederatio Helvetica be imitated? 
The Swiss confederation existed prior to the period in which the state became the 
dominant form of political association. Although modem Switzerland has since 
adopted 'state-like' features, there are still basic elements that have remained. 
Switzerland, despite being a state, displays non-'state-like' characteristics in 
comparison to other states. Indeed, the confederatio Helvetica as a means of political 
association has remained extremely stable and avoided the majority of the turmoil that 
has periodically engulfed the rest of Europe, and in this way, the confederatio 
Helvetica existed largely unchanged in the medieval period and the modem period. 
Subsequently, although the confederation adopted more federal arrangements in 1848 
to become more state-like, the fact that the confederatio Helvetica existed at the same 
time as the other great confederations of the medieval period, the fact that it did not 
undergo the same statal process as the rest of Europe and the fact that Switzerland had 
a direct influence on Althusius' thought make the confederatio Helvetica a interesting 
example of a sui generic association. 
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For Barber, the Swiss participatory political system offers both an alternative way of 
understanding democratic life, and an alternative model of nation-building under 
conditions of multi-ethnic and religious diversity (1988: 48). The Swiss participatory 
model is of particular interest in relation to Althusius' thought and to the Titoist 
variant of Althusianism practised in Yugoslavia, for two main reasons: the 
individual's relationship to the state, and the notion of representation. 
Just as for Althusius, the individual in the Western understanding of the term does not 
exist: 
In Switzerland, there is no radically individualistic notion of the person either 
as a solitary agent of nature or as a fictionalised creature of the law. The 
binary figures of a central state and an isolated individual revolving around 
one another simply do not appear in a land where the state is perceived as an 
extension of the commune and the individual is understood primarily as a 
constituent member of a family, a church commune or a communal 
jurisdiction (1988: 32). 
Subsequently, the Swiss can offer nothing to the understanding of the state as a 
contract between 'disassociated individuals who are defined by abstract 'human,86 
essentials such as passions and interests, rather than by their political membership' 
(Ibid: 32-33). Rather, the Swiss model has avoided the individualism of liberalism and 
instead focused on 'an understanding of individuals as socially embedded in families, 
religious communities, and above all, common citizenship' (Ibid: 34). 
The second 'innovation' that Barber notes within the Swiss model (and this is also a 
staple characteristic of Althusius) is the idea of 'representation'. Indeed, Barber notes 
that just as political 'representation' has been placed on a pedestal in the Anglo-
American system, in the Swiss model this is not the case, not because there are no 
representative institutions, 'but because it is not the crucial feature of democratic 
activity in the Swiss state' (1988: 36). Due to the fact that the majority of activity is 
undertaken at the communal level, there is 'no longer much direct participation at the 
federal level or the cantonal level' (Ibid: 38). Again, this is recognisable in the 
86 The criticism of the notion of the abstract individual is also a reoccurring theme in the work of 
Edvard Kardelj, the main theoretician of Titoism. There is also a remarkable Althusian similarity in 
the fact that both Titoism and the Swiss model appear to politicise the whole of society. 
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Althusian notion of direct democracy only at the immediate levels of governance: 
"The representative principle, so crucial in preserving accountability in systems where 
there is otherwise little participation, is relatively less important in a system where 
considerable power is devolved on the cantons and communes ... " (Ibid: 44) 
Pre-Modern or Polyvalent federalism 
In essence, Althusius' theory of federalism is relatively easy to explain: he does not 
have one. Whilst this may appear to reduce the usefulness of Politica to a discussion 
on federalism, this assertion is based on the fact that Althusius never used the word 
'federal' in Politica.87 Despite this lack of use, Daniel Elazar argues that Politica is 
'federal through and through', largely due to the fact that universal association is 
constructed as a federation of communities (Elazar 1995a: xli). In addition, Hueglin 
(1999, 1979) discusses Althusius in relation to federalism, and Politica has also been 
linked to the discussion on Polyvalent Federalism that occurred in the 1970s. 
Although having its origins in chemistry, the term 'polyvalent' refers to a body acting 
against or interacting with more than one kind of antigen, antibody, toxin, or 
microorganism. Politically, the term was first used in the early 1970s to describe the 
sui generic federal model of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The 
theoretical basis of this theory was that human society was in a process of transition 
from "traditional (territorial and political) federalism to a "new federalism" that is 
social, functional, and participatory, recently referred to as "polyvalent federalism" 
(Elordevic 1975: 77). Moreover, Elordevic argued that this new model was unique 
within the political world, so much so that it was argued that: 
87 Relating to the edition of Politica used, a proviso must be added here. If the abridged versions of 
either 1964 or 1995 are used, this statement that Althusius never mentioned the term 'federal' is 
correct. However, as Thomas Hueglin notes, 'Althusius did not use the term 'federal' except in a brief 
passage in which he mentions the possibility of unifying several existing political entities into a larger 
confederation (1999: 2), citing Politica ch. XVII, 24ff as a reference (1999b: 31). This reference 
appears in the edition used by Heuglin (a re-edited 3,d edition by Aalen, Scientia 1981) and in 
Friedrich's Latin version (1932: 128). The possible reason why it was omitted by Carney was that it 
was of insignificance to the overall discussion on types of confederation, as it is apparent from both the 
English and the Latin that Althusius' occupation is with Plena consociatio & con/ederatio and non-
plena con/ederatio & consociatio. 
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... Yugoslav constitutional law and political theory during the last quarter of 
this century may play the role American constitutional law and political 
theory played during the last quarter of the eighteenth century (Dordevic 
1975: 79). 
Polyvalent federalism as a model has never been explored in the depth that it possibly 
warrants. Indeed, the Publius article by Dordevic is probably the only reference, but 
DordeviC's article does offer an interesting insight. Polyvalent federalism: 
... has some traits of the pre-nation-state era of the Middle Ages, as described 
in particular by the German 10hannes Althusius, whose understanding of 
federalism is much deeper than that of Montesquieu, Madison, Hamilton and 
other thinkers too much concerned with legal-statist and power-ridden 
conceptions offederalist structure (1975: 78). 
The key point in the discussion is the emphasis on the societal organisation of 
differing consociatios, rather than a simply being a manner in which to describe or 
organise the relationships between two or three political levels. 
Althusian Federalism 
It will be recalled that the basic structure of the Althusian commonwealth consists of 
different levels of consociation; from the simple and private family, to the universal 
and public universal association. As Frederick earney notes in the preface to the 
1964 edition of Politica: 
The key to this concept of federalism is that on all levels the union is 
composed of the units of the proceeding lower level. Thus, when we arrive at 
the top, the members of a state are neither individual persons nor families, but 
are the politically organised collectives, namely the provinces and the cities. 
This construction contrasts sharply with the later American concept of a 
federal union composed not only of states, but of individual citizens as well 
(1964: x). 
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As apparent from Carney's definition, Althusian federalism is based on principles of 
stratification and amalgamation. While both stratification and amalgamation have 
been discussed in the previous chapters, this has only been implied; it is the point of 
this discussion to make each point explicit. 
Amalgamation was discussed in both Chapter Two and Chapter Three, where the 
social contract did not represent an agreement between individuals to form a state; but 
the universal association comprised of different levels of consociatios, each of which 
had been founded on a contract. Similarly, in Chapter Four, while sovereignty was 
vested in the relationship between the individual consociatios, the relevant amount of 
the right of sovereignty was given to each latter level of consociatio for it to fulfil the 
purpose for which it was intended. 
In each of these discussions there is a strong federal element. The family is founded 
on a contract, but when with others, the paternal head forms a village or guild; this is 
done so on a contract. This in itself represents federalism: the family can only 
achieve a limited amount as a consociatio, and so necessity forces them to seek 
fellow consociatios to achieve those things they cannot achieve alone. Likewise, 
federalism is evident when each new consociatio is created: from family to guild or 
village; village to town; town to city; city to province; and province to 'state'. 
The stratification of Politica also contains a strong federal element. It will be recalled 
that under the Althusian structure direct individual participation only occurs up to the 
level of the city (Carney 1995: xix). After this point, it is individual representatives of 
the city who composes the province and the 'state'. While this may appear 
'undemocratic' from a societas viewpoint, it must be remembered that Althusian 
federalism must be viewed as a constituent part of a larger whole. In this manner, if 
the notion of sovereignty and the residual nature of the right of sovereignty are 
considered, the indirect participatory nature of the Althusian 'state' is explained: 
namely, why does the individual need a direct link to the state, when the 
responsibilities the government undertakes, has little or no connection to the 
individual's everyday life. 
Indeed, these federal characteristics of Politica produce interesting results for the 
understanding of the federalism of a sui generic association. In relation to the EU, the 
188 
current Community structure is criticised, predominantly by the notion of the 
'democratic deficit', for not reconciling the idea of the EU as a collection of states 
and citizens, with a direct accountability of the EU institutions to the citizens. 
Lindahl notes that whereas in US federalism, the constitution opens with the infamous 
lines "we the people", the Maastricht Treaty opens with the words "His Majesty the 
King of the Belgians; Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, etc", which leaves in 
no doubt that the parties to the Treaty are sovereign states and not the 'Peoples of 
Europe' (2000: 249). This concern is echoed in the work of Stefan Collignon: 
"Europe's multilevel governance, on the contrary to republican federalism, is a 
mechanism to exclude citizens at the European policy level" (2003: 65. Emphasis in 
original). 
Collignon's position relies on the three assumptions: firstly, that the modem statal 
federal model of the US is applicable to the EU and so subsequently the 'democratic 
deficit' will demonstrate the weaknesses of the Community method; secondly, the US 
model is based on the people; and finally the US model is the paramount federal 
model and so should be the basis for all comparative analyses. The contention here is 
that all the assumptions are false. As was discussed above, despite the fact that the 
US constitution opens with the words 'we the people .. .', this does not mean the 
sovereign people play an active role in the political process. In support of this claim, 
we can recall the argument of Joshua Miller that Madison and Hamilton deliberately 
supported Federal Republicanism in order to locate popular sovereignty artificially in 
'We the people .. .' and thus exclude them from decision-making supports this claim. 
The second flawed assumption relies on the fact that both Lindahl and Collignon 
approach the EU with prior assumptions about why the EU is bad and how it can be 
made better, without actually challenging these views. For both authors, the very fact 
that the European Union is based on states and not a European 'people' demonstrates 
a democratic failing of the EU. If the authors had not been educated in statal 
traditions or if they had been more open to alternative suggestions88 (it is clear that 
Collignon is both hostile to and dismissive of Althusian ideas) then they would have 
approached this specific problem in a different manner. 
88 As Edvard Kardelj once argued 'Firstly, nothing that has been created should be so sacred to us that 
it cannot be transcended and superseded by something still freer, more progressive, and more humane 
(in Stankovic 1981: 19). 
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This criticism results from a modem statal federal interpretation of the EU. lfthe EU 
were described using the Althusian federal model then different conclusions could be 
drawn. In this scenario, due to the practical nature of Althusian federalism logically 
building each level on the previous, the fact that the EU consists of states would not 
only be unproblematic, but also expected. Furthermore, the lack of the individual's 
direct involvement with the EU institutions would be explained as rather than 
attempting to locate the individual in direct relation to the state, the Althusian model 
practically locates the individual within naturally occurring (such as the family) or 
specifically formed associations, allowing them greater control and participation 
within the political life of the universal association. 
The 'Federal Competencies' of the Supreme Magistrate 
Despite the emphasis on the lower levels of consociation and the remoteness of the 
Supreme Magistrate from the individual's everyday life, Althusius does spend a 
significant portion of Politica discussing the roles of the Supreme Magistrate, as these 
are crucial for establishing the conditions that are needed for the realisation of the just 
life. In this respect, Althusius denotes a significant portion of Politica to discussing 
the roles that the supreme magistrate must undertake for the good of the universal 
association. The most relevant point of this debate occurs in the discussion of the 
'special and secular right of sovereignty', which indicates 'the particular means for 
meeting the needs and wants of all symbiotes of this association, for promoting 
advantages for them, and for avoiding disadvantages'. The competencies identified in 
the first part are akin to a set of federal competencies in a current federal arrangement. 
For Althusius, this special right of the realm consists in (1) commercial regulations, 
(2) a monetary system, (3) a common language, (4) public duties in the realm, and (5) 
privileges and the conferring of titles of nobility (Politica: 84). 
The main role of the supreme magistrate revolves around the creation of an economic 
framework in which the different associations can realise their specific aims. The 
reason for this is that there are certain aspects without which the individual cannot 
conveniently live a social life. Indeed, Althusius offers the example that 'just as the 
human body cannot be healthy without the mutual communication of offices 
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performed by its members, so the body of the commonwealth cannot be healthy 
without commerce' (Politica: 85). 
The second competence of the universal association is very much related to the issue 
of commerce; the striking of money 'which is established in material publicly selected 
by the supreme magistrate with the approval of the people or realm'. This is essential 
as 'if there is no fixed valuation of gold, silver, and money among men and 
neighbouring peoples, commercial activity cannot be maintained. It follows that an 
uncertain monetary system throws everything into disorder, and makes intercourse 
and commerce with other peoples difficult' (Ibid.). 
The third right is focused on the issue of language, for as the 'the use of speech is 
truly necessary for men in social life, for without it no society can endure, nor can the 
communion of right' (Ibid.). While the final two roles focus on the 'power and 
responsibility for assigning and distributing duties that arise in the universal 
association' and 'privileges and the conferring of titles of nobility', but it is clear from 
the first three roles, that the main roles of the supreme magistrates are focused on 
economic aspect of consociationallife. 
It is possible to hypothesise that the most prominent reasons for the creation of sui 
generic entities are twofold: either economic or military. Although Althusius does 
offer a discussion on defence in chapter XVI, it is the economic issue that is of most 
interest here. If the purposes for the creation of the sui generic model are economic, 
then the first two roles of the Supreme Magistrate discussed above are of direct 
relevance to this. In this way, the predominant role of the top echelons of the entity 
would be to ensure the multi-faceted issue of the commercial regulations of the whole 
and to instigate and maintain a common monetary system. If this is related back to 
the EU, then the Commission is responsible for much of the commercial activities of 
the EU, while the European Central Bank (ECB) is responsible for the management of 
the €uro. The interesting aspect of this comparison is the issue of language, which 
does not enjoy the prominence in the EU, as it does in Althusius. Indeed, in the three 
main EU institutions the common documents are published in all official languages. 
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Conclusion 
As Althusius was able to set forward a political model based on his experience of the 
Empire, the United Provinces and the confederatio Helvetica it offers a genuine 
alternative to the Westphalian societas form of political association. As Althusius 
represents the initial stage of federalism, Politica is not afflicted by the defects, such 
as describing sui generic associations as a 'league of states' , of the latter stages of the 
federal evolution, as we have portrayed them here. 
By viewing sovereignty as residing within the interaction between the people, and 
recognising that the right of sovereignty could be mandated to different levels, 
Politica is able to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the sui generic 
associations that existed immediately prior to the Treaty of Westphalia. Indeed, the 
existence of the societas notion of sovereignty meant that the most apt definition of 
these entities that authors such as Pufendorf or Kant could offer was a 'league of 
states' . 
Althusian federalism also enjoys an upper hand against modem statal federalism for 
two reasons. Firstly, as was discussed in Chapter Four, Politica attributes sovereignty 
to the relationship between the individual consociatios, or in AIthusius' term, the 
people, with the right of sovereignty being given to the relevant level of consociatio 
to fulfil the purpose of its creation. Secondly, AIthusian federalism represents an 
organisational principle, as opposed to the governmental technique of the societas 
canon. 
Before this difference between these terms can be fully understood, , a point on the 
social origins of the respective authors needs to be understood. As explored above, an 
interpretation of American federalism was to ensure the continuation of the privileged 
position of the landed gentry, of which James Madison was a member, in relation to 
the majority of the population. Likewise, for the Aristocrat Montesquieu, the social 
separation of society played a significant role in his subsequent theory of the 
separation of powers. On the contrary, as AIthusius was of 'peasant stock' his aim 
was not to protect an elite from popular encroachment, but rather he 'sought to secure 
the aspirations of a plurality of new political, economic, and cultural constituencies 
against the absolutist claims of ruling minorities' (Hueglin 1999: 112). 
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This social status is evident in Althusius' focus on federalism as the organising of the 
political structure. For both Madison and Montesquieu, federalism represents a 
governmental technique of keeping the interests of the different groups of the 
association in check (Ibid: 113). Rather, Althusius advocated federalism as an 
organisational principle: 
While legislative sovereignty is indivisibly assigned to the organised body of 
the entire people, a process of multilevel governance is organised among a 
plurality ofconsociations which are generically alike (Hueglin 1999: 112). 
As Althusius himself argued, '[for] human society develops from private to public 
association by the definite steps and progress ions of small societies' (Politica: 39), 
and so federalism was the manner in which the individual consociatios, through their 
desire to lead a cornmon just life, organically joined together to form the different 
levels of the Universal Association. Recalling the discussion on the individual in 
Chapter Three, Althusius saw that after the creation of man, 'necessity forced men to 
build separate houses, villages, counties 'since we cannot assume that all men lived 
together for any length of time at one place or in one family' (Friedrich 1932: lxix). 
As a result, Althusius sees the state as 'natural phenomenon that leaves no choice to 
the individual' (Friedrich 1932: lxx). 
In contrast to the organic nature of Althusius' theory, under the societas version, 
federalism is used a governmental technique to ensure the territorial boundaries of a 
sovereign state by ensuring that different groups, of often-hostile people, can live 
together in a single state: a good example of this is the federalism incorporated into 
the Iraqi constitution of 2005, or the Belgian constitution of 1994. In this account, 
federalism can be used to ensure the territorial integrity of a 'failed' state, by ensuring 
strong federal leadership, but giving sufficient autonomy to appease the hostile 
groups. 
The main weakness in using Althusius as a model for understanding sui generic 
constitutionalism, relates back to Neil Walker's point in the second chapter on the 
problems of translation' , namely that to gain the most from Politica it must be used as 
a holistic model. What is meant by this, is that it is advantageous to use Politica in 
order to understand sui generic entities, but in order to be in a position to make full 
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use of the work, the Althusian principles inherent in the Universal Association must 
also be applied to the individual states that form the sui generic entity. These 
methodological strengths and weaknesses of Politica as a tool for understanding sui 
generic entities will addressed fully in the conclusion. 
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Conclusions 
AIthusius' theory of the state enabled him to do greater justice to the complex 
and puzzling structure of the Germanic Empire than Bodin. 
Murray Forsyth 1981,' 79 
This thesis has sought to demonstrate that the complex nature of Politica offers a 
better understanding of the constitutionalism of sui generic associations, than that 
offered by the theories of the societas canon. The primary reason for the suitability of 
Politica to the study of sui generic association is the absence of the 'state' as 
understood in the societas manner. For the authors of the societas canon, political 
theory was reduced to a means of understanding either certain aspects of the state or 
of state behaviour. Yet, while the societas canon serves the climate for which it was 
devised, namely state building, its weaknesses have been highlighted through its 
problematical application to the sui generic EU. One key reason for this is that the 
EU does not fit neatly into either of the two organisational categories of the canon; 
either state or international association. Coupled with this is the apparent inability of 
the societas canon to deal with the possibility of a third or fourth category of political 
associational relationship, besides that of state and international organisation. 
The aim of this chapter is to summarise and explore further the relevance of 
Althusius' thought to sui generic constitutionalism, principally by addressing the 
question posed in the introduction: How specifically does an Althusian perspective 
aid our understanding of sui generic constitutionalism? 
Before we can address this question, it has become evident from the discussion in the 
preceding chapters that features of Althusius that are forwarded as aiding our 
understanding of sui generic constitutionalism already exist in current political theory. 
This observation leads to the questions that if there are AIthusian characteristics 
already in existence in political theory, why a) do we need such a detailed analysis of 
Politica in relation to the understanding of sui generic association, and b) why do we 
need to apply Politica at all, if the characteristics are already evident? 
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In many respects, the answers to the questions overlap. The answer to the first 
question centres on the methodological issues that arise from the alternative approach 
to constitutionalism presented by Althusius, and while it has already been explored in 
the Introduction, certain of these issues can now be revisited in light of the discussion 
so far. With regard to the language used in Politica, it has become apparent that the 
terms Althusius uses need exploration, as while some are in existence in current 
political vocabulary, such as 'city' or 'family', Althusius uses them in a different 
context to their current usage. In addition to these terms, there is also the issue of the 
Latin and Calvin influence on Althusius constitutional thought. In this manner, there 
are two categories of terms used by Althusius; those that also have a meaning in 
current usage, and those that need to explained, due to their specific background. 
In addition to this issue of language, and to answer the second question, there is also 
the structural aspect of Althusius' thought that needs to be clarified. Chapters One 
and Two defined the constitutional structure of Politica in order to clarify its potential 
for our understanding of sui generic association. The holistic nature of this approach 
is necessary due to the fact that certain aspects of Althusius' thought, such as 
consociationalism are already in current political usage, and the weaknesses of this 
approach were discussed in Chapter One, and so it is necessary to present Althusius' 
version in its original context, in order to replicate these weaknesses. 
Five Incidences of AIthusius in Current Political Vocabulary 
It is possible to identify five main occurrences of Althusian characteristics in current 
political associations. In addition, we note that these characteristics are not solely 
limited to sui generic associations, but can also be located in the state. 
First, in many respects the ceding of competences of the member states to the 
European institutions represents an Althusian federal 'structural theory of efficiency'. 
In this instance, the governments of the EU member states have decided that certain 
competences that were previously carried out by the state, can now be more 
efficiently achieved, or the effect magnified, at the EU level. The most obvious 
example of this is the currency union, areas of the common market and 'transnational' 
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issues such as the environment and fisheries. Although this transfer is 'advanced' in 
the cornmunity framework, this notion is not solely unique to the EU. The basic 
principle, similar to the 'sovereignty magnifier' identified in Chapter Four, is also 
found in membership of specific 'sole-purpose' international organisations, such as 
NATO. While certain activities are promoted to a more efficient, higher level, the 
government of the member state retains the power to recall the power for these bodies 
to work and this is comparable to the Althusian relationship between sovereignty and 
the right of sovereignty. 
The second characteristic is the notion of sovereignty vested in the people or in their 
fundamental agreement, such as the constitution. As was demonstrated in Chapter 
Four, both thanks to the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the events of the 
French Revolution, this is no longer limited to Althusian theory alone. The factor that 
differentiates Althusian sovereignty from 'modem' Rousseaunian sovereignty is the 
difference between the 'people' in each theory. 
The third aspect was discussed in Chapter One and concerns the notion of 
'consociation' or 'consociational democracy', which 'reappeared' in the late 1960s in 
the work of Gerhard Lehmbruch and Arendt Lijphart. Despite receiving a significant 
amount of criticism, and in addition to the four countries originally studied, which 
were The Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland, the concept has been 
applied to other areas of conflict and fragmentation as well as refined as a tool to 
understand the EU. The main problem with the current application of 
'consociationalisrn', and a criticism noted in Chapter One by Thomas Hueglin, is the 
'loss of Althusius'; namely, that although originating specifically in Politica, the idea 
has been removed from this original setting, and applied to recent political problems, 
with little or no empathetic thought or consideration for the original context in which 
the term was used. 
The fourth Althusian feature, and the second feature that displays a 'loss of 
Althusius', is the notion of subsidiarity. While Althusius never explicitly uses the 
term (Hueglin 1999: 12), the federal make-up of Politica ensures that the procedure 
and tasks in each level of association are allotted under the principle of subsidiarity. 
In a similar manner to the discussion on sovereignty, Althusius is able to offer a 
significant degree of clarity on the subject by stressing that for subsidiarity to function 
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effectively in a political association, the structure must be multi-layered with a 
bottom-up nature of power. 
Chapters One and Five looked at the fifth characteristic, which is that each level of 
association consists of an amalgam of the prior levels. In relation to the EU, this 
equates to the EU consisting of the member states, which in turn consist of either 
Unde, regions, which in turn consist of village and towns, etc. While this scenario 
existed in the EU until 1992, the creation of European citizenship in the Maastricht 
Treaty, has changed the situation, with the EU now consisting of both the member 
states and their citizens: but, this did not create a direct link between the European 
institutions and the citizens, as European citizenship is still dependent on national 
citizenship. This feature is not solely restricted to sui generic associations; as was 
shown in Chapter Five, the same features can be found in the Swiss confederation. 
Two general principles can be drawn from the identification of these Althusian 
characteristics. First, Althusius' work is appropriate to the current discussion on 
constitutionalism, as similar principles to those found in Althusius have already been 
applied in both political theory and practice. Second, these characteristics reiterate 
the position adopted throughout this thesis, that Althusius enables an alternative 
understanding of the constitutionalisation of sui generic association: but, in order to 
realise its maximum potential as a descriptive tool, Politica needs to be applied as a 
whole to any cited example of sui generic association. Having identified these 
incidences, the chapter can now focus on the addressing the question asked in the 
Introduction. 
How specifically does an Althusian perspective aid our understanding of sui generic 
constitutionalism? 
As shown in the biographical note in Chapter One, Althusius' academic and political 
life coincided with a major crossroads in the history of the European continent. On 
the one hand, Althusius' early life was indirectly affected by the consequences of the 
St. Bartholomew's Day massacre (1572), while on the other Althusius died ten years 
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before the treaty of Westphalia (1648) that effectively ended the Empire in its sui 
generic form and started Europe on the path to statehood. 
Althusius' early academic life was directly affected by the religious wars in France. 
While in Basel, Althusius met Franyois Hotman (1524-1590), whose Francogallia 
(1573) initiated the genre of French Calvinist resistance - or "monarchomach" -
literature, and while in Geneva Althusius studied under Dionysius Gothofredus (Denis 
Godefroy 1549-1622), one of the leading 'Reformed' (Le. Calvinist) scholars of the 
day, who narrowly escaped the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre. Likewise Emden, 
the city Althusius was to serve for 34 years between 1604 and 1638, was likened to 
the 'Geneva of the North', due to the fact that as it was the first city to adopt the 
Reformed Faith openly, it became a centre for Calvinists seeking refuge from 
Catholic persecution in either France or the Spanish Netherlands. 
The importance of this period in history for the thesis is that each 'rival' form of 
association, both state and empire, created their own distinct line of political thought 
and we have sought to demonstrate that these are best exemplified in Bodin's Six 
Books and Althusius' Politica respectively. While Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan built 
upon the former canon, the latter, 'Althusian', canon was initially disparaged as 
promoting either 'anti-statism' or 'anarchy', and as a result was gradually forgotten. 
Yet, and of importance to the thesis, Politica, or the ideas found in it were never 
completely absent from discussions on political theory. As Chapter One 
demonstrated, characteristics of Politica can be identified in subsequent authors, such 
as Leibniz or Proudhon, or in actual political associations, such as Titoist Yugoslavia. 
Chapter Two enabled us to address the definitiona1 problems that have plagued 
attempts to define sui generic associations using the traditional terms 'constitution' or 
'treaty'. While it is possible to ascertain a working definition of the general features 
of both terms, this is very much dependent on the normative interpretation of the 
writer in question. Indeed, one fundamental constitutional question that cannot be 
resolved is the very nature of the 'constitution' itself. While it is unproblematic to 
argue that the constitution is the 'supreme' or 'basic law' of a state, on further 
inspection this vagueness reveals several inherent weaknesses. Leaving aside the 
question of the applicability of the term to non-state associations, and concentrating 
on the constitution within the confines of the state, several questions arise to which 
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there is no agreed answer; namely, should it be written? If so, who should write it? 
What should it contain? Who should amend it? While these questions remain 
unanswered, then there can be no definitive answer to the oft-asked question 'can the 
EU have a constitution?' Or even 'does it need one?' 
Similarly, legal scholars have long sought to find an explicit definition for the term 
'treaty'. While there are conventions on the law of treaties, and treaties remain the 
staple agreement for the conducting of inter-state relations, there is still no agreed 
definition of the term. If this confusion were carried into an attempt to describe sui 
generic associations, then the limitations are apparent. While the member states of 
the EU have all agreed on the fact that the original Treaties of Rome were indeed 
treaties, there appears to be confusion over the recent Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. Alas, legal theory appears to offer, at best, contradictory 
advice as to the nature of the document. 
Furthermore, the discussion highlights a further weakness in the neat dichotomy 
between a constitution and a treaty. What of associations that do not fit into this neat 
division, whether through design or evolution? As this dichotomy is based on the 
activities of states (constitution=intra-state; treaty=inter-state), it can neither 
comprehend any activity outside of this divide, nor accommodate the increasing role 
played by non-state or sub-state actors in the politics. 
The predominant section of Politica deals with the internal structure of the universal 
association. Althusius does entertain a brief discussion on confederations, when a 
universal association deems it necessary to join in with another, either partially or 
completely. While the idea of the confederation is available as an analytical term for 
sui generic associations, it is the conclusion of that chapter that it is the intra-
associational, or constitutional, aspects of Politica that best offers a descriptive tool of 
the understanding of sui generic constitutionalism. The social contract, sovereignty 
and federalism, not only represent the three key aspects of AIthusius' 'constitutional' 
theory, but also permit a direct comparison between Althusius and the societas canon, 
which employ the same concepts. 
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Chapter Three addressed the concepts of the state of nature and the social contract, 
two interconnected terms. In the societas canon the two terms offered a chronological 
progression, in that the social contract allowed the individuals to leave the state of 
nature and enter in civil society. While it is possible to criticise the likelihood of the 
existence of the state of nature of Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau, what must be 
remembered is that the state of nature can be viewed best as an analytical tool to 
describe the need for a civilised state, rather than a serious study of 'pre-civilised' 
societies. Despite offering a very different version of the state of nature, the essential 
focus of each author was the individual. For Hobbes, the individual could only lead a 
civilised life where there existed a centralised power to keep him 'in awe'. For 
Locke, due to the integral aspect of the law of nature, the individual profited from the 
'free-market' of the state of nature and the creation of civil society merely allowed 
existing laws to be enacted in a more efficient manner. For Rousseau, the state of 
nature was a romantic historical period in which man existed as a primitive hunter-
gatherer with limited contact with other individuals. This focus meant that the 
creation of the civil society could be equated to an agreement between individuals to 
form a collective in which they all would live, yet remain as free as before, and it is 
this emphasis on the individual that has evolved into one the key aspects of liberal 
democracy. While the direct relationship between the individual and the government 
in the confines of the state is relatively unproblematic, how is this relationship played 
out in a sui generic association? The assumption of the infamous 'democratic deficit' 
of the EU is based largely on the lack of a direct connection between the individual 
European citizen and the European institutions (with the exception of the European 
Parliament). Clearly in this example, the traditional concept of the individual in the 
political association has been applied, and as the relationship does not work or does 
not exist, then this equates to a problem with democracy. 
Approaching this problem from an Althusian angle delivers interesting alternatives. 
While it is clear that both the individual and central government exist within Politica, 
the emphasis on their relationship is completely different. Rather than the individual 
legitimising the government, there is no direct connection between the supreme 
magistrate and the individual, after the level of the city. While it is a comparable 
situation that has proved problematic for the EU, in Politica it does not. The reason 
behind this is that the individual and his needs are better represented by not enjoying a 
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direct link to the supreme magistrate, and two key features ensure this. Firstly, the 
nature of power is such that the initial levels of consociation, such as the family, city 
and guild are designed in such a way as to take care of the individual's needs and 
desires. Secondly, the practical nature of each consociation means that they were 
purposefully formed to fulfil a certain role or task and whichever of these tasks could 
not be fulfilled at the initial level, were done so by uniting with other such 
associations. An example of this could be, while the guild may be able to take care of 
the needs of an the individual working members, their social needs would be better 
looked after by a town or a city. In this way, the individual's needs are better served 
by the immediate locality, than they could be by a centralised government. 
A second point in this structure is that the individual is also better able to represent his 
views within the immediate consociations, than he would in a central parliament. 
Instead of individuals electing a representative, who then represents their own 
interpretation of some form of abstract 'general will', the multi-layered system of 
Althusius means that the key decisions are taken at the lowest possible consociation, 
in which all members can actively voice an opinion. As the competences move up the 
structure, they become less and less important to the everyday life of the individual. 
Relocating this discussion to the EU provides an alternative explanation of the 
democratic deficit. In this scenario, the fact that individual citizens do not have a 
direct say in the composition of either the Council or the Commission does not equate 
with a democratic deficit: if the European Union consisted solely of the individual 
member states, which in turn are composite bodies of lower consociations, and there 
was a residual power relationship between each level. However, with the centralised 
nature of the sovereign state, and the inclusion of a direct connection between the 
individual and the European institutions, the EU now displays a curious hybrid of 
several different constitutional styles. 
Chapter Four allowed us to focus on the issue of sovereignty, which, in recent years 
has probably become one of the most debated topics within all disciplines of political 
and international theory. Rather than approaching the subject from the overarching 
question of the relevance of sovereignty to the current multi-national and global 
world, the chapter focused on the confusion that exists in the societas canon 
surrounding sovereignty. This confusion was seen to stem from two key sources; 
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natural evolution, and a failure of political authors to distinguish properly between 
'sovereignty' and 'the right or power of sovereignty'. The first area originates in the 
use of the term by different authors in different epochs. While the topic was first 
thoroughly addressed by Jean Bodin in 1576, the key discussion on the subject 
occurred in Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan in 1651 and these two books alone nicely 
highlight the confusion surrounding the subject. While both authors proposed 'ruler 
sovereignty' - that is, sovereignty in the Prince or the Leviathan - each author not 
only attached different provisos to this ruler sovereignty, but they also approached the 
subject from different angles; Bodin displayed a realistic approach, that is working 
around the political conditions that existed in 1562, while Hobbes' scientific 
background influenced the approach of Leviathan. A second key point of this 
discussion is that neither Bodin nor Hobbes differentiates between sovereignty and 
the power of sovereignty, but both claim it to be absolute, so when subsequent authors 
discussed the subject they bound themselves to the indivisibility and absolute nature 
of sovereignty. 
The key shift in the societas canon occurred with the work of Rousseau and the 
French Revolution. In both, sovereignty transferred from the ruler (i.e. the prince) to 
the people as a collective. The problem here is that although there was a shift in the 
location of sovereignty, the internal framework was not sufficient to realise the task 
fully; that is, how can a collective of unrelated individual citizens, who share no 
common interest or political framework, enact sovereignty? 
The second cause of confusion stemmed from the failure to differentiate between 
sovereignty and the right of sovereignty. For both Bodin and Hobbes, the two were 
not only synonymous, but also indivisible. This has the effect that in modern 
democracies there is a failure to distinguish between the people who are sovereign, 
and their elected representatives who make the political decisions; in the EU, the 
sovereignty discussion is even more of an essentially contested concept. In this 
setting, questions arise as to whether the EU can have sovereignty as it is not a state, 
and what precisely is the relationship between the sovereignty of the member states 
and the EU. Adopting an Althusian view of sovereignty does offer significant 
insights. In Politica, Althusius attributes sovereignty to 'the people', but it can better 
be described as the result of the active relationship between the different layers of 
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consociation. Furthermore, Althusius also differentiates between the jus regni or the 
jus majestatis and the posestas regni, and so while agreeing with Bodin and Hobbes 
as to the indivisibility of sovereignty, Althusius is able to avoid the subsequent 
problems by differentiating between sovereignty's two constituent parts. Sovereignty 
or jus regni is attributed to the people, who then give sufficient amounts of power or 
posestas regni for each consociation to fulfil the task for which it was intended. 
Transferring this back to the EU, then the discussion as to whether the EU can enjoy 
sovereignty or whether or not member state sovereignty is eroded or surrendered 
through membership is irrelevant. Rather, neither the EU nor the member state, can 
enjoy sovereignty, but each one does enjoy the specified amount of power or right of 
sovereignty attributed to it by the sovereign, or the interrelationship between the 
individual consociatios of the EU, which in turn remains indivisible. 
Chapter Five explored the three 'evolutionary stages' stages of federalism as a form 
of political organisation; polyvalent or pre-modem, international and modem statal 
federalism. Similar to the inverse relationship identified between the 'state' and the 
'international organisation' in the Introduction, the rise of the state played an integral 
part in the evolutionary nature of federalism, with the latest stage equating to the 
modem theory of federalism as a means by which to organise internally a politically 
or socially 'fragmented' polity'. The paradoxical aspect of this evolution is that it is 
this final stage of federalism that is routinely applied as a model to describe the 
constitutionalism of the European Union. The resultant outcome of this application is 
a limited understanding of any possible federal model of the EU, as one of the basic 
premises of modem statal federalism is that it occurs in a state, which the EU is not. 
Likewise, for the international federal model, highlighted by the work of authors such 
as Pufendorf, the state is the predominant feature. Indeed, under this evolutionary 
stage, the Empire, which was once described as an association in which the rights of 
sovereignty were exercised by the Emperor and the Ephors, became a league of states, 
as the emphasis shifted largely due to the Treaty of West ph alia, to underlining the role 
of the individual courts in relation to the Emperor. The point of this second stage of 
federal evolution was that sui generic associations that had been adequately described 
for centuries were now re-evaluated in the light of the theoretical dominance of the 
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centralism of both Bodin and Hobbes, and also the signing of the Treaty of 
Westphalia. 
The problem that both final stages offederal evolution fail to surmount is the location 
of the state within constitutional theory, as both evidently centred on the relationships 
of the state. For international federalism, as the name suggests, federalism is a theory 
of association in which different sovereign states can be organised, while for the 
modem statal variant, federalism is a means in which internal state relations and 
structures can be organised. The key feature in both theories is that federalism is 
reduced to a descriptive tool to emphasise state activity, both internal and external. 
Relating this to the understanding of the EU, it is clear that the modem statal federal 
model is only of relevance if the aim of the EU is to become a state. While the answer 
to this question is open to normative interpretation, there is sufficient doubt 
surrounding this idea to consider that this will ever happen. Similarly, international 
federalism, while appearing more relevant to the understanding of the EU than 
modem statal federalism, still suffers from the predominance of certain state-centric 
assumptions. Firstly, federalism is a theory for describing certain aspects of state's 
external activity and secondly, the state is the only form of association that can 
legitimately participate in any form of external relation, as it is the only association in 
which sovereignty is vested. While it is apparent that the EU was founded by 
sovereign states, and so international federalism does have relevance, the increasing 
rise of sub- or non-state actors and the increasing role of the EU law are relevant 
factors, and the theory appears unable either to accommodate or to explain these. 
Despite Althusius not using the term 'federal', this does not disqualify Politica from 
any discussion on the subject, as it is 'federally-orientated' in its entirety. In reality, 
an exploration of Politica highlights the main areas in which the discussion is 
applicable to the EU. In addition to the discussion on 'complete' and 'partial' 
confederations, which was dismissed in Chapter Two, the basic structure of Politica 
serves an essentially federal purpose; but it is also able to advance federal theory in 
the fact that Politica is not bound to justifying state existence or behaviour. There are 
two main reasons why Althusius is able to advance beyond the limitations of 
traditional federal theory: first, this emphasis on the practical nature of federalism as a 
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means of achieving an end, and second the possibility of non-territorial 
representation. 
Traditional federal theory, in this case modem statal federalism, appears to offer a 
theory that allows different 'peoples' to live in the same single state. In this sense, 
federalism becomes a theory of association allowing different people to live in a 
comparable association to the homogenous state. In an Althusian understanding, 
federalism is not a top-down theory of association, but a 'bottom-up', practical 
manner in which individual groups can realise their allotted political and social aims; 
in this way, federalism becomes a 'structural theory of efficiency'. By keeping the 
majority of decisions as close to these groups as possible, subsequent levels merely 
allow the previous groups to realise an aim in a more efficient manner. While the 
supreme magistrate is allotted specific tasks by Althusius, these are limited to those 
areas that are necessary for the universal association as a whole to function, such as 
the monetary system. 
What conclusions can be drawn from the application of this model of federalism to 
the EU? Another way to approach the question is to ask why do the traditional federal 
models fail competently to explain the EU's process of constitutionalisation? The 
main answer to this lies in the two points emphasised above. Firstly, modem statal 
federalism is a top-down theory of constitutionalism that occurs within the confines of 
a state; secondly, representation is based on geography. If it is supposed that the EU 
was created for a specific purpose or purposes and this was not the creation of a state, 
then the initial assumption of modem statal federalism falls down. Likewise, it is 
apparent that although geographical associations, or the member states, do play the 
predominant role in the EU, either through the states or regions, there are non-
geographical groups which also have a vested interested in the EU, such as 
occupational, political or religious groups. From this it becomes increasingly 
apparent that an Althusian structural theory of efficiency is able to consider both the 
practical character of the EU and also the non-geographical nature of many of the 
interested parties. 
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Limitations of the AIthusian Discourse 
Our basic premise, that to understand sui generic constitutionalism what is needed is a 
political theory that is not dependent on the societas canon, could be tackled using 
several different approaches. To pit a minor individual author against an entire 
political canon of reputable authors represents the biggest venture of the entire thesis. 
Political theorists hold the work of Hobbes and Locke in such regard, that to not only 
directly challenge them, but also to dismiss them as representing a regression in 
political thought would necessitate that the 'new' theory to replace this canon be 
extraordinary. Although it is presented in the thesis that Althusius represents such a 
'new' model of constitutionalism, one way in which this claim may be reinforced or 
consolidated is to link Althusius' work to comparable authors or political systems. 
The most evident way in which this could be tackled is to elaborate upon Althusius' 
work by locating him in a specific political canon. While Chapter One identified the 
influences on and the influence of Althusius' work on subsequent authors, this was 
the extent to which this line of argument was pressed. If this argument were furthered 
it could represent a comparison between the societas canon and an Althusian canon, 
which could contain the likes of Grotius, Leibniz and Proudhon. While this canon v. 
canon view appears to be methodologically stronger and less bold than the one 
adopted in the thesis, it also raises its own set of questions. How are the two canons 
to be compared? Are specific authors to be identified as directly comparable, such as 
Althusius v. Hobbes, or is the comparison topic based, such as comparing authors who 
wrote on sovereignty? But the most fundamental question that needs to be asked, is 
how would this canon v. canon approach improve our understanding of Althusius as a 
tool for understanding sui generic constitutionalism? 
A second way in which Althusius' work could be strengthened is by relating 
Althusius' work to a broader discussion such as the recent analysis of the liberal v. 
communitarian debate (i.e. Frankel Paul, Miller, & Paul 1996, Delaney 1994), as this 
would offer a more secure grounding in which to locate the two opposing schools of 
thought. While the liberal camp contained authors with direct links to the societas 
canon, namely Michael Oakeshott's connection to Thomas Hobbes (Oakeshott 
I 975c), this is not true of the communitarian camp. In addition to this lack ofa direct 
link, although the communitarian camp and Althusius share similarities, could they be 
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viewed as representing the same theoretical views, given that the main antagonists in 
the communitarian no longer argue for the communitarian cause? 
A third approach could be to explore Politica's connection to the functionalism of 
David Mitrany (1888-1975); namely, in what respect could Althusius be seen as a 
early exponent of functionalism? Whilst it is evident that Mitrany's work displayed 
several Althusian characteristics, such as the promotion of the "common good", as 
opposed to the elimination of national security and the prevention of war 
(ClaudeI965: 344); or that the appropriate administrative unit for any given function 
varies with the size of the problem (Ibid: 348), and that functionalism has been 
described as 'offering a distinct alternative to normal ways of thinking about a post-
Westphalian international order' (Rosamond 2000: 39), this line of investigation alters 
the fundamental aim of the thesis, which was to offer an understanding of sui generic 
constitutionalism. Instead, an investigation of this sort shifts the focus away from 
using Althusius as a tool for understanding, and moves it towards an in-depth 
theoretical discussion of Althusius' theory of association in relation to that of 
Mitrany, but this could be the basis offurther research into Althusius' political theory. 
A fourth way in which Althusius' argument could be bolstered is to develop the 
exploration into the practical examples where Althusius was applied. In Chapter One, 
Titoist Yugoslavia was offered as the sole example of constitutionalism in which 
ideas from Politica were practically applied. While this practical interpretation is 
possible, on a methodological note any attempt to explore a practical 
constitutionalism must take into consideration significant external factors that can 
neither be controlled nor discounted. A final note of caution that must be added to 
this list is that it is also impossible to 'prove' that Althusius did or did not serve the 
intended purpose for which the Yugoslavs used them. 
Rather than specifically bolstering the basis of the Althusian discussion with further 
theoretical or practical examples, an alternative approach that could be adopted is to 
supplement Politica with comparable constitutional models, and the specific example 
that could be cited here is the Iroquois Confederation (see for instance Lutz 1998, 
White 2000, Druke Becker 1998). In this way, the central claim that Politica offers a 
better constitutional theory for the understanding of sui generic constitutionalism 
remains, but it is supplemented by a parallel investigation into the Iroquois 
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constitutionalism. The reason why the Iroquois is cited in this example is that if the 
Holy Roman Empire is taken as being influential for Althusius, then the Empire and 
the Iroquois share many similarities not only with regards to constitutional structure, 
but also in the fact that both examples as workable models of constitutionalism were 
effectively ended through the involvement of states in their affairs; for the Empire, the 
Treaty of West ph alia and for the Iroquois, the American War of independence. 
We have argued that Althusian constitutional theory displays a high degree of 
competency in accommodating and explaining the issues that appear to blight the 
constitutionalisation of the sui generic EU. Adopting an Althusian approach to the 
key issues explored in the chapters highlights that, despite its age, Politica still holds 
relevance to modem issues. Reading the closing remarks of Althusius, this 
conclusion should come as no surprise: 
For although political art is general, it always and everywhere agrees with and 
can be accommodated to every particular and special place, time, and people. 
This is so even though various and separate realms often use laws of their own 
differing from those of others in some matters (Politica: 208). 
While the thesis does not promote either the removal of the state from the EU, or the 
creation of an EU Empire based on the Holy Roman Empire, it does argue for an 
alternative understanding of sui generic constitutionalism that allots a different degree 
of significance, importance and power to the different consociatios evident in sui 
generic constitutionalism. In relation to the EU, this would require increased roles for 
the different Regions within the Member States and occupational or political groups, 
in order to enable these groups to act as a more appropriate arena for specific issues 
and needs to be addressed. In order for these groups to be effective, this 
'Althusianised' approach would also need to redress the power relationships within 
the EU, with the individual collectives entertaining sovereignty, with each subsequent 
level of association being sufficient right of sovereignty to fulfil the purpose for 
which it was created. Under the redistribution, issues such as subsidiarity or 
consociationalism, which have been so contentious or impotent in the current EU, 
would be allowed to naturally develop in the confines of the constitutional system. 
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As this conclusion is drawn from the theoretical potential of Althusius' work, the 
limitations placed on its applicability are set only by the normative interpretation of 
the author. Yet, as with all modern studies using historical material as a tool, a 
significant amount of empathy is required to fully utilise the potential of Politica; 
thus: 
Every system is a mosaic of elements taken from other systems. And yet, it is 
a great mistake to believe that an idea is necessarily the same when passing 
from one system to another. Quite apart from the pure misunderstanding, 
which is so important a factor in the growth of ideas, general concepts gain or 
lose in significance according to the place which they occupy in different 
systems. Besides, words abound in meanings. The systematic problem is 
largely that of developing the implications and limitations of certain general 
concepts by considering such concepts in ever new relations to the world of 
concrete data as well as to each other. The careful and exact thinker, fully 
conscious of the multiplicity of meanings of which each word is capable, 
wages a never ending battle against this slippery, soft, evasive, medium 
(Friedrich 1932: xlii. Emphasis mine). 
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